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The goal of this thesis was to validate journalist Rick Perlstein‟s assertion in Nixonland: 
The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (2008) that the foundational 
dialectic of the 1960s “has not yet ended.” With Nixon as the principal cultural architect 
of modern American political discourse, Perlstein defined Nixonland as “the America 
where two separate and irreconcilable sets of apocalyptic fears coexist in the minds of 
two separate and irreconcilable groups of Americans.” Perlstein‟s grand narrative for the 
inherited socio-political landscape of the 1960s has conceptually synthesized the nature 
of the “culture wars” of the 1960s based on Nixon‟s imposed hegemonic framework for 
political discourse through the theatre of television. The central argument of this thesis is 
shaped by the dialogue in the historiography in that Richard Nixon and Barack Obama 
appear to be “bookend presidents” of the limits of the modern American kulturkampf- the 
ongoing conflict between religious and secular elements in American society. While 
Nixon confined political discourse within the hegemonic framework of the images and 
rhetoric of modern American conservatism imbibed in the 1960s, Obama expanded the 
limits of political discourse through the motives and motifs of New Left rationalism 
established in the 1960s. Within this interpretative framework, this thesis illustrates the 
foundational dynamic of campaigning and governance within modern American political 
discourse by demonstrating how presidential elections are structured according to the 
Republican style of conservative “populist aggression” against the liberal Democratic 
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While modern American conservatism first entered political discourse through the rhetorical 
theatrics of the 1964 Republican National Convention, American postwar liberalism visibly witnessed its 
decline on television during the 1968 presidential election, isolating the New Left, and making it 
“blindingly clear that New Left universalism was fragile from the outset, that the category of citizen, or 
even human being, had long felt like a weightless abstraction.”
1
 The 2008 Presidential election 
inaugurated the interjection of New Left rationalism , or liberal constructivism, into the modern American 
political discourse of conservative “populist aggression” since 1968 based on Barack Obama‟s New Left 
cult of personality mass movement. Journalist Rick Perlstein‟s Nixonland: The Rise of a President and 
the Fracturing of America (2008) has provided a definitive and illuminating piece to the puzzle of modern 
American culture by illustrating the formation of the socio-political dialectic for America‟s modern 
political economy, with Nixon as the populist personification of modern American conservatism. 
Perlstein‟s grand narrative for the inherited socio-political landscape of the 1960s has conceptually 
synthesized the nature of the “culture wars” of the 1960s based on Nixon‟s imposed hegemonic 
framework for political discourse through the theatre of television. With Nixon as the principal cultural 
architect of modern American political discourse, Perlstein defined Nixonland as “the America where two 
separate and irreconcilable sets of apocalyptic fears coexist in the minds of two separate and 
irreconcilable groups of Americans.”
2
 This thesis will illustrate Perlstein‟s narrative for the 
institutionalization of Nixonland in the 1968 presidential election by demonstrating Nixon‟s inauguration 
of the “populist communication” of modern American conservatism, found in the duality and polarization 
                                                 
1
 Todd Gitlin, The Twilight of Common Dreams (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1995), 100. 
 The New Left student movement, or antiwar movement, including civil rights hero Martin Luther King Jr. and 
liberals such as Eugene McCarthy and Robert F. Kennedy Jr., was imbibed in the late 1960s in opposition to liberal 
paternalism and imperialism. While liberals believed in the power of the vote to give a voice to individualism, New 
Leftists promoted the rational extension of New Deal liberalism for the empowerment of the disenfranchised as the 
principal means to reform society. 
2
 Rick Perlstein, Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (New York: Scribner, 2008), 46. 
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of Nixon‟s cultural images of conservative “Cold War Manichaeism”
3
 and liberal, or moderate, 
paternalism (conservatism). 
The postwar “generation gap” in modern American culture - institutionalized within modern 
American political discourse during the 1968 presidential election - became inverted during the 2008 
presidential election, marking a significant change in American political history. New Left sociologist 
Todd Gitlin identified the “generation gap” as a contest in which “the young insisted that their life 
situation was unprecedented (and therefore they had no one to follow); the older, that they did understand, 
so well, and with so many years‟ advantage, that they knew better (and therefore they should be 
followed).”
4
 While Nixon‟s personification of the alienated paternal majority enabled him to win the 1968 
presidential election, Barack Obama‟s embodiment of the alienated liberal majority enabled him to win 
the 2008 presidential election. Time‟s “Man and Woman of the Year” in 1967 were the forgotten middle-
Americans who Nixon consciously personified during the 1968 Presidential election. Nixon became 
Time‟s and popular culture‟s “Man of the Year” in 1971 and 1972, resentfully sharing the honor the 
second time with his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. In 2008, Time‟s “Person of the Year”
5
 
symbolized the remaining forgotten Americans - or what Senator Hillary Clinton attempted to rhetorically 
appropriate as “invisible Americans”
6
 - Barack Obama. While the Nixon presidency was the first time a 
president was met by organized opposition during his inauguration, the Bush II presidency was the first 
time a president was met by organized opposition during his inauguration and spontaneous opposition 
outside of the White House Gates the night the new President-elect won the election. The 2008 American 
presidential election symbolized the liberal democratic appropriation of the conservative movement‟s 
hegemony over American political discourse since 1968. The election personified the generational culture 
war of the conservative postwar generation and the liberal baby-boomer generation, between the “old” 
and “new” politics; the younger generation‟s black liberal Democrat against the older generation‟s white 
                                                 
3
 Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1987), 339. 
4
 Ibid., 19. 
5
 Time, January 5, 1968, pg. 10-17, “Man and Woman of the Year: The Middle Americans”; Time, “Person of the 
Year”, December 29, 2008, 38-51. 
6
 New Hampshire Democratic Primary Acceptance Speech, January 8, 2008. 
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liberal Republican who still had to publicly play by the party‟s old rules; a minority individual who 
opposed America‟s new international conflagration against a POW patriot from the country‟s old 
international conflagration. 
The historic nature of the 2008 Presidential election presents visible allusions to the foundational 
socio-political dynamic of modern American culture imbibed in the 1960s. While the social effects or 
cultural resonance of the 1960s appear inescapable within modern American culture, there is not yet a 
consensus of the socio-political inheritance of the 1960s. This thesis contends that Nixon‟s politicization 
of the medium of television during the 1968 presidential election inaugurated America‟s modern political 
discourse founded on a McLuhan culture, with Reagan inaugurating the postmodern presidency  within 
Nixon‟s paradigm of the “culture wars” of the 1960s: Nixonland. The aggregate media realities of 
Nixonland are premised upon Nixon‟s emulation of JFK‟s inauguration of America‟s modern basis of 
socio-political mobilization of the American electorate - “populist communication” - involving the 
marketing of substantive populist issues on television and in print through images and rhetoric. Nixon‟s 
instigation of the American public‟s increased consciousness of the media realities of modern politics was 
identified by cultural and academic commentary as the visible intensification of FDR‟s modern 
presidency, with the Nixon presidency inaugurating the “imperial presidency”, comprised of a 
McLuhanesque ode to empire based on the media‟s inability to identify Nixon‟s media strategy for his 
political image without appearing partisan. Nixon‟s politicization of television infiltrated American 
political discourse with a McLuhan culture, wherein the image projected over the television screen is 
more important than the content of the message itself. Reagan subsequently institutionalized Nixon‟s 
inaugural McLuhan culture during the 1980s, inaugurating the postmodern presidency by using the 
presidential television image as the principal medium through which to aggregate public support for his 
                                                 
 In The Post-Modern Presidency: The Office after Ronald Reagan (1988) Professor Ryan Barilleaux argued that the 
postmodern presidency, created through a series of events and trends that culminated in the Watergate story and the 
end of the Vietnam War, is post-modern in nature because it is not an extension of FDR into the future, “but has 
been transformed into something substantively different.” Barilleaux believed the postmodern presidency 
represented Reagan‟s personification of a conservative ideology that was substantively different from FDR‟s 
personification of the modern presidency. Barilleaux contended, “Post-modern presidents not only use public 
politics to govern, but also realize that the entire public face of the presidency affects their ability to do so.” 
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ideological agenda. In Tear Down This Myth: How the Reagan Legacy Has Distorted Our Politics and 
Haunts Our Future (2009), Professor Will Bunch observed that Reagan “used television more often and 
better than any president who came before him and delivered more prime-time speeches- yet held far 
fewer formal press conferences than other chief executives, at least until George W. Bush aggressively 
mimicked the Reagan model.”
8
 
Ronald Reagan inaugurated the postmodern presidency by reversing FDR‟s portraits of “us” and 
“them” among the younger generation and institutionalizing the Republican Party as the political party of 
the “people”, representing small government and family values, with the liberal Democratic Party 
representing the protested failure of New Deal federalism. During the first of the three presidential 
debates on September 27, 2008, liberal Republican Senator John McCain asserted his identity as a 
“Reagan foot soldier”
9
 of the 1980s in his attempt to consolidate the status quo of modern American 
political discourse: “We Republicans came to Washington to change government and government 
changed us.”
10
 With similar intentions, Senator Obama responded to a comparison of him and Ronald 
Reagan for the Reno-Gazette Journal editorial board on camera on January 14 by acknowledging the 
inescapable popular consciousness in the “age of Reagan”, identified by professor Sean Wilentz (2008) as 
encompassing American political culture since 1974: 
I don‟t want to present myself as some kind of  
singular figure. I think part of what‟s different is 
the times. I do think that, for example, the 1980  
election was different. I think that Ronald Reagan  
changed the trajectory of America, in a way that  
Richard Nixon did not, and in a way Bill Clinton  
did not. He put us on a fundamentally different path  
because the country was ready for it. I think that  
they felt like, with all the excesses of the 60s and  
70s, and government had grown and grown, but  
there wasn‟t much sense of accountability in terms  
of how it‟s operating. I think he tapped into what  
everyone was feeling. We want clarity. We want  
optimism. We want a return to that sense of dynamism  
                                                 
8
 Will Bunch, Tear Down This Myth: How the Reagan Legacy Has Distorted Our Politics and Haunts Our Future 
(New York: Free Press, 2009), 27. 
9
 Ibid., 206. 
10
 YouTube.com, “First 2008 Presidential Debate (Full Video)”, posted on September 27, 2008. 
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Following liberal Democratic criticism, Senator Obama and his aides quickly clarified they were 
commenting on “Reagan‟s skill in connecting with the public and not his actual policies.”
12
 Thus, Obama 
was praising Reagan‟s style, not Reagan‟s substance. Bunch observed, “And so it seemed possible in 
2008 that American voters might really have a clear choice, between a candidate who wanted to return the 
nation to an idealized and even partly fictionalized version of the 1980s, and one who would bring the 
country into the new millennium with policies that were not nostalgia-based.”
13
 
The postmodern presidency in the television age - with the supremacy of image over substance - 
institutionalized the principal cultural importance of relatability over substantive content for the 
presidential image. Reaganism represented an ideological revolution insofar as Reagan read the zeitgeist 
of the stagflation of the 1970s similar to the way FDR read the zeitgeist of the Great Depression: by 
articulating a genuine set of values that were congruent with the circumstances. Professor John Kenneth 
White observed in The New Politics of Old Values (1990): “As time passed Franklin Roosevelt and 
Ronald Reagan appeared to be “bookend presidents”: one expanded and the other confined the limits of 
the federal government.”
14
 In a similar parallel, Richard Nixon and Barack Obama appear to be “bookend 
presidents” of the limits of the modern American kulturkampf- the ongoing conflict between religious and 
secular elements in American society. While Nixon confined political discourse within the hegemonic 
framework of the images and rhetoric of modern American conservatism imbibed in the 1960s, Obama 
expanded the limits of political discourse through the motives and motifs of New Left rationalism 
established in the 1960s. While New Left populism of the 1960s was predicated upon protesting more 
                                                 
11
 YouTube.com, “Obama‟s Transparent Government”, posted on January 17, 2008. 
12
 Bunch, 207. 
13
 Ibid., 206. 
14
 John Kenneth White, The New Politics of Old Values (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 
1990), 132-33; While Reagan confined American federalism within public discourse through his rhetoric of small 
government, he enlarged the size of the federal government. This fundamental disjuncture between rhetoric and 
action speaks to the principal contradiction of the postmodern presidency of sight and sound. 
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than politics, New Right populism “was intensely political, focused on winning power by packaging new 
ideas for policy and feeding off the resentment of what Richard Nixon had called the “silent majority.””
15
 
 Before Senator Robert Kennedy‟s campaign of New Leftist rationalism (or realism) – insofar as 
he adopted the language and style of the movement - was silenced on June 4, 1968, the Kennedy 
campaign attempted to counteract the activist conservative ideology of Cold War Manichaeism with the 
liberal rhetoric of New Left realism. The Kennedy campaign‟s rhetoric of New Left rationalism was 
premised upon combating the pervading liberal culture motives and motif of ethnic militancy at the end of 
the decade by offering a moderate cultural alternative. Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. rationally 
outlined his dissenting argument against the Vietnam War within messianic language by identifying that 
absolutist perceptions of his position as an antipatriotic enemy of the United States, equating dissent with 
disloyalty, was actually dissenting from the “wisdom of our traditions.” King identified that the mirror 
domestic struggle of black nationalism to the national struggle in Vietnam was unified in the perversion 
of American values. Senator Kennedy appeared before a mostly black audience during a scheduled rally 
the night of April 4, 1968 in Indianapolis, Indiana, informing his audience of the assassination of Martin 
Luther King, Jr. and exhorting them to refrain from conceding to their desire for revenge, only to result 
“in greater polarization.” Senator Kennedy demonstrated his empathy with his African-American 
audience by identifying that a white man also killed his brother. The next day he spoke to the City Club of 
Cleveland in Ohio, exhorting his audience of the necessity to heal the whole of America in order to cure 
the sickness: 
We learn at the last to look at our brothers as alien. Alien men 
with whom we share a city but not a community. Men bound  
to us in common dwelling but not in a common effort. We learn  
to share only a common fear. Only a common desire to retreat  




                                                 
15
 Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (New York: HarperCollins Publisher, 2008), 85. 
16
 YouTube.com, “Mindless Menace of Violence”, posted on April 20, 2008 (Robert F. Kennedy‟s “Mindless 
Menace of Violence” speech, April 5, 1968). 
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President Reagan‟s era of reconciliation addressed this alienated sentiment among the public that 
intensified during the 1980s with the renewed threat of nuclear war, suggesting the only unifying answer 
to the United States and the Soviet Union‟s ideological nuclear war of attrition rested outside of humanity 
and this planet through an alien presence. Reagan first identified this abstract basis of unity on December 
5, 1985 at Fallston High School in Fallston, Maryland; next, in front of the United Nations in New York 
on September 21, 1987; then, during a question and answer session with members of the National 
Strategy Forum in Chicago, Illinois on May 4, 1988.
17
 Thus, in contrast to Senator Kennedy‟s attempt to 
bridge the gap of this alien sentiment between Democrats and Republicans, Reagan further annulled the 
concept of universalism in public discourse. On the night Senator Robert Kennedy was killed he thanked 
the black community for their efforts in his campaign at the beginning of his acceptance speech, rejecting 
the politics of division and embracing the popular sentiment for change through unity as an American 
rather than simply as a member of a political party.
18
 
The visible liberal paternalism of the Democratic Party by the end of the 1960s, expressed 
through the ideology of “Cold War Manichaeism” (“us against “them”), converged with the radicalization 
of the Civil Rights Movement to centralize American political discourse, consolidating the status quo 
through Richard Nixon‟s moderate Republican paternalism (conservatism). Within the context of the 
Humphrey-Nixon presidential contest of 1968, Gitlin reminisced during the Reagan presidency of his 
participation in New Left activism during the 1960s: “To the campaign‟s end the vice president 
[Humphrey] was imprisoned by a Cold War Manichaeism that viewed every contraction of the American 
sphere of influence as a triumph of evil, every extension of American power, at whatever cost, as an 
unadulterated good.”
19
 As a result, the inherent dynamism of American culture became constrained within 
Nixon‟s static perception of the “other” in his ideological worldview of Cold War Manichaeism and his 
inauguration of the modern basis of news management in order to regulate his cultural identification of 
the adversarial liberal press corps. Within this modern paradigm of political theatre in the “television 
                                                 
17
 Wilentz, 138, 261-262. 
18
 California Democratic Primary Acceptance Speech, June 4, 1968. 
19
 Gitlin, The Sixties, 339. 
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age”, visible confrontation between politicians and the press corps has eclipsed the substantive content of 
the politician‟s discourse, or “talking point”, with the recognition of the adversarial dynamic between the 
politician and the reporter. 
Professor David Greenberg confined this dynamic to the interaction between the president and the 
media in Nixon’s Shadow: The History of an Image (2003). Greenberg inaugurated the historiography on 
Nixon‟s cultural image(s) as the interpretive vehicle for modern American culture during the Bush II 
presidency based on Nixon‟s intensification of the “hyperaware[ness] of the construction and 
manipulation of images in politics.”
20
 Greenberg‟s interpretive framework was rooted in Daniel 
Boorstin‟s seminal analysis of the apparatuses of advertising and public relations in the rise of mass 
media in The Image, Or What Happened to the American Dream (1961). Greenberg identified this work 
as the origins for how “celebrities replaced heroes, credibility superseded truth, invention eclipsed 
discovery, and personality was vaunted over character.”
21
 Professor Matthew Dallek argued that the 
Hollywood actor Ronald Reagan obtained his political credibility during the 1966 California 
gubernatorial election due to his opponent‟s misplaced negative campaigning against his character as an 
actor; the only time Reagan lost his composure during the campaign was during his March 6 town hall 
style debate with the liberal black Republican candidate George Christopher when Reagan was provoked 
to defend his personal integrity against implications of racism. By 2008, the celebrity of the black 
Kennedyesque New Left Senator Barack Obama eclipsed the culturally identified heroic patriotism of 
POW Vietnam veteran liberal Republican John McCain, whose patriotic biography during the 2008 
Republican National Convention was delivered by the former Republican Senator from NBC’s award-
winning television show Law and Order, Fred Thompson. 
Greenberg emphasized the Boorstinian landscape of images dominating American culture over 
the explicit influence of Marshall McLuhan‟s interpretation of the effects of the mass media on popular 
culture (“the medium is the message”) in Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (1964). Perlstein 
                                                 
20
 David Greenberg, Nixon’s Shadow: The History of an Image (New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2003), xii. 
21
 Ibid., xix. 
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subsumed Greenberg‟s Boorstinian landscape for tracing the development of Nixon‟s image(s) in 
American culture within McLuhanism due to his perception of the causal paradigm shift in American 
culture. This shift was based on the exegesis of the Kennedy-Nixon television debates and Nixon‟s 
inaugural politicization of television during the 1968 Presidential election. While the centrality of Nixon‟s 
image(s) inescapably predominate modern American culture and consciousness, the inescapable medium 
that informs Americans of the war of images is television. Therefore, this thesis extends Greenberg‟s 
seminal interpretation of Nixon as the nucleus of modern American culture by illustrating Perlstein‟s 
adversarial dynamic of Nixonland as the encompassing interpretative framework for modern American 
culture. 
But President Reagan‟s cultural image remains at the center of modern American culture and 
consciousness. Similar to Nixon, Professor Sean Wilentz identified that “Reagan was also a polarizing 
figure - a divider, not a uniter - beloved by Republicans but despised by Democrats.”
22
 Nixon and Reagan 
both projected a polarizing image due to the absolutism of their identities. The superimposition of 
Nixon‟s cultural images - or the multiplicity of Nixon‟s image due to its premise of evoking emotion - has 
caused American revisionist historiography to perpetually contextualize President Nixon‟s image within 
the developing cultural identification of the Nixon presidency. The difficulty with this basis of cultural 
and psychoanalytical history is that Nixon constructed the cultural framework of news management 
within the system of “populist communication” that rehabilitated his image. Nixon‟s form of news 
management - based on a system of professional rewards and incentives through patronage - was 
perpetuated by the visible adversarial culture confirmed by the Watergate story. 
While the McLuhan culture of the “television age” quickly became as redundant as the age itself, 
the basis of campaigning and governance for Reaganism was an explicit emulation of Nixon‟s 
politicization of television to control his political image and Nixon‟s form of news management. 
Reagan‟s chief public relations strategist, Michael K. Deaver, identified the redundancy of the television 
age and the confidence of his candidate‟s hegemony over political discourse at the beginning of the 1984 
                                                 
22
 Wilentz, 278. 
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election year in The National Journal: “Television elects Presidents.”
23
 The visible centrality and clarity 
of Reagan‟s cultural image within the history of American political theatre has caused cultural and 
academic commentary to perceive Reagan‟s cultural rise during the 1960s and the institutionalization of 
conservative political culture during the 1980s as eclipsing Nixon‟s formation of the cultural framework 
during the 1960s which enabled Reagan‟s presidency. 
 In The Right Moment: Ronald Reagan’s First Victory and the Decisive Turning Point in 
American Politics (2000), Professor Matthew Dallek conceptualized Reagan‟s 1966 gubernatorial victory 
in California within the paradigm shift of American federalism, with the election inaugurating the 
“Reagan Revolution.” Dallek argued that the California election most aptly personified the first 
generational confrontation on television between the instinctual civil libertarianism of Governor Pat 
Brown and the socially conservative messianic philosophy of Ronald Reagan. Dallek‟s narrative 
effectively captured Nixon‟s observation that culture forms consciousness by illustrating how both 
individuals defected from their opponent‟s political philosophy in the context of their recognition of the 
new socio-political realities of the culture of New Deal politics in 1934 and the Cold War political culture 
in 1947. However, the fundamental disjuncture between Dallek‟s narrative for the origins of modern 
American culture and the Reagan presidency is found in the fact that the Reagan campaign of 1980 was 
causally shaped by the adversarial cultural paradigm shift of the Nixon presidency. Although Reagan first 
identified “a conspiracy in the Eastern liberal press” during his GOP primary speech at the Biltmore Hotel 
for the 1964 Goldwater campaign
24
, Nixon nationalized this cultural perception associated with a liberal 
press corps. While the Goldwater campaign of 1964 polarized political discourse, causing conservative 
candidates such as Reagan and Nixon to project visibly moderate political images, the California 
gubernatorial contest of 1966 served as a microcosm for the nationalization of the recently centralized 
Republican strategy for campaigning; the inauguration of the present Republican Party policies on 
campaigning during the 1964 presidential election will be discussed in chapter two. Although Reagan‟s 
                                                 
23
 The National Journal, January 29, 1984, pg. 34. 
24
 Matthew Dallek, The Right Moment: Ronald Reagan’s First Victory and the Decisive Turning Point in American 
Politics (New York: The Free Press, 2000), 65. 
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political credibility gained by the 1966 election provides a visible representation of the American 
electorate‟s shift to the right, Reagan‟s state-strategy was within the central framework of the Republican 
Party‟s modern basis of campaigning; in fact, Reagan relied on the new Eleventh Commandment (“Thou 
Shall Not Speak Ill of Any Republican”), enabling him to avoid public criticism from moderate 
Republicans and later to identify his party as the “big tent” political party during his presidential era of 
reconciliation. Reagan‟s cultural identity as a celebrity and a politician provides the centripetal image of 
modern American conservatism; however, this media strategy for modern political discourse was 
inaugurated by Richard Nixon. 
 Following 9/11, popular Hollywood action star Arnold Schwarzenegger‟s most recent film, 
Collateral Damage, was delayed from release based on its content, involving the story of a firefighter 
who watches his family die in a terrorist explosion and avenges their death by killing the Middle Eastern 
terrorists. Equipped with his historical action movie persona and his recent personification of America‟s 
heroic fight against terrorism, Schwarzenegger led a recall election as a conservative Republican anti-
politician against the liberal Democratic Governor of California, Gray Davis. The Schwarzenegger 
campaign invoked the Republican Party‟s rhetoric and motif of small government imbibed in the 1960s 
through the dialogue of his popular action movie The Terminator (1989), asserting that the “tax-and-
spend” liberal Democrat Gray Davis “has terminated jobs, he has terminated dreams. Gray Davis has 
terminated opportunity and now it‟s time to terminate Gray Davis.” Schwarzenegger claimed he was an 
“optimistic person”, leading the “fight of the people against the politicians” in order to reclaim the 
government for the people. After winning the election, Governor Schwarzenegger enthusiastically 
endorsed President George W. Bush two years later during the Republican National Convention by 
recounting watching the Humphrey-Nixon debates in which Humphrey sounded like a socialist from back 
home in Austria while listening to Nixon speak sounded “more like a breath of fresh air.” 
Schwarzenegger identified this event in political theatre as the moment in which he found his 
political identity: “Then I am a Republican too.” During the convention Governor Schwarzenegger 
appeared on camera behind the podium amidst thunderous applause, telling his audience that being on 
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stage felt like wining an Oscar: “And speaking of acting, one of my movies was called True Lies. And 
that‟s what the Democrats should have called their convention.” Following Schwarzenegger‟s emphasis 
within his first two anecdotes of his ill-thought reputation as an actor, he reminisced about his childhood 
in the shadow of the Soviet Union in Austria, his immigration to the United States, and his triumphant 
personification of the American dream. Schwarzenegger then informed his fellow immigrants and 
Americans how they knew whether they were Republican: 
If you believe that government should be accountable to  
the people, not the people to the government, then you are a  
Republican. If you believe that a person should be treated  
as an individual, not as a member of an interest group, then  
you are a Republican. If you believe that your family knows  
how to spend your money better than the government can then 
you are a Republican. If you believe that this country, not the 
United Nations, is the best hope for democracy then you are  
Republican. And ladies and gentlemen, if you believe that you  





Governor Schwarzenegger, like Governor Reagan, campaigned in the spirit of the populist aggression of 
Goldwater conservatism. Hence, the California gubernatorial election of Ronald Reagan in 1966 was as 
much the culmination of a societal shift as was the 2004 Illinois Senatorial election of Barack Obama. It 
was merely the event during which each candidate earned their political credibility; in 1966, Reagan‟s 
campaign represented the western inauguration of the Republican Party‟s national strategy for what came 
to be known after 1976 as the New Right restoration of America‟s archetypal spirit of the past. 
 While Dallek identified the paradigm shift in American political culture originating prior to the 
Nixon presidency, in The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (2008), Professor Sean Wilentz identified 
the formation of the conservative apotheosis during the Ford administration as the visible disjuncture 
between the New Deal Era and the inauguration of the Reagan Era. Wilentz argued that “conservatives in 
the age of Reagan learned how to seize and keep control of the terms of public debate.”
26
  They achieved 
this control by displacing the New Left counterculture‟s vision for the future with the New Right‟s 
                                                 
25
 YouTube.com, “Arnold Schwarzenegger Speech”, posted on March 31, 2008. 
26
 Wilentz, 8. 
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restoration of America‟s original spirit of the past.
27
 Although Time asserted the “Overturning of the 
Reagan Era” in August 1993 with an upside-down picture of Reagan on the cover, this perception was 
reversed three days prior to the midterm referendum on the Republican‟s “Contract with America” with 
Reagan‟s public disclosure of his Alzheimer‟s disease, and his journey into the sunset of his life amidst 
America‟s bright dawn.
28
 The chief domestic legacy of the “age of Reagan” was the regressive tax cuts 
redistributed to the upper classes, precluding the introduction of liberal social programs and exerting 
pressure on the existing system of social programs
29
; the fundamental changes to America‟s constitutional 
order through the politicization of the federal judiciary process; and, the “unitary executive theory of 
presidential power”
30
, derived from “Nixonism.” As Wilentz observed, “Instead of what now looked like 
a golden age of middle-class prosperity of the 1950s, the so-called Reagan boom brought inequalities of 
living standards reminiscent of the nineteenth-century robber barons‟ gilded age.”
31
 Wilentz argued that 
“by formally endorsing the evangelical conservative cause and cultivating its political support, Reagan 
brought into the Republican Party, especially at the state and local level, large cadres of indefatigable 
culture warriors who would battle hard for the party‟s soul and the nation‟s.”
32
 Wilentz illustrated the 
disintegration of the gilded age of the neoconservative Republican Party into its constituent elements 
during the 2008 presidential election as reminiscent of the liberal Democratic Party during the 1980 
presidential election, interpreting George W. Bush‟s messianic “war on terror” as the radicalization of 
Reagan‟s Cold War Manichaeism. 
The fundamental disjuncture between the “age of Nixon” - identified by New York Times 
columnist Anthony Lewis as encompassing postwar American history up to his resignation
33
 - and the 
“age of Reagan” appears to rest in professors Rowland Evans and Robert Novak‟s original observation in 
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The Reagan Revolution (1981). The authors argued that the Nixon presidency consolidated the status quo 
of FDR‟s modern presidency through Nixon‟s conservative “rhetoric of hyperbole” and his liberal 
policies, intimating Reagan‟s inauguration of the postmodern presidency through the balance of 
“moderate language” (strategically mixed with conservative “rhetoric of hyperbole”) and conservative 
policy action committees to undo the institutional consensus of the modern presidency.
34
 The common 
foundation of the opposing political images of Nixon and Reagan rests in their expedient personifications 
of the socio-political context. Both politicians knew they were selling images, only Reagan believed in his 
image. Based on the cultural framework for political discourse that Nixon imposed, the American public 
interpreted Watergate and any subsequent presidential scandal as a cultural reflection of partisanship 
rather than the cultural delegitimization of the presidency. Wilentz pinpointed ways in which Clinton‟s 
use of the presidential image imitated Nixon‟s foreign policy strategy of “triangulation.” This involved 




While Wilentz provided a chronicle of American political history since 1974, this thesis 
chronicles the cultural extension of the “age of Nixon” into Wilentz‟s “age of Reagan” through the 
development and interpenetration of Nixon and Reagan‟s cultural image(s). Wilentz identified the 
rhetorical and ideological inheritance of Reaganism within the governance of George W. Bush‟s 
presidency but he did not identify the explicit use of Nixon‟s presidential image over Reagan‟s during 
President Bush‟s reelection campaign. During the 2004 American presidential election, the cultural 
perception of the Vietnam War was understood as a “noble cause” within the consciousness of the “age of 
Reagan” but this cultural perception was contextualized within the institutionalization of Nixonland 
during the 1968 presidential election. Wilentz testified to the authoritative force of the “age of Reagan” 
and modern American conservatism in its ideological recovery from the “age of Nixon”; however, the 
adversarial dynamic between the presidency and the press corps - institutionalized in the “age of Nixon” - 
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dialogically produced Reaganism based on Nixon‟s dogmatic framework of opposition (“us” against 
“them”), which Carter and Reagan appropriated through the image of the anti-politician. The “age of 
Nixon” institutionalized the American Cold War cultural revolution in the 1968 presidential election 
while the “age of Reagan” institutionalized the modern American revolution through Nixon‟s strategy of 
news management to regulate his liberal opposition. Both of these revolutions were televised. 
This thesis analyzes Nixon‟s inauguration of “populist communication” through a dialogue of the 
developing cultural and academic perceptions within America‟s modern political discourse of Cold War 
Manichaeism. In Rebels All! A Short History of the Conservative Mind in Postwar America (2008), 
Professor Kevin Mattson replaced what he identified as the cultural trend to label “the postwar 
conservative mind” as this thesis identifies populist conservative discourse in his analysis of the 
confrontational nature of the modern American political system.
36
 Mattson identified the contrasts and 
similarities between the intellectual architect of the modern conservative movement, William F. Buckley, 
Jr., and the present cultural representation of an extreme conservative pundit, Ann Coulter, as indicative 
of how American conservatism evolved from Buckley‟s substantive rebelliousness of Edmund Burke‟s 
“politics of reality” to a “style” based strictly upon populist appeal to the political and popular culture of 
entertainment,
37
 where Coulter‟s “extreme stance and performative style constitute her intellectual 
substance.”
38
 As Mattson observed, the “penchant for shock is part of the conservative mind and a central 
feature of its makeup”
39
 due to the populist basis of political discourse in the “television age” as a form of 
entertainment. Consequently, within this cultural framework, presidential elections are structured 
according to the Republican style of conservative “populist aggression” against the liberal Democratic 
substance of “fairness issues.” 
Mattson intimated the originating duality of modern American conservatism in popular culture in 
his identification of Buckley as the conservative rebel as opposed to a defender of the status quo, such as 
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the image of the 1968 Nixon campaign, appearing “akin to student protesters of the 1960s who marched 
with self-righteousness and self-assuredness that they were bringing utopian transformation to 
America.”
40
 This thesis illustrates that, as reflective of the polarizing dynamic of American popular 
culture, Buckley‟s spirit of rebelliousness was in fact imbibed in his support of the conservative status 
quo against the liberal paternalism of Cold War Manichaeism and civil libertarianism. Buckley‟s 
intellectualism served as the foundation of what would become known as the New Right culture 
following 1976, comprised of grassroots organizations, “think-tank policy mongering”, and sophisticated 
marketing techniques in opposition to the Eastern liberal establishment.
41
 The superimposition of cultural 
images and rhetoric within the modern conservative movement - imbibed in the “age of Nixon” - was 
rooted in the reactionary basis of the party‟s ideology of opposition to the New Deal coalition. Mattson 
observed, “The conservative mind acted on history, remaining steadfast, but it was also acted on by 
history, changing in certain ways.”
42
 These changes proved to be contingent upon the readings of the 
popular zeitgeist by the conservative movement. Accordingly, Buckley‟s intellectualism was perceived as 
visibly “re-formed as a force for progress as well as history”
43
 on his PBS television show Firing Line 
during the 1970s through the convergence of the new counter-establishment rhetoric (new right 
counterculture) with conservative evangelical activists and Goldwater Republicans. 
 On July 2, 2009 Mattson appeared on stage with New Left comedian Stephen Colbert on Comedy 
Central‟s The Colbert Report to promote and debate his book “What the Heck are You Up to Mr. 
President?” Jimmy Carter, America’s Malaise, and The Speech That Should Have Changed the Country 
(2009). Mattson asserted that Carter‟s speech of July 15, 1979 - which was identified by Reagan as 
Carter‟s “Malaise Speech” but the speech never included the word - attempted to inform the American 
public that the energy problem could not be solved unless America confronted its dependency on foreign 
natural resources and its domestic values of civic consumption. Colbert vehemently recanted that 
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President Carter was “the original blame-America-firster”, making the mistake of proposing to wage “the 
moral equivalent of a war” without actually mobilizing the public to wage a war: “That‟s what President 
Bush understood. Because that you don‟t fight back against.” While Mattson attempted to endorse 
President Carter‟s speech as marking the pivotal “wrong turn” in modern American politics, Colbert 
asserted that with the election of 1980, “the market had spoken”, before instigating chanting from his 
audience: “Reagan good! Carter bad!”
44
 It was an entertaining confrontation, yet also one that reflected a 
popular view in America of Reagan‟s triumph in 1980. 
While Greenberg acknowledged the academic apprehension of the synthesis of  “presidential” 
history, this was precisely the interpretative language identified in Kevin Phillips‟ The Emerging 
Republican Majority (1969), considered by Newsweek as “The Political Bible of the Nixon Era.”
45
 This 
divine revelation of the “southern strategy” will be discussed in chapter two. Greenberg argued, “The 
president‟s symbolic power exerts material force”
46
 insofar as the duality of Nixon‟s cultural image 
shaped the framework for the discourse of modern American culture. Greenberg identified, “a pseudo-
event became real; image created reality.”
47
 His analysis was premised upon the interrelationship of 
Nixon‟s creation of “populist communication” and the development of Nixon‟s multi-faceted images 
within American political and popular culture. Greenberg analyzed the value of political symbols based 
on Nixon‟s actions and meaning in American history. His methodology was based on enhancing the 
standard sources of historical analysis by using “cultural artifacts” to both assess the artistic 
representation of reality and its effect on American self-consciousness and to illustrate the multiple and 
superimposed perceptions evoked by Nixon‟s image(s). Reflective of the inherent dynamic of culture, 
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Greenberg‟s analysis of Nixon‟s cultural image was grounded in two loyalist Republican 
observations following Nixon‟s resignation in August 1974. While New York Times columnist Anthony 
Lewis identified Nixon‟s cultural centrality in American history since the Second World War as “the Age 
of Nixon”
49
, Nixon‟s manuscript editor for Simon & Schuster, Michael Korda, intimated the underlying 
dynamic of the polarization of Nixonland in his observation that Nixon was the only American president 
during the twentieth century of whom it was “absolutely impossible to be indifferent.”
50
 Greenberg 
concluded, “Cumulatively, through their experiences with Nixon, Americans came to believe that politics 
revolves around the construction and manipulation of images- a shadow that Nixon still casts upon our 
age.”
51
 Greenberg suggested the foundational dynamic of Nixonland in his identification that the age of 
Nixon in postwar American culture was premised upon a “fearful symmetry”
52
 in which Nixon and his 
opposition inflated the hostility of the “other”, perpetuating a cyclical basis of interaction by conflating 
fact with partisan assertion. The pervasiveness of paranoia which encircled Nixon‟s political image 
intensified during his presidency through the visible use of surveillance, fuelling “popular paranoia” 
among New Leftists.
53
 As Greenberg identified, the cultural perception of an event was not determined by 
the facts of the event but rather through the lenses of each prism of paranoia.
54
 
While the Watergate story “forced the mainstream to take the left seriously”
55
, Nixon‟s 
inauguration of the modern form of news management structured the cultural reaction to this event within 
Nixon‟s rhetoric of Cold War Manichaeism (“us” against “them”) and his identification of the “adversary 
culture” and liberal elitism of the American press corps. Consequently, Greenberg argued, “politics has 
come to be seen as an illusion, a superficial contest of images, that, like the pseudo-event, has no intrinsic 
meaning.”
56
 In other words, “identity politics”- as the most apt description of each political party‟s 
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representation of socio-political groups on television - imbibed in “the age of image-consciousness”
57
, 
was dialogically produced from Nixon‟s recognition that consciousness was directly shaped by popular 
culture, inaugurating the modern political discourse of “populist communication.” The cultural 
recognition of “pseudo-events”, meaning the cultural identification of a media-generated depiction of 
reality, was inaugurated with American newspapers‟ suggestions during June 1973 that Nixon‟s global 
tour was a diversion from the centralizing cultural issue of the Watergate story.
58
 Within the framework of 
the “culture wars” imbibed in the media realities of the 1960s, Greenberg observed, “Nixon had become a 
celebrity, well known for his well-knownness, a human pseudo-event.”
59
 Perlstein has extended 
Greenberg‟s analysis of modern American culture by identifying Nixonland as the synthesizing paradigm 
to encapsulate the dynamic and nature of the “pseudo-events” of modern American culture. 
Greenberg‟s interpretation of “Nixon‟s Shadow” inferred Perlstein‟s framework of Nixonland in 
its conceptualization within Plato‟s cave analogy- indicative of how shadows, or artificial reflections of 
reality, can be “expressive of reality, yet also rooted in individual perspectives.”
60
 Greenberg asserted that 
“Images reflect substance” because they are naturally produced “from a dialectical or collaborative 
process between politicians and their audiences.”
61
 The Boorstinian landscape of American culture - 
identified by historian Stephen Whitfield in 1991 - was premised upon Boorstin‟s observation of the 
primacy of images in mass culture and media over the traditional Enlightenment ideals of rationalism. 
The Boorstinian landscape of American culture is founded on the redundancy of identifying “the 
proliferation of pseudo-events”
62
 due to the cultural identification of the redundancy of the Nixon mask 
and the “elusiveness of Nixon‟s true self.”
63
 Greenberg organized the development of this cultural 
framework into each decade‟s pattern of image construction: “with makeup and lighting in the 1950s, 
refining polling methods in the 1960s, slick campaign ads in the 1970s, sound bites in the 1980s, focus 
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 During the 1990s, the revisionist period in the historiography on Nixon‟s political image 
recontextualized Nixon‟s policies during the repercussions of Reaganism. While the polarizing event of 
the Watergate story precipitated a polarizing basis of psychoanalytical commentary by American culture 
and academia during the 1970s, reflective of the cultural trend of inwardness during the decade, Nixon‟s 
cultural image was imbibed in the consciousness of the inescapability of inference or the appearance of 
partisanship. The absolutism attributed to the cultural perception of partisan denials as the dynamic of the 
debate rather than analyzing the content of each perception consequently delegitimized the academic 
perception of the genuine contributions of psychoanalysis. The inherent cynicism of modern American 
culture - due to the dual consciousness of media strategies - can be found in Nixon‟s inaugural cultural 
image of corruption. Accordingly, President Reagan‟s falsehoods - his lies and half truths about American 
deaths in Lebanon, the Iran-Contra arms deals, the extent of U.S. intervention in Central America and his 
complicity in using the stolen Carter campaign strategy briefing book for the first debate of the 1980 
presidential election – became reconciled within the adversarial modern American culture. 
Reagan illustrated in his diaries the tactic of countering media allegations such as stealing 
Carter‟s campaign briefing book for the debate. After Reagan‟s attention to the media‟s “scandal” for the 
first few days, he dismissed the confrontational “yelling” from the “press corps” within his perception of 
Cold War Manichaeism, delaying his response to the issue until his scheduled press conference seven 
days later.
65
 The confrontational cultural dynamic between the Reagan administration and the president‟s 
identification of the liberal media enabled public outrage - caused by contradictions in Reagan‟s public 
image - to be reconciled in American culture. “Nixonism”
66
 identified that integrity could not be 
maintained in the new media realities of modern American culture. 
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 The academic revisionism of “Nixonism” as the final form of Great Society liberalism, 
representing an extension of liberal paternalism rather than the inauguration of conservative paternalism, 
is premised upon re-interpreting and “reconsidering” Nixon‟s principal contribution to popular culture. 
This revisionism was premised upon the identification of a retrospective partisan liberal role rather than 
his widely observed centrist or moderate role at the time for his expedient perpetuation of Great Society 
populism. The cultural perception of Nixonian liberalism originated during the Reagan presidency 
through the parallels identified in the media and the Reagan administration of President Carter as a 
technocratic micromanager similar to President Nixon. This cultural reinterpretation of Nixon‟s image 
was facilitated by the reconceptualization of Nixon‟s image in popular culture and political discourse 
during the Reagan presidency. In early November 1981, following Reagan‟s acquiescence to Haig‟s 
suggestion for Nixon to accompany the delegation of former Presidents Ford and Carter to the ceremony 
in Egypt for President Sadat‟s funeral, Time set for popular culture what Greenberg said was the tone for 
the decade by identifying Nixon as “the world‟s unique and ubiquitous elder statesman without 
portfolio.”
67
 While Nixon endorsed the pre-détente Reaganesque posture of toughness from the 
beginning, once Reagan aggregated media scrutiny for his posture, Nixon semantically altered his support 




The visible reconciliation of Nixon‟s image within liberal popular culture occurred following 
Nixon‟s speech at the Associated Press luncheon on April 21, 1986, during which Nixon deflected 
references to the Watergate story through good-natured sarcasm and shook hands with the editor of The 
Washington Post Katherine Graham. Greenberg identified this cultural armistice as “superficial” based on 
Nixon‟s abrasive response to the Post‟s attempt several years later to authenticate the rumors of his death: 
“Mrs. Graham will go before I do.”
69
 A month later, on May 19, the Newsweek headline read: “He‟s 
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Back: The Rehabilitation of Richard Nixon.”
70
 Greenberg contended that Nixon manufactured press 
releases and therefore political discourse following the media campaign to rehabilitate his image in 1986 
by having media operatives release “secret” memos, principally Time‟s Strobe Talbott, who President 
Clinton later appointed to oversee his Russia policy. These stories were published by Time following 
Nixon‟s meeting with Gorbachev in 1986 and Nixon‟s private memo to president Bush concerning 
Nixon‟s China trip in 1990.
71
 
During the summer of 1990, the privately owned - unlike other presidential libraries run by the 
National Archives - Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library was opened, with the exhibits not surprisingly 
depicting Nixon strictly in partisan terms as a victim of liberal vengeance, blaming the break-in on John 
Mitchell and the cover-up on John Dean.
72
 Nixon staged his first return to Capitol Hill prior to the 
unveiling to meet with the Republican congressman who declared the recovery of Nixon‟s image 
complete and later would become the Republican Presidential candidate in 1996, Bob Dole.
73
  
 By 2001, President Ford‟s cultural image was still developing within the cultural dialectic of 
loyalists who were gracious for Nixon‟s pardon and the others who were resentful of his pardoning 
Nixon. The Bush II presidency intentionally synthesized the cultural issue by historicizing Nixon‟s 
presidential image in popular culture through the emulation of Reagan‟s conservative awards of 
patriotism to the public by rewarding President Ford‟s act in 1974 with a “Profile in Courage” from the 
liberal symbol of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
74
 Greenberg argued that this represented a 
cultural recognition of the decreased perception of vindictiveness of Nixon‟s image rather than his 
innocence: a cultural armistice. The Bush II presidency further vindicated Nixon‟s Presidential cultural 
image by explicitly premising the Bush re-election campaign of 2004 on the imagery of Nixon‟s “silent 
majority” during the 1968 presidential election. This positive strategy of associating patriotism with the 
Republican Party was coupled with a negative surrogate campaign of attacking New Left Vietnam veteran 
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John Kerry‟s personal integrity and patriotism. The root of the duality of the Bush II presidency appears 
to rest in President Bush‟s personal image of Reagan‟s “citizen-politician”, projecting the cultural image 
of Reagan‟s postmodern conservative presidency while also radicalizing this image by instrumentalizing 
Nixon‟s foreign policy of neorealism. The Republican Party‟s disingenuous denial of the exploitation of 
9/11 during the inauguration of the New American Century was imbibed in the denial of the Republican 
exploitation of a “white backlash” during the 1960s to consolidate the status quo of the American 
Century : Nixonland. 
In the first chapter, the formation of Nixonland will be illustrated through Perlstein‟s 
psychoanalytical narrative for how Nixon‟s central identity and political image of  “us” against “them” re-
entered the mainstage of political theatre. Nixon‟s politicization of television during the revolutionary 
year of 1968 - wherein numerous other societies were challenging the status quo - was facilitated by 
Nixon‟s subtle exploitation of Confederate nationalism  on television to ensure that his revolution was 
televised to the southern states. Nixon infiltrated political discourse after the midterm elections of 1966 by 
publicly accusing President Johnson of politicizing peace in Vietnam, which Nixon would later do 
throughout the 1968 presidential election. When the North Vietnamese seemed prepared to agree to a 
condition during the Paris peace talks, Nixon would have his agent, Anna Chenault, known as the Dragon 
Lady, dissuade the South Vietnamese from acquiescing to concessions because she promised them the 
election of her friend would provide them with a better deal.
75
 While President Johnson was aware of 
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Nixon‟s diplomatic pressure on Saigon, perceiving it at the time as treason
76
, Nixon accused LBJ of 
politicizing the American system of democracy by relying on the antiquated New Deal generation and 
consequently alienating conservative “outsiders.” The reversal of this perception in modern American 
culture is the ultimate legacy of Nixon‟s cultural image(s). 
The McLuhan nature of Nixonland is illustrated before providing a narrative of the McLuhan 
culture of the Reagan Revolution as the principal medium for Reaganism in chapter three- based on 
journalistic accounts and participant memoirs. The Reagan Revolution is illustrated as the modern 
American revolution by chronicling the private formation and public execution of Reagan‟s public 
relations apparatus, derived from Nixon‟s form of news management. This chapter illustrates the 
development of Reagan‟s populist conservative image in American culture by analyzing the 
historiography of the “new politics of old values” and Reaganite perceptions of modern American 
political and popular culture. 
The conclusion illustrates the visible and tangible penetration of New Left rationalism into 
America‟s conservative political discourse alongside the polarizing cultural image of Nixon‟s “silent 
majority” during the Bush II presidency. This basis of cultural analysis was illustrated in The Daily Show 
and Philosophy (2007), comprising of nineteen essays edited by Jason Holt, which analyzed the 
philosophical foundations of the liberal parody of television news based on Neil Postman‟s Amusing 
Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business (1985). Postman extended McLuhan‟s 
fundamental premise of the media (“the medium is the message”) by observing that the politicization of 
television has reduced the substantive content of political discourse to entertainment.
77
 While Postman 
argued that the medium of television constrained American political culture within the content of 
providing entertainment, both Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert, as well as Barack Obama, believe the 
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quality of political discourse can be improved through the New Left motive and motif of informing and 
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CHAPTER 1: THE MODERN AMERICAN KULTURKAMPF, As Seen on Television 
 
America‟s ensuing “culture wars” between the conservative depression era-postwar generation 
and the liberal baby-boomer generation since 1968 represents an artificial rhetorical dialectic coercively 
imposed through television. Nixon first instrumentalized the medium of television during the 1968 
presidential election to implement the neorealist  basis of modern American political discourse. While 
Ronald Reagan defined his ideology and identity in opposition to Richard Nixon‟s “era of negotiation”, 
he emulated Nixon‟s form of populist communication during the 1980 presidential election and then 
subsequently regulated the content of the medium during the 1980s “era of reconciliation.” New Left 
comedian George Carlin concisely observed the relationship between the politicized medium of television 
and its guiding discourse of “identity politics” within the formation of the conservative apotheosis during 
his 1988 HBO standup special “WTF: What Am I Doing in New Jersey?”: 
The FCC (Federal Communications Commission) decided,  
all by itself, that radio and television were the only two parts  
of American life not protected by the free speech provisions of the  
first amendment to the constitution. I‟d like to repeat that because  
it sounds vaguely important. The FCC, an appointed body, not  
elected, answerable only to the president, decided on its own that  
radio and television were the only two parts of American life not  
protected by the first amendment to the constitution. Why did  
they decide that? Because they got a letter from a minister in  
Mississippi. A reverend Donald Wildman heard something in  
Mississippi that he didn‟t like. Well reverend, did anyone tell  
you there were two knobs on the radio? It‟s called freedom  
of choice and its one of the principles this country was founded  
upon. Look it up in the library reverend if ya have any of them  
left when you‟re finished burning the books… 
 
On June 1, 2009 CNN reported the structure of the FCC debate as being between the fairness doctrine 
(eliminated in 1987, no longer requiring television networks to report public issues in an objective and 
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nonpartisan, or fair and honest fashion) and government control of content. During the presidential 
election of 1984, which was arguably the high point of the Reagan ascendancy, the liberal Democrat 
Walter Mondale‟s campaign was premised upon “fairness issues”, while President Reagan‟s campaign 
was premised upon controlling the presidential image on television. 
Modern American conservatism is premised upon controlling its message more than the content 
of its message. The source for this nature of modern American culture is found in President Richard 
Nixon‟s inaugural politicization of television during the 1968 presidential election by instrumentalizing 
the medium as the principal means for campaigning and governance. Newsweek observed the 
neoconservative Republican Party‟s ideological perversion of William F. Buckley Jr.‟s philosophical 
currents of American conservatism upon his death at the beginning of March 2008.
79
 The New Yorker 
declared the end of the conservative apotheosis by the end of May when Obama‟s populist momentum 
ensured him the Democratic presidential nomination.
80
 A week later, The Nation, a liberal institution of 
political culture, echoed this sentiment on their cover: “Is the Party Over?”
81
 Obama was able to defeat 
Hillary Clinton because the Obama candidacy personified the actualization of hope and visible (racial) 
change within the history of populist communication. By combining Karl Rove‟s Nixonian campaign 
tactics with the injection of the emotional display of crying to obtain hegemony over public discourse, 
Clinton failed to counteract Obama‟s cultural image in her attempt to solidify the image of the 
“compassionate conservative” Democrat. The 2008 presidential election was premised upon the cultural 
image of liberal hope and rationalism of the younger generation in contrast to the cultural image of the 
moderate Republicanism of the “underdog” older generation. Senator Barack Obama managed to 
counteract the conservative hegemony over American political discourse by utilizing the medium of the 
Internet, primarily YouTube.com, to attain an unprecedented proliferation of the liberal democratic 
message. In its early stages, the Obama presidency appears to represent the desegregation of American 
political and popular culture in America‟s political discourse of “populist communication,” also identified 
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as “symbolic communication”, based on the use of symbols, brands, and identities, to create a story for a 
product on television. The visible shift in the American electorate from the Right to the Left in American 
political discourse has precipitated the Democratic Party‟s attempt to inaugurate a liberal apotheosis 
based on the conservative mandate Reagan aggregated during the 1980 presidential election. 
The 2008 presidential election has been interpreted by mainstream publications and media as an 
ideological collapse of conservatism that has produced economic disorder, compared to the ideological 
collapse of liberalism in 1968 that produced cultural disorder. However, postwar liberalism, or “liberal 
corporatism”, or liberal conservatism, or Cold War Manichaeism, is the synthesizing ideology which 
explains both these elections: “us” against “them”. Following the Second World War, the postwar socio-
political dialectic between the socially progressive New Deal coalition and the fragmented Republican 
Party created an absolute rhetorical dialectic between democracy and communism, between good and 
evil, between New Deal social liberalism and Republican social conservatism, in order for hardline New 
Deal liberals to control American political discourse. The postwar ideology of Cold War Manichaeism 
dialogically produced a “we/they world” where binary oppositions consumed the American 
consciousness. New Left sociologist Todd Gitlin has identified that America‟s triumph of 1945 spurred a 
“centrifugal cultural motion”
82
, creating a “tug-of-war team”
83
 over American nationalism between the 
liberal Democratic Party and the Republican Party through an irreconcilable culture war. The modern 
American kulturkampf institutionalized on television in the 1968 presidential election between the liberal 
baby-boomer generation and the postwar conservative generation was personified by Richard Nixon‟s 
consciously constructed television image of moderate paternalism to attract the alienated paternal 
majority of American society, the southern electorate. The nature of America‟s “culture wars” has 
recently been identified as Nixonland, defined by journalist Rick Perlstein (2008) as “the America where 
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two separate and irreconcilable sets of apocalyptic fears coexist in the minds of two separate and 
irreconcilable groups of Americans.”
84
 
Perlstein argued that Nixonland first entered the American psyche during Nixon‟s “Checker‟s 
Speech” on national television in 1952 - a speech he delivered with the sole intent of portraying himself 
as the victimized Republican against the Democrats and then somehow could not understand why the 
Democrats hated him for it. After being labelled as a campaign finance “crook”, Nixon volunteered to 
demonstrate the complete transparency of his finances while confessing to having received a dog from a 
supporter which he couldn‟t think of taking away from his daughter. This episode in political theatre is 
how Nixonland began and this is the fundamental premise upon which Nixon‟s artificial political dialectic 
was formed. American political culture and popular culture divided based on an interpretation of the 
message rather than the content of the message itself, illustrating Marshall McLuhan‟s view of culture 
years before he coined the term. America became divided between those who didn‟t see past Nixon‟s 
disingenuous and sentimental attempt to play on America‟s heart strings, and the “other” side who viewed 
Nixon‟s attempt to reach out to American sympathies as what Walt Lippman observed as “the most 
demeaning experience my country has ever had to bear.”
85
 As Nixon identified in Six Crises (1962), the 
“Checkers Speech” inaugurated the theatrical basis of modern political discourse by providing Nixon a 
televised platform “to tell [his] story directly to the people rather than funnel it to them through a press 
account.”
86




The foundational McLuhan culture of Nixonland provides the regulatory medium for the modern 
American kulturkampf because the medium of television causes the viewer to feel what he or she 
perceives the picture to denote and what the words connote: what the image says speaks louder than the 
words we hear. This is why the viewer is inclined to subordinate the content of the message to the image 
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itself. Inherent to the medium, the ideal political strategy in Nixonland is to make your opponent feel as if 
he or she has leverage over you and then induce him or her to exploit an intentional mistake in order to 
make the person seem “unduly aggressive” while you garner “pity by making the enemy look like a self-
righteous and hyperintellectual enemy of common sense.”
88
  This political tactic is meant to exploit 
sentimentality within the candidate‟s constituency of the “citizen-politician” while at the same time 
attracting sympathy from the opponents‟ constituency for being disappointed in the actions of their 
presumed leader. 
The term Nixonland was introduced into American political discourse by Adlai Stevenson and his 
speechwriter‟s sarcastic attempt during the 1952 Democratic campaign to reduce the hardline anti-
communist rhetoric and images of Nixon to a farcical reality. Nixon‟s instinctual anti-communist crusades 
during the late 1940s aggregated the image of a hardline conservative Republican, enabling him to be 
recruited by General Eisenhower out of political expediency to his image as his vice-presidential 
candidate. While Nixon visibly moderated the “southern strategy” through his creation of “identity 
politics” on television during the 1968 presidential election to appropriate the hegemony of “Cold War 
Manichaeism”, the eroding liberal democratic coalition assumed the dependent identity of the ideological 
“outsider” within American political discourse. Gitlin defined the root of “identity politics” as the “cant of 
identity” in The Twilight of Common Dreams (1995): 
Cant is the hardening of the aura around a concept… 
the cant of identity underlies the identity politics, which  
proposes to deduce a position, a tradition, a deep truth,  
or a way of life from a fact of birth, physiognomy, national  




During the 1968 presidential election, the socio-political dialectic of the 1960s, between civil libertarians 
and social conservatives, transferred from America‟s residual de jure social segregation to a de facto 
segregation and regulation of liberal popular culture by conservative political culture. Gitlin argued that 
                                                 
88
 Ibid., 28 
89
 Gitlin, The Twilight of Common Dreams, 126. 
  
   
 31 
the “identity politics”, or “surrogate politics”
90
 of the “culture wars” of the 1960s annulled the Left within 
American political discourse by abstracting universalism: “If there is no people, but only peoples, there is 
no Left.”
91
 The visible cultural decline of the New Left caused “the fragmentation of the Idea of the 
Left.”
92
 Gitlin philosophically implied the inherent artificiality of “identity politics” because they 
comprise  
a set of false solutions proclaimed for real problems-  
false solutions that began with certain plausibility.  
The oddity is that the Left, which once stood for  
universal values, seems to speak today for select  
identities, while the Right, long associated with  





Subsequently, “People lived, felt, desired, revolted as members of identity categories- not as citizens, let 
alone as human beings.”
94
 Gitlin argued that the medium of this war and “the recognition of a collective 
hurt”
95
 is perpetuated by “the desire to mimic the identity consciousness of others.”
96
 Similar to the basis 
of volition for religious faith, individuals have been drawn to identities since the 1970s for a sense of 
belonging and inclusion. The cultural ideal of celebrity and fame appear to have become the 
quintessential identity for an individual to strive toward because it universalizes self-identity, visibly 
annulling an individual‟s inherent feeling of alienation in America‟s political discourse of “identity 
politics.” 
Nixonland was established in 1968 through the polarized and demagogic presidential campaign of 
Richard Nixon, symbolizing the premature end to America‟s process of racial reconciliation. Nixonland 
emerged from Nixon‟s (neo)realist creation of an artificial political dialectic between the Democrats and 
Republicans. Perlstein argued that Nixon “brilliantly co-opted the liberals‟ populism, channeling it into a 
white middle-class rage at the sophisticates, the well-born, the “best circles”- all those who looked down 
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their nose at “you and me.”
97
 Accordingly, his political discourse became the philology of modern 
American conservatism, with Goldwater conservatism acting merely as the socio-political catalyst. 
Nixon‟s political discourse and Nixonland itself is premised upon a “new style of demagoguery, a kind of 
right-wing populism”, which emerged during the mid-1960s in convergence with the individualism 
afforded by the Civil Rights Movement and the decentralizing medium of television. Nixonland consists 
of a politics of mass consumption precipitated by the Republican Party in order to attract the increasing 
demographic and electorate that were becoming alienated by what Samuel Lubell observed was a shift in 
the inner dynamics of the Roosevelt coalition from those of getting to those of keeping.
98
 Perlstein 
identified Nixon‟s imposed rhetorical dialectic between the Democrats and Republicans but exempted 
Nixon from a devolving impact upon American political culture due to his belief that Nixon perceived his 
actions as saving the United States from the ramifications of racial reconciliation. 
While the Nixon presidency inaugurated the concurrent shift of the American electorate with the 
American mass media toward New Right populism, the Obama presidency represents the symbolic 
inauguration within “populist communication” of postwar liberalism‟s interjection of New Left 
rationalism into modern American conservatism‟s hegemony over political discourse since 1968. This 
was facilitated by the media‟s collective guilt for deference to the Bush II Administration, similar to the 
lessons learned from McCarthyism during the 1950s. Nixon‟s politicization of television during the 1968 
presidential election inaugurated the American electorate‟s visible shift to the Right of the political 
spectrum in order to consolidate the status quo. Nixon inaugurated the modern American discourse of 
populist rhetoric and images of domestic realism (or centrism) and international neorealism by 
consciously forming his political image of moderate paternalism in accordance with the alienated paternal 
southern electorate, known as the “southern strategy.” This form of realpolitik was interrupted by Nixon‟s 
corruption of the presidential image, enabling the Democratic Party and Southern Governor Jimmy Carter 
to project an authentic image of the “outsider” from the Washington Establishment during the 1976 
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presidential election within the framework of the southern strategy. During the 1980 presidential election 
Reagan generalized the “southern strategy” by projecting an authentic image of conservative paternalism, 
institutionalizing the conservative apotheosis through his visible cultural restoration of American 
nationalism based on “identity politics” and the rhetoric of “shared values.” Reagan implemented his 
ideological agenda in accordance with substantive public opinion through deregulation and increased 
defense spending by inaugurating “supply-side economics” and his technological diplomatic leverage 
over the Soviets in the abstract form of the Strategic Defense Initiative; S.D.I. was dialogically produced 
from Nixon‟s leverage of Sino-American collusion against the Soviets. Wilentz argued that Reagan 
“thought of SDI as neither a bargaining chip nor a means to intimidate the Soviet Union but as a genuine 
guarantor of world peace.”
99
 Although Reagan may have genuinely perceived S.D.I. to provide a new 
hegemonic level to nuclear diplomacy, Reagan‟s assurance that the U.S. was going to share the 
technology once it was developed did not answer Gorbachev‟s question during the Reykjavik Summit of 
why S.D.I. would be necessary if all nuclear weapons were eliminated.
100
 
The media realities of Reaganism gained increased attention during the Bush II presidency, with 
the historiography interpreting Reagan‟s cult of personality and hardline nationalist ideology as the 
principal means for enlarging the conservative middleclass. By the end of the 1980s, Reaganism 
represented the visible reconciliation of the “culture wars” of the 1960s through Reagan‟s populist cult of 
personality - as the personification of American Christian nationalism - moderating the American 
electorate by visibly synthesizing America‟s conservative political culture and liberal popular culture. 
Wilentz observed, “Reaganism was its own distinctive blend of dogma, pragmatism, and, above all, 
mythology. Although it had tens of millions of followers, its theory resided not in a party, a faction, or a 
movement, but in the mind and the persona of one man: Ronald Reagan.”
101
 Reaganism became premised 
upon an ideological zealotry born of the belief that the perpetual threat of the “other” required true 
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believers to “take matters into their own hands and execute.”
102
 Wilentz identified the fundamental basis 
for political discourse outside of the principal medium which has structured modern American culture: 




While Nixon‟s “imperial presidency” was premised upon emulating the Kennedy campaign‟s 
populist tactics, Reagan‟s postmodern presidency has been emulated based on Reagan‟s politicization of 
television to emotionally connect with the viewing electorate. President Clinton is considered to have won 
the presidency in 1992 by instrumentalizing the postmodern presidency to visibly feel the public‟s pain 
during the recession. A black female voter posed a question to the candidates concerning how the 
recession had personally affected each man. President Bush broadly claimed that the recession touched all 
of us. Clinton claimed when citizens lost their jobs in his state of Arkansas, he most likely knew them, 
and felt their pain. The woman visibly nodded in agreement. President Clinton won reelection through 
exploiting his popular cultural image and his semantic strategy of co-opting the conservative hegemony 
over political discourse by declaring “The Era of Big Government is Over.” However, the publicly 
revealed affair at the beginning of his second term, and the ensuing allegations and attempted 
impeachment proceedings organized by the conservative movement, culturally associated Clinton with an 
image of liberalism imbibed in the counterculture of the 1960s: a liberal enemy of family values. The 
instrumentality of the perjury charge to associate Clinton with a cultural image rooted in the 
counterculture was evoked during the formal televised hearings of the House Judiciary Committee. This 
included the irrelevant testimony from a former female coach from a women‟s basketball team, who had 
testified to lying under oath about going to a lesbian bar called Puss „n‟ Boots.
104
 During the hearings, the 
visible partisanship of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr was made most apparent when Starr 
“parenthetically” acknowledged that months earlier he had exonerated Clinton of the Whitewater affair 
and all other purported scandals he investigated. Democratic Representative Barney Frank questioned 
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why Starr had not revealed this information prior to the midterm elections.
105
 In the context of the 
proliferation of political adultery scandals by both parties in 2009, Reagan‟s former speechwriter and the 
architect of Vice President Bush‟s 1988 campaign image of the American cowboy reminiscent of Clint 
Eastwood (“Read my lips: no new taxes.”), Wall Street Journal columnist Peggy Noonan traced the 
origins for such behaviour to the Clinton era. She asserted – almost pensively, looking into the distance as 
to elevate her idea – that it seemed it was during that time in which “a new devilishness was unleashed, 
especially in the media, in which a new meanness took style.”
106
 
 Wilentz used the term “Clintonism” to describe and contextualize Clinton‟s presidency against 
the larger backdrop of presidential history. While Clinton‟s cultural image of moderation mediated the 
opposing forces of the Republican majority and the Democratic minority, the visible intensification of the 
“culture wars” during Clinton‟s tenure reflected the rhetorical “politics of rage” of New Right populism 
within Nixonland. The identification of the irreconcilable opposition between the right and left was 
articulated by First Lady Hillary Clinton when the event of the Lewinsky scandal was first revealed as a 
“vast right-wing conspiracy.”
107
 Similar to the accusations against Nixon of using foreign policy to deflect 
his domestic scandal of Watergate during the spring of 1973, Clinton‟s critics accused him of attacking Al 
Qaeda to distract attention from his domestic political problems.
108
 Wilentz observed, “Clintonism came 
to stand not just for unprincipled political expediency but also for a political pathology, the pathology 
actually being politics itself- in Clinton‟s case, the politics of re-creating liberalism during a long 
conservative era.”
109
 The “pathology” of Clintonism was rooted in Clinton‟s image of moderation, 
promoting fiscal conservatism while not being able to substantively advocate liberal reform due to the 
institutional constraints of the political “age of Reagan.” The mythical legacy of “Reaganomics”, or 
“supply-side economics”, or “trickle-down economics”, and the end of the Cold War by the end of the 
“American Century”, dialogically produced a paradigm shift from the “old politics” of the Cold War to 




 ABC News The Roundtable, hosted by George Stephanopoulos, June 28, 2009. 
107
 Wilentz, 383. 
108
 Ibid., 394. 
109
 Ibid., 324. 
  
   
 36 
the “new politics” of liberal Democratic globalization, causing what academics have identified as an 
“enemy crisis” in American political discourse. As Henry Kissinger observed in Diplomacy (1994), “The 
end of the Cold War produced an even greater temptation to recast the international environment in 
America‟s image.”
110
 The discourse of Cold War Manichaeism was consequently regulated during the 
1990s era of Eastern European decolonization by neoliberal realism and economic modernization through 
the deregulation of the banking system. 
America‟s socio-political dialectic during the 1960s pushed public opinion and American 
political discourse to the moderate paternalism (conservatism) of the American Century while the 
neoconservatism of the New American Century has pushed American public opinion and political 
discourse to New Left rationalism. The George W. Bush presidency was founded upon the image of 
“compassionate conservatism” until the hardline neoconservative ideologues of George W. Bush‟s 
Cabinet exploited the terrorist attacks of 9/11, tripling the size of the federal government to implement the 
Project for the New American Century (2000). While the Bush II administration aggregated public 
support for preemptive U.S. military action in Iraq
111
, the administration‟s neoconservative intentions for 
access to oil resources on the Eurasian continent subsumed public opinion similar to Nixon‟s neorealist 
foreign policy in Vietnam. By the end of the Bush II presidency, chief ideologue Vice-President Dick 
Cheney responded to a public opinion poll in which two-thirds of Americans opposed the Iraq War on 
March 20, 2008 during an interview on ABC‟s Good Morning America. He responded, “So?” When 
asked by the interviewer if he cared what the American people think, he responded, “You cannot be 
blown off course by the fluctuations in the public opinion polls.” By December, Cheney reaffirmed 
Nixon‟s neorealist perception of the presidency to Fox News‟ Chris Wallace by asserting the powers of 
the president are unlimited. Neoconservatives, such as the daughter of former vice president Dick 
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Cheney, Liz Cheney, argue that Obama‟s “September 10
th
 mentality” - in conjunction with Clinton‟s 
political strategy of triangulation - prevents liberal diplomacy from assuming a viable option.
112
 Similar to 
the causal entropy of New Deal liberalism during the 1960s, the pervasive threat provided by an external 
and internal enemy has focused political discourse within Cold War Manichaeism. In the “age of 
Reagan”, the Gramscian intelligence of Reagan‟s postmodern presidency constrains the President‟s 
actions within the inspiration of the public will; this is why the Bush II administration, principally Dick 
Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, injected political discourse with the real fear of the Iraq threat. 
Following the implementation of the neoconservative foreign policy agenda, President George W. 
Bush‟s absolutist approach relegated dissension against his foreign policy by attempting to personify 
Nixon‟s “silent majority” during the 2004 Presidential election. Following the 2008 election, Republicans 
Mitt Romney, Jeb Bush, and Eric Cantor attempted to rebrand the party against the backdrop of a small 
local pizza chain beginning the weekend after former Democratic Senator Arlen Specter‟s defection from 
the Republican Party (and back to the Democratic Party) on April 28, 2009. The rebranding campaign 
comprised of traditional rhetoric of what Specter asserted to the Washington Post was an attempt to 
simply reaffirm the party‟s antiquated representation of the “silent majority.” The content of the 
Republicans‟ rebranding message was comprised of Jeb Bush‟s assertion that the Republican Party holds 
principles and values shared by the majority of Americans. Romney reiterated the Republican Party‟s 
socially conservative position on a fundamental issue of “identity politics”: “Marriage is not an activity, 
it‟s a status, and there should be a national standard.” Once again, liberalism was visibly threatening the 
conservative status quo. 
In response to the Republican rebranding campaign to reclaim the cultural symbol of the average 
middle-American, President Obama went to a local DC burger chain on May 29 with his aides, the press 
corps, and NBC‟s Brian Williams, in order to visibly demonstrate Obama‟s personification of the average 
American. Brian Williams‟ Report Inside the Obama White House was televised from 8-10pm on June 5 
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(filmed on May 29, Day 130 of the Obama presidency) reminiscent of Nixon‟s creation of this one-hour 
format in 1969. 
Modern American conservatism lost its hegemonic potency on television during the 2008 
presidential election similar to the de facto referendum on American liberalism on television in 1968. 
While the Nixon campaign contained political discourse during the 1968 presidential election to obtain 
hegemony, the Obama campaign expanded the rational limits of political discourse by injecting New Left 
rationalism into American political discourse. President Obama continues to wage this rational culture 
war within Nixonland due to the foundational dynamics of the “culture wars” during the 1960s.  
Gitlin identified that the socio-political dialectic of the 1960s - expressed in American political discourse 
through the ideology of “Cold War Manicheaism”
113
 - is premised upon the rejection of liberal rhetoric 
for conservative action: “It was as if everyone were playing out a fantasy version of Vietnam: act tough, 
try to intimidate, win over the center with a show of force, draw the other side into acting every bit as 
monstrous as you said it was.”
114
 Gitlin identified this dialectic of appearance versus reality in the 
“television age” as caused by the entanglement of the New Left movement‟s motives and their “reform-
through-polarization motif” to make the enemy reveal his own nature.
115
 Senator Barack Obama 
personified the New Left motives and motif imbibed in the 1960s by visibly representing the reform of 
American liberal democracy through his polarizing identity as a liberal black man and his New Left 
rational rhetoric, identifying for the television audience during the third debate that Senator McCain‟s 
negative campaigning “says more about his campaign than it does about me.”
116
 
CNN senior political analyst John King introduced the term Obamaland into political discourse 
on the day Barack Obama received the unprecedented Democratic presidential candidacy by acclamation 
on August 27. However, King conceived the term within the media‟s effect on the strategy of the Obama 
campaign in CNN‟s release of the name of McCain‟s vice-presidential candidate during the climax of the 
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Democratic National Convention: “Some times in Obamaland, as we saw, some things can change 
depending on what we do.” Nixonland has not transitioned to Obamaland because the New Left motives 
and motifs of the 1960s continue to structure American political discourse: liberal Democratic attempts to 
reveal the ideological irrationality or contradictions of New Right populism are deflected or negated by a 
visible display of emotion, due to the absolutism of American political discourse and the aloofness 
attributed to a “citizen-politician.” 
Southern Democratic Senator Zell Miller demonstrated this strategy following his keynote 
address during the 2004 Republican National Convention by simply getting angry at ABC interviewer 
Chris Mathews and challenging him to a “duel” to deflect a question concerning his disingenuous and 
hyperbolic denigration of John Kerry‟s personal character during his inflamed address. This tactic of 
using a Democrat to deliver the keynote address for the Republican National Convention - with Joe 
Liebermann assuming the role during the 2008 RNC - is symbolically rooted in sending a visible message 
to the American electorate of liberal Democratic disunity and ideological fragmentation reminiscent of 
the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Both Democratic politicians accused the 
Democratic presidential candidate of politicizing American foreign policy and questioned the candidate‟s 
personal integrity and patriotism. Gitlin argued that the 1968 DNC represented the socio-political 
culmination of the decade: “the exhaustion of liberalism, the marauding vengefulness of the authorities, 
the resolve and recklessness of the movement, the disintegration of the Democratic Party.”
117
 
Gitlin‟s reduction of this cultural dialectic to the concept of “cant” provides a direct applicability 
to American society today in that the criticism of aloofness attributed to Republican vice presidential 
candidate Sarah Palin and President George W. Bush - and their inadequate knowledge of identity politics 
- is identified as the antithesis of “cant”: a lack of intellectual curiosity. Similar to the New Deal 
coalition‟s internal entropy during the 1960s - in the attempt to collectively represent all of their 
constituency‟s individual issues - modern American conservatism has attained a level of ideological 
systemic hegemony which has alienated the expanding constituency of the younger liberal generation. 
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The New Left motif imbibed in the 1960s of making the enemy reveal his or her own nature was 
illustrated by the women of NBC‟s partisan talk show The View during an interview on May 20, 2009 
with conservative radio commentator and Fox News talk show host, Glenn Beck, the second most popular 
Fox personality since the 2008 presidential election. New Left African-American comedian Whoopi 
Goldberg and veteran presidential reporter Barbara Walters confronted Beck in regards to his depiction of 
their first meeting on the Amtrak train to the Correspondents Dinner in which Beck approached the two 
women to introduce himself. On his radio show, Beck embellished their meeting to portray the women as 
elite liberals by asserting that he approached four empty seats and was told by an employee that the seats 
were reserved for Goldberg and Walters, although it is a policy of Amtrak to not reserve seats. Beck 
defensively acquiesced that he had “misspoke” while asserting that Americans are “tired” of the Left-
Right debate anyways because both the Republicans and Democrats have revealed themselves as 
“liars.”
118
 During this exchange, Beck demonstrated the present Republican strategy to deflect New Left 
populist hegemony over public discourse by universalizing accountability. 
Glenn Beck, like many right-wing broadcasters before him, has fought his way to the front lines 
of the “culture wars‟ of the 1960s strictly through the partisan trade of rhetoric and emotion. Perlstein‟s 
assertion that Nixonland “has not yet ended”
119
 is validated by the causal intensification of the 
foundational McLuhan culture of Nixonland following the 2008 presidential election by conservative 
political personality Glenn Beck - similar to Nixon‟s intensification of Kennedy‟s populist tactics to 
inaugurate the “imperial presidency.” Beck‟s populist tactic was premised upon manipulating American 
political discourse through the combination of crying and a Television/Internet populist movement 
founded on the feeling of community the day after 9/11 (www.9-12 Project.com). Based on this image, 
Beck has formed the Republican Party‟s new surrogate populist movement based solely on a feeling and 
sustained through Reagan‟s rhetoric of a “compassionate conservative.” While Nixon instrumentalized 
television for his “Checker‟s Speech” by stylistically reducing his substantive message of economic 
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transparency and family values to a father‟s paternal instincts or feelings to protect his daughter, Beck has 
attempted to obtain populist hegemony over American political discourse by offering a substance-free 
common feeling to communicate the feeling of belonging in his populist movement. Nixon attempted to 
obtain hegemony over the public discourse on the issue of his public accusations by injecting political 
discourse with a sense of misunderstood empathy with the Republican Party. Beck is visibly showing his 
empathy with his viewers through his inability to control his emotions over the issue of 9/11. 
Senator Hillary Clinton injected the present basis of political discourse with the technique of 
crying on January 7 - at the beginning of the 2008 presidential election year. During a televised press 
conference with a fifteen-women panel at Café Espresso in Portsmouth prior to the New Hampshire 
Primary, Senator Clinton began weeping: 
I just don‟t want to see us fall backwards. This is very  
personal for me. It‟s not just political. It‟s not just public. 
I see what‟s happening. We have to reverse it. And some 
people think elections are a game. They think it‟s like  
who‟s up or who‟s down. It‟s about our country. It‟s about 




Clinton‟s emotional display was historically paralleled at the time by the media to Edmund Muskie‟s 
originating self-destructive display of emotion during the 1972 Democratic Primaries. Perlstein argued 
that Muskie‟s display of emotion (described by Dan Rather as he “began to weep” and by David Broder 
as “Tears streaming down his cheeks”) was provoked by the Union Leader‟s “gutless” attack of his wife‟s 
image.
121
  New York Times Op-Ed Columnist and culturally recognized feminist Maureen Dowd observed 
the “whiff of Nixonian self-pity about her choking up” in a January 9 article, “Can Hillary Cry Her Way 
Back to the White House?”
122
 
Beck produced You Are Not Alone: 9-12 Project on Fox News on March 13 at 5pm - two weeks 
prior to President Obama‟s March 24 press conference on the economic crisis, informing the public of his 
comprehensive economic strategy. During the one-hour special Beck introduced the 9-12 Project, 
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premised upon recreating the feeling of community and individual autonomy of choice the day after 9/11. 
MSNBC‟s Morning Joe responded to the Beck announcement of the 9-12 Project by laughing at Beck‟s 
emotional theatrics while acknowledging that there was obviously nothing wrong with displaying one‟s 
emotion because it influenced public discourse. Joe Scarborough suggested that Beck was “parodying 
Colbert‟s parody of a conservative talk show host.”
123
 The special opened with Beck standing backstage, 
acknowledging that he sounded “like a fricking televangelist”, to later visibly authenticate and verify his 
heartfelt pronouncement: 
The real power to change America‟s course resides  
with you. You are the secret. You are the answer. 
[Beck emotionally broke down weeping] I‟m sorry.  
I just love my country. And I fear for it. And it seems  
like the voices of our leaders, and special interests,  
and the media, they‟re surrounding us and it feels  
intimidating. But you know what? Pull away the  
curtain. There isn‟t anybody there. It‟s just a few  
people who are pushing the buttons and their  
voices are really weak. The truth is they don‟t  




The juxtaposition in Beck‟s performance of weeping and then quickly smiling or laughing reflects the 
psychological after-effects of 9/11: emotional confusion. Beck asserted his reluctant role as the messenger 
of the people as the “underdog” and the true guardians of American freedom within the context of the 
post-9/11 world, romanticizing the socio-political context through messianic language of Cold War 
Manichaeism, “us” against “them”: 
Many in Washington want to convince you that they‟re  
the solution. I happen to believe that them being the  
solution is the problem. The system has been perverted 
and it has to be restored. Those who screwed up must be 
allowed to fail. Those who broke the law must go to jail.  
And those who have played by the rules need to be left  
alone to rebuild our nation. The answers have never come  
from Washington. We weren‟t told how to behave that day 
after 9/11. We just knew. It was right. It was the opposite  
of what we feel today. Let us find ourselves and our  
solutions together again with the nine founding principles 
and the twelve eternal values.
125
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Beck has appropriated Reagan‟s messianic conservative rhetoric of small government and shared values 
by offering a populist image that is still compatible with the Republican Party‟s alienated constituency of 
realist neoconservatives. While President Nixon‟s cultural image was used to mobilize the American 
conservative electorate‟s support for the Iraq War, President Reagan‟s cultural image of a “compassionate 
conservative” was utilized following the liberal and black backlash election of 2008 to reinvigorate the 
populist Republican cultural image. On July 23, 2009 – in the middle of “Obama‟s Healthcare Offensive” 
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CHAPTER 2:  NIXONLAND 
 
Perlstein‟s Nixonland has provided a narrative for the 1960s that unfolds from Nixon‟s self-
perception as a peripheral martyr, enabling him to authentically personify America‟s alienated 
demographic majority following 1966. This research builds on Perlstein‟s Before the Storm: Barry 
Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus (2001) in which he traced the rise of the 
American conservative movement, culminating in Goldwater‟s presidential campaign in 1964. The 
identification of Goldwater conservatism became institutionalized within the Republican Party during the 
1966 Republican National Convention, wherein 75 percent of the delegates identified themselves as 
conservatives.
126
 During the convention of the 1962 California Republican Assembly, Nixon denounced 
the conservative John Birch Society as “nuts and kooks”
127
, without realizing that the institution had been 
consumed by what liberal historian Richard Hofstadter observed as the “paranoid style” of member 
Phyllis Schafly, leader of the STOP ERA [Equal Rights Amendment] movement following 1972, arguing 
that the ERA would destroy the traditional family and women‟s legal protections.
128
 During the 
universally recognized polarization of Republicanism during the 1964 Republican National Convention, 
Perlstein observed, “Nixon was one of the few outsiders to understand what was happening: that the 
delegates he addressed at the Cow Palace would be controlling the nomination in 1968, even if Barry 
Morris Goldwater didn‟t win a single electoral vote in 1964.”
129
 During the 1966 California gubernatorial 
election Ronald Reagan deflected his polarizing political affiliation with the radically conservative John 
Birch Society by asserting in late 1965 that he hoped their members would accept his philosophy rather 
than serving as a spokesman for an institution on the fringe. Nixon approached the 1968 presidential 
election with no illusions of the necessity of appeasing the John Birch Society. In spite of National 
Review‟s condemnation of the institution in the October 1965 issue, Nixon observed the emerging 
zeitgeist of the fundamental constituency of Buckley‟s cultural followers: “the Birchers could be handled, 
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but the real menace to the Republican Party came from the Buckleyites.”
130
 As professor Kevin Mattson 
observed, the cultural origins of contemporary conservative television and radio pundits with the 
conservative renaissance philosophy of William F. Buckley Jr., Nixon identified Buckley‟s cultural 
importance and necessary support because of the formation of popular consciousness and culture through 
television. 
Perlstein has uncovered a central psychological identity of Richard Nixon - as well as the 
contingent influences that shaped this self-identity - by recognizing a pattern of behaviour that resonated 
throughout Nixon‟s entire life and simplified it to his identification of “self” and “other”: Orthogonians 
and Franklins - the rural outsider who had to fight his way past the Establishment to reach the center of 
power. This dialectic originated between a minority social group, who ran the student body in Nixon‟s 
high school, called the Franklins, and the majority of students who “seemed resigned to its exclusion.”
131
 
Nixon coined the term Orthogonians - defined as “upright” and a “straighter shooter”
132
 - as an identity 
for the majority to gravitate towards. Academic and cultural commentary has heavily criticized Perlstein‟s 
psychoanalytic extension of this social construct during Nixon‟s high school years to national political 
discourse; however, Perlstein‟s synthesis of Nixon‟s basis of social interaction, solidifying at an early age, 
encompasses the nature of Nixon‟s self-identity and that of his opponent as static - evident in Six Crises 
(1962) where Nixon provided an insight into his perception of “the other”: 
Bigamy, forgery, drunkenness, thievery,  
anti-Semitism, perjury, the whole gamut  
of misconduct in public office, ranging  
from unethical to downright criminal  
activities- all these were among the charges  
that were hurled against me, some publicly  
and others through whispering campaigns  




The present trajectory of this dialectic is most aptly described by Senator Barack Obama‟s quip during the 
2008 American presidential election in which he observed that his opponent, Vietnam POW John 
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McCain‟s “Straight Talk Express” had jumped the rails.
134
 On September 30, 2008, during Senator John 
McCain‟s interview on camera with the Des Moines Register editorial board, the candidate responded to 
the interviewer‟s allegation that the McCain campaign‟s motif of the “ Straight Talk Express” had been 
detoured.
135
 In response to McCain‟s request for “examples of an assertion of that nature”, the interviewer 
identified the McCain campaign‟s depiction of Senator Obama‟s promotion of sexual education in one of 
their television ads based on Obama‟s support of a recent education bill. McCain claimed that he 
respected the interviewer‟s “opinion” that McCain was fragmenting the truth by making disingenuous 
statements, but her opinion did not change the visible facts of his image: “I certainly respect your opinion 
but it‟s not the facts that changes my position and my honorable service to this country. So I respect your 
opinion but I strongly disagree with your assertion.”
136
 After all, in the “age of Reagan”, as President 
Reagan identified during the 1988 Republican National Convention, “Facts are stupid things – stubborn 
things, I should say.” Facts don‟t change denoted images. 
In The Emerging Republican Majority (1969), Kevin Phillips attempted to disincline any partisan 
affiliation in his socio-political analysis by depicting his findings as “a portrait of American presidential 
voting behavior from Civil War days to 1968.”
137
 Phillips attempted to contextualize his grandiose 
assertion within his interpretative framework of “presidential cycles and regimes”
138
, propounding “no 
strategic or policy recommendations,”
139
 but asserting that Nixon‟s election marked “the end of the New 
Deal Democratic hegemony and the beginning of a new era in American politics.”
140
 Serving as an 
administrative assistant to Republican U.S. Representative Paul A. Fino from 1964 to 1968, Phillips 
became special assistant to Nixon campaign manager John N. Mitchell during the 1968 presidential 
election and later became the special assistant to Attorney General Mitchell during the Nixon presidency, 
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serving as the principal analyst for voting patterns and trends for the Nixon organization. Phillips 
concluded based on the election of 1968 that “The Future of Southern Politics” is found in the national 
alienation of the liberal Democratic Party in the south: “Expanding on the pattern of Richard Nixon‟s 




The liberal apotheosis, which Perlstein asserted “had always been clouded,”
142
 was essentially 
undone by the hierarchical dislocation between public and private perceptions. American civil society was 
ready for social change but the American polity as a whole was not. This became evident when orders 
were given from high up instructing the middle ranking officials to view all citizens as equal; they 
weren‟t ready to do that. This became evident immediately during the riots of 1964. Perlstein asserted, 
“Southern political folk wisdom was receiving its vindication: that once civil rights bills started affecting 
North as much as South, it wouldn‟t just be Southerners filibustering civil rights bills.”
143
 The Civil 
Rights Bill attempted to make America flat for all the races and the majority of southern white males, 
especially the older generations, were not ready to be coercively divested of their higher legal status and 
consequently higher existential and historical status. So the majority of them lashed out against the race 
that threatened them. Accordingly, the status quo afforded all middleclass white men the right of equality 
in relation to African-Americans through the benign discourse of exclusionary populist white 
egalitarianism. 
This political conversion explains why racial reconciliation was not accepted in the United States 
as a whole; both political parties had to balance the irreconcilable interests within their constituencies, 
causing American civil society and political culture to be powerless against the seemingly inertial force of 
the ramifications of racial reconciliation. Stability, deemed to be derived from a conservative status quo, 
was implicitly accepted as more valuable than civil rights; this sentiment resonated throughout the 
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philosophy of the principal intellectual architect for the modern American conservative movement, 
William F. Buckley Jr. 
In the National Review‟s obituary issue for its founder in March 2008, the magazine divided their 
founder‟s life into four periods: “The Picador”, 1951-1958, during which Buckley established the 
magazine “to disrupt the operation of liberalism‟s iron triangle”
144
 (liberal bureaucracies - liberal press - 
liberal Congress); “The Organizer”, 1958-1965, during which time Buckley allied with the New 
Republicans “to fight the necessary culture wars of conservatism”, taking “individualism to the extreme 
length of being an individual”
145
; “The Organizer”, 1965-1981, developing a “fusionist conservatism” in 
relation to Samuel Huntington‟s 1957 definition as the reactionary defense of established institutions
146
, 
and believing that “if conservatism had any future, it had to be a hard political movement as well as a soft 
intellectual one”
147
; “The Guardian Angel”, 1981-2008, during which time Buckley intellectually drifted 
away from politics and toward fiction and religion. John O‟Sullivan concluded his glorifying portrait of 
Buckley by acknowledging that Buckley had “undoubtedly said some wrong and foolish things”
148
 during 
the Civil Rights Movement but history exonerated the intellectual architect of the modern American 
conservative movement: 
  There had been two great moral choices facing America  
in the 1950s- segregation and Communism, oppressed  
black Americans and captive nations. Bill had initially  
stumbled, like half the nation, on the first, but he recovered 
himself and sought thereafter to reconcile civil equality  
with constitutional form. Many of Bill‟s enemies (and his  
most bitter ones) remained wrong or indifferent on the  




Within the cultural perception of political redemption (imbibed in the “age of Nixon”) and the 
ability to change (imbibed in the “age of Reagan”), Newsweek observed, “Buckley tolerated some 
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disreputable ideas, including segregation; but he had the capacity to change.”
150
 Newsweek contextualized 
Buckley‟s cultural contribution to modern political thought in their obituary issue by establishing the 
bourgeois landscape of Buckley‟s lifestyle and intellectualism. Evan Thomas eulogized the man and the 
modern Conservative movement based on the degeneration of Buckley‟s “tone and level of civilized 
discourse”
151
 into “the conservatism spawned by talk radio and TV, [where] the haters and know-nothings 
are back, ranting about immigrants and liberals.”
152
 Thomas asserted that the present absolutist “dark 
view of human nature” of social conservatives, perverting Buckley‟s belief that an individual‟s political 
views did not define his or her “essential person”, “But Buckley was as sunny and hopeful as the hero he 
created, Ronald Reagan.”
153
 Conversely, the liberal editor and publisher of The Nation, Katrina Vanden 
Heuvel, acknowledged, “While he could deploy a sometimes vicious wit- which could descend into 
cruelty- Buckley disdained the kind of partisan shoutfests that too often pass for political debate on our 
TVs today.”
154
 Michael Gerson, former speechwriter and policy advisor to President Bush, argued that 
Buckley exorcized the “tortured soul” of conservatism and “came to symbolize the tensions within 
conservatism” by personifying the intellectual crusade of modern American conservatism to defend its 
perception: “Buckley did not regard this struggle between freedom and order as a problem to be solved 
but as a fact, a given deep down in the nature of things. Conservatism, after all, is not an ideology 
demanding rational harmonization. It is a way of life we inherit and appreciate and defend.”
155
 
In the same obituary issue, Evan Thomas also wrote an article on “The Myth of Objectivity” of 
the modern media realities of American politics, concluding that the mainstream media “are prejudiced, 
but not ideologically”, looking for narratives of conflict to reveal character.
156
 Since the “press corps are 
romantics in disguise”, the media is more susceptible to fall for the fraternity-style charm of George W. 
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Bush rather than the substantive rationalism of a politician because “the press lacks the capacity to 
understand and explain technical concepts.”
157
 
 The origins for the modern media realities of American politics was rooted in the media‟s 
inability to identify Nixon‟s media strategy of exploiting the sentiments of racial prejudice during the 
1968 presidential election. Consequently, Nixonland is premised upon the rhetorical fusion of America‟s 
founding religion of Judeao-Christianity and an expansionary American nationalism: Christian 
Nationalism. The foundation of Nixonland is predicated upon the dynamics of confederate nationalism 
due to the fact that the principal objective of Nixon‟s rhetoric was premised upon attracting the southern 
electorate, known as the “southern strategy.” Confederate nationalism and modern American 
conservatism both rely upon a “purity of diction”, a “linguistic uplift and uniformity”, and a “hybrid of 
elite purpose and popular influence”
158
, expressing the purposes of the ruling class and the rhetorical role 
of nationalist thought in society.
159
 Confederate nationalism scholar Drew Gilpin Faust argued, 
A central contention of Confederate nationalism,  
as it emerged in 1861, was that the South‟s effort  
represented a continuation of the struggle of 1776… 
They intended to claim American nationalism as their 




Faust claimed “interpretation must precede evaluation. We must begin to explore Confederate nationalism 
in its own terms - as the South‟s commentary upon itself - as its effort to represent southern culture to the 
world at large, to history, and perhaps most revealingly, to its own people.”
161
 Just as Nixonland cannot be 
understood without abandoning its identification as a partisan interpretation,  
The study of Confederate nationalism must abandon  
the notions of “genuine” or “spurious”, of “myth” or  
“reality”. Such approaches are equivalent to embarking  
upon the study of religion by inquiring into the validity  
of its substantive claims, or to opposing “ideology” and  
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Also, similar to the way the McLuhan culture of Nixonland is “shaped and constrained by its situation,”
163
 
both ideologies reflect the nationalist struggle between tradition and modernity; this manifested in 1968 as 
America‟s transition from a liberal apotheosis to a conservative apotheosis; the threats of modernity - 
posed by American liberalism - provoked American society to retreat to traditionalism. 
Gitlin observed the frailty of the postwar American liberal apotheosis in that American 
liberalism‟s cultural image and message of commonality was personified by an individual rather than the 
liberal Democratic Party: “King alive was the refutation of separatism; King murdered was its 
rationale.”
164
 Following King‟s death, Perlstein observed, “Conservatives pronounced that Martin Luther 
King, with his doctrine of civil disobedience, was responsible for his own murder.”
165
 Professor Will 
Bunch identified that, while black hostility was as real during the Reagan presidency as during the 1960s, 
Reagan reluctantly enacted the law declaring Martin Luther King‟s birthday a national holiday in 1983 
based on his recognition to a conservative supporter of King‟s cultural identity: “I have the reservations 
you have but there the perception of too many people is based on an image not reality.”
166
 
Within the national collective consciousness, the liberal consensus eventually eroded due to the 
gradual heightening of contradictions within American political culture, as revealed in American popular 
culture. American citizens turned on their television sets during the mid-1960s to increasingly observe 
riots within a supposedly racially reconciling society and an increase of American casualties in the 
Vietnam War. The mounting lack of trust in President Johnson during this time and LBJ‟s personification 
of the eroding liberal apotheosis was best demonstrated when the president required gallbladder surgery 
and the media required him to show the scar to prove it. The liberal apotheosis of the 1960s was undone 
by the identification of a paradigm shift within the socio-economic structure of the United States; the shift 
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did not produce Nixonland, it only facilitated it. Hence, Nixonland became premised upon an artificial 
solution to society‟s civil unrest because it was not a social solution to the conflict but rather a politicized 
solution that was framed to attract the electoral support of a simple majority. Perlstein observed, “The 
pundits‟ interpretation was myopic. The antiliberalism was downplayed.”
167
 While media strategies such 
as Nixon‟s would garner analytical attention following Reaganism, Greenberg identified, “in 1968 editors 
were loath to inject analysis into news articles, and the press scarcely mentioned Nixon‟s designs.”
168
 
While Reagan inaugurated the postmodern presidency and institutionalized modern American 
conservatism by restoring the efficacy of the presidential image, the instrumentality of Reagan‟s 
television image grew out of Nixon‟s rhetoric for “identity politics” and his institutionalized form of 
“populist communication.” Nixon was not in the position to assume the leadership of the Republican 
Party following the 1964 Republican National Convention due to the ensuing tension of Nixon‟s 
apprehension of assuming a leadership role of the Goldwater wing and their distrust of Nixon. Perlstein 
asserted that Nixon built his ideology by identifying and encouraging Ronald Reagan as the “pre-eminent 
demagogic moralizer.”
169
 The institutional framework for this modern basis of political organization for 
the Republican Party was inaugurated by Dr. Gaylord Parkinson‟s transformation of the party‟s 
chairmanship role during the 1964 Goldwater campaign into a full-time position. After entering politics 
based on congressman Richard Nixon‟s advice during the HUAC hearings of the late 1940s, Parkinson 
created the Fair Campaign Practices Committee following the 1966 election to formally monitor internal 
party factionalism, regulating criticism from moderates of conservative candidates by introducing Robert 
Walker‟s idea of an Eleventh Commandment: “Thou Shall Not Speak Ill of Any Republican.”
170
 While 
the messianic and hyperbolic rhetoric of Goldwater conservatism polarized the American electorate, 
causing the Republican Party to moderate their rhetoric and images, Nixon, as well as most conservative 
Republicans, observed that the emerging “generation gap” where “the cultural war within which Ronald 
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Reagan thrived was enveloping the nation.”
171
 In the context of the polarizing atmosphere of Goldwater 
conservatism, Dallek observed that Reagan identified in his correspondence with Charles Zweng and 
Dudley Swim that the Eleventh Commandment “would lead him to the promised land.”
172
 
The 1966 Reagan campaign‟s acquisition of the public relations firm of Spencer-Roberts 
provided the principal impetus for Reagan‟s popular political image by creating the modern cultural 
concept of a “citizen-politician.” The marketing concept was based on the inescapable recognition of 
Reagan‟s inadequate knowledge and grasp of state government next to his personal recognition of a 
“citizen‟s resentment” of the social order.
173
 Dallek identified this strategy as “the beginning of the run-
as-an-outsider trend that would sweep presidential politics.”
174
 Reagan conceptualized this approach in 
the context of President Johnson‟s “Great Society” by abstractly proposing “The Creative Society”, 
created by W.S. Birnie, a “right-wing preacher” and radio host.
175
 While the historiography differs on the 
underlying intellectualism of Ronald Reagan and Reaganism, the inescapable reality of Reagan‟s 
intellectual ability is founded on his ability to adapt political rhetoric into an effortless communication of 
the common middle-American‟s concerns. Matthew Dallek identified that Reagan‟s intellectual political 
image originated in the behavioral psychology of UCLA professor Kenneth Holden and San Fernando 
Valley State professor Stanley Plog, who both inserted into Reagan‟s speeches quotations from Edmund 
Burke, Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, Abraham Lincoln, and Benjamin Disraeli.
176
 
 Although the cultural discussion of a “white backlash” surfaced during the 1964 presidential 
election, the cultural stirrings assumed the form of a public debate only after the August 1965 Watts 
riots
177
, during which time, Dallek asserted, Reagan “abandoned even the pretense” of mobilizing black 
voters.
178
 Professor Will Bunch identified that Reagan‟s political image “combined his small-town 
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heartland upbringing with a skill for storytelling that was honed on the back lots of Hollywood into a 
personal narrative that resonated with a majority of voters, but only after it tapped into something darker, 
which was white middle-class resentment of 1960s unrest.”
179
 Conversely, the Watts riots were perceived 
by liberals such as Governor Brown as a visible impetus for the need to repair society‟s social fabric. 
Social conservatives proved to be more connected with the cultural zeitgeist of a “white backlash” by 
observing the riots as evidence of the failure and entropy of New Deal liberalism. Although Governor 
Brown and Reagan mutually agreed not to make the riots a political issue, Dallek asserted that Reagan 
tactically exploited the event by deploring Negro unrest during rural rallies while denying the significance 
of a “white backlash” within the strategy of his campaign.
180
 Dallek argued that Reagan‟s public 
discourse was dialogically produced from Governor Brown‟s opposition, Los Angeles Mayor, Sam Yorty, 
and police chief, Bill Parker, who “denounced social movements, fads, and ideologies for encouraging 
social rebellion and cultural upheaval, and adopted a Manichaean worldview that pitted police and law-
abiding citizens on one side of the social divide against criminals, social workers, and political liberals 
cowering on the other.”
181
 Poignantly, Brown‟s opposition, even within his own political party, perceived 
his defection to New Deal liberalism as political expediency, while Brown perceived his opposition as 
uniformed dogmatists of the new media realities of American politics. Due to these irreconcilable 
perceptions, the failure of Mayor Yorty‟s challenge to Governor Brown‟s candidacy in 1966 - within the 
similar margin that Nixon lost in 1962 - caused analysts to generalize the Democratic primary vote as 
“anti-Brown”, with Yorty further clarifying the result for the public as caused by a “black backlash.”
182
 
The accusations of a “black backlash” underlying the 2008 Obama campaign was implicated by 
McCain during the third televised presidential debate on October 15. McCain demanded an apology and 
repudiation of the public statement released by Georgia Democratic Congressman John Lewis following 
his attendance of the October 11 campaign rally of Republican vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin in 
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which the audience chanted “terrorist” and “kill him” in a racial tension reminiscent of the 1960s: “As 
one who was a victim of violence and hate during the height of the Civil Rights Movement, I am deeply 
disturbed by the negative tone of the McCain-Palin campaign. What I am seeing reminds me too much of 
another destructive period in American history. Sen. McCain and Gov. Palin are sowing the seeds of 
hatred and division, and there is no need for this hostility in our political discourse.”
183
 McCain responded 
to Obama‟s recognition of the public consensus of the cynicism of American politics by defending the 
integrity of his constituency: “I‟m not going to stand for people saying that the people who come to my 




While Reagan was the first individual to personify the political and moral outrage of the white 
majority in American society during the Reagan campaign rally of May 12, 1966
185
, Evans & Novak 
acknowledged in The Reagan Revolution (1981) that the Nixon presidency inaugurated the foundational 
dialectic between liberal activism of the big government of the New Deal era and the conservative 
individualism of the small government of the Reagan era: “In his successful campaign of 1968, Richard 
M. Nixon had made the Republican politician‟s perfunctory obeisance to smaller government.”
186
 Reagan 
and Nixon both had to deflect or benignly neglect the racial issue in order to prevent an ambiguous public 
image; Reagan vehemently denounced the issue as a baseless attack on his personality and integrity, while 
Nixon deemed the issue irrelevant to America‟s future. During the 1966 Republican campaign to win 
back the Senatorial and Congressional majority, Nixon deflected the socio-political reality of racial 
tension resulting from the imposition of racial reconciliation by inaugurating the Republican Party‟s new 
rhetorical emphasis on the contradictions of the New Deal coalition: between Johnson‟s altruistic liberal 
rhetoric of “guns and butter” and the Republican Party‟s depiction of a messianic malaise enveloping the 
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nation. In 1966, Nixon‟s strategy was premised upon a backlash effect against American liberalism by 
campaigning “in traditionally Republican districts where a Democratic congressman had won in 1964 on 
Lyndon Johnson‟s coattails.”
187
 Nixon deflected the central issue of racial tension by redirecting the 
debate from the social level to the legal and federal level of “states‟ rights.” The New York Times “was 
impressed” by Nixon‟s declaration that the racial issue was “a dead horse.”
188
 
To deflect the racial issue Nixon had to first publicly appease the Southern segregationists within 
his party before he proposed a greater priority within American political discourse. Nixon reined in 
control of the Southern Republican Party delegates by publicly rejecting any segregationist plank in the 
Republican platform. Perlstein asserted, “He then defended the Southern Republican segregationists 
against their critics by “accusing its critics of anti-Southern bigotry.”
189
 This served to unify his party 
while simultaneously garnering sympathy for Nixon‟s requisite Southern leaders by creating a perceived 
prejudice against Southern nationalism, understood by the Southern public as Confederate nationalism. 
While Nixon urged all political parties to cease using race in favor of the “issues of the future,”
190
 
Perlstein identified that the “new American conflagration was racial.”
191
 Nixon attempted to deflect the 
issue of race by emphasizing domestic and international security through the broader lens of a “Law & 
Order” motif. Dallek identified that Reagan personally “defined the nature of the new appeal” of the 
Republican “Law & Order” motif by structuring an encompassing morality theme.
192
 Gitlin argued that 
the conservative America in need of protection through the Republican “law and order” motif was 
“abstract, offscreen.”
193
 On September 20, 1966 Gerald Ford staged a press conference during which he 
spoke out against Democrats as the party with big riots in the streets: “How long are we going to abdicate 
law and order – the backbone of any civilization - in favor of a soft social theory that the man who heaves 
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a brick through your window or tosses a firebomb into your car is simply the misunderstood and 
underprivileged product of a broken home?”
194
 
During 1967 Nixon fought to rhetorically infiltrate the political arena with President Johnson by 
publicly questioning his foreign policy for the Vietnam War. Perlstein argued, “Every Nixonian twist and 
turn on Vietnam fit a specific pattern: whatever he said, whenever he said it, was always exactly 180 
degrees from the current line the president was taking. Nixon was endeavouring to drive the Texan crazy, 
and to make Nixon the public focus of his rage.”
195
 Nixon accused President Johnson of politicizing peace 
and making the same “great blunder the Truman Administration [committed] during the Korean War”: 
“He has put politics ahead of policy so many times that leaders of both parties on Capital Hill are publicly 
asking today whether- in going to the far East- he is even playing politics with world peace.”
196
 Derived 
from Nixon‟s imposed framework for modern political discourse, Professor Will Bunch observed that, 
during the Reagan presidency, ”The president‟s message was the 180-degree opposite of what was 
happening behind the scenes.”
197
 
 During 1968‟s Summer of Rage, only months prior to the presidential election, Nixon remained 
silent about the visible displays of police brutality in order to avoid appearing to endorse martial law or 
alienate victims of police brutality. Initially, while the media and the Johnson Administration were 
blaming the rioters, Nixon remained silent. This merely played into Nixon‟s intended framework for 
political discourse.
198
  By November 1, Nixon stated that his faith in the Southern vote had declined: “The 
reason is that the Democratic Party- in a desperate throw of the dice- has gambled upon racism, 
demagoguery, and backlash to win for it what the calibre of its candidates cannot. The gamble will pay 
off in some backwaters of the South. But the Democratic Party has made a fatal mistake. It has risked the 
next generation, just to win the next election.”
199
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Nixon‟s centrist strategy was premised upon using rhetorical generalities to avoid alienating any 
demographic on top of the American southern electorate. Perlstein observed, “It was part of a strategy 
unprecedented in modern times. Never before had a candidate devoted so much to saying so little to so 
many.”
200
 Nixon‟s opponents and the prevailing conventional wisdom of the McLuhan culture predicted 
1968 to be the year of  “Republican Camelot.”
201
 Perlstein asserted that a New York Times dispatch 
indicated the perception that Nixon‟s depiction of his presidential image “as the Goldwater candidate of 
1968” was “a tactical error of major importance.”
202
 However, Perlstein argued that Nixon triumphed as 
the Republican nominee in 1968 because the other candidates “were men who hardly noticed the 
ideological ground shifting beneath their feet.”
203
 Nixon‟s political “other” was not as self-conscious. 
Perlstein asserted, “Richard Nixon was gearing up to run for president in a different country from the one 
that had apotheosized Lyndon Johnson. The only consensus was that the consensus was long gone.”
204
  
By 1968, “The hottest idea was that a mood of radical helplessness was blanketing the land- America was 
suffering an epidemic of “alienation.””
205
 Nixon chose to exploit this universal sentiment to the same 
advantage as Reagan‟s gubernatorial campaign by uniting the expanding middle class against the 
demonstrated ramifications of enacting minority rights. 
Although Ronald Reagan paved the road to Nixonland in California and later consolidated a 
McLuhan culture in the White House, it did not become “Reaganland” because Nixon created the very 
premise upon which the road was built. In fact, Reagan thanked Nixon after his win in 1966 and Nixon 
“started paying a lot more attention to Reagan”
206
 because he was still a political opponent at that time. 
Nixon acquiesced to Reagan‟s demands on antipoverty and welfare reform to prevent him from running 
in 1972. Evans & Novak argued, “Reagan took an overt tutorial role, using “reading sheets” prepared by 
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his staff to lecture the president on runaway government.”
207
 President Ford similarly sought Reagan‟s 
advice on appointments and hinted that he would be consulted following the end of his governorship.
208
 
This does not represent the guidance of the movement, only friendly overtures to prevent the future issue 
of competition. Meese revealed in an interview with Greenberg that the overtures to Nixon during the 
Reagan presidency were similarly just attempts to make Nixon feel good.
209
 
Reagan consolidated the foundational psychology of Nixonland by choosing Alexander M. Haig 
Jr. as his Secretary of State based on Nixon‟s suggestion. Haig inferred in his memoir that his 
appointment by Reagan was based on Haig‟s association with the Nixon administration and his 
appearance in the media for apparently criticizing Carter‟s foreign policy, amounting to a competitive 
commercial appeal for Haig as a presidential candidate. Reagan first requested to meet Haig to discuss the 
“European scene” in the spring of 1979 after Haig had “made some comments [in Europe] about U.S. 
policy toward Soviets that the press had interpreted as being critical of the policies of my commander in 
chief, President Jimmy Carter.”
210
 Haig intimated in his memoir that Reagan acquired him on the team to 
eliminate the competition between their intersecting visions. Haig emphasized his acceptance of the 
position based on Reagan‟s suggested relationship of subordinating the National Security Advisor‟s role 
of spokesman or staff coordinator to the Secretary of State.
211
 
Reagan‟s election reflected a public mandate for conservative realism, and Haig, like Reagan, 
believed that confrontation with the Soviet Union would provoke the inner migration of the demographic 
majority within the Soviet Union.
212
 In his memoir, Haig implied Reagan‟s primary role as the spokesman 
for the Republican Party in his observation that Reagan had not intellectually impressed him prior to his 
taking office and he did not believe this quality was essential for the Reagan presidency.
213
 Meese and 
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Deaver quickly limited Haig‟s access to the president due to a continued suspicion of Haig‟s intentions; 
this ambiguity was found in Haig‟s immediate insistence on “NSDD1, the Presidential decision 
memorandum establishing the structure of foreign policy.”
214
 Haig handed in the document to Edwin 
Meese for Reagan to sign on Inauguration Day based on his moral belief to frame foreign policy within a 
legal framework; however, Reagan never saw the document: “The next day, the press contained gossip 
items suggesting that I had tried to thrust the paper into the President‟s hands and secure his signature 
only moments after he had taken the oath of office.”
215
 Haig was confounded to find that Meese 
“appeared to think that the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the 
National Security Advisor had to clear this paper with him.”
216
 
Prior to the Bush II presidency, professor William E. Pemberton argued in Exit with Honor: The 
Life and Presidency of Ronald Reagan (1998) that by the mid-1960s Republican actor Ronald Reagan 
emerged within American conservative political culture “at the center of the [culture] war, both as a 
product of it and as a general in it, commanding territory seized by Goldwater, Nixon, and Alabama 
governor George C. Wallace.”
217
 Three years earlier, Gitlin contended that Reagan personified a 
“Gramscian intellectual”, focusing “diverse interests, or class fractions, into functioning “historic blocs” 
by enunciating their common cause.”
218
 Pemberton argued that the conservative opposition to Roosevelt‟s 
“relativistic moral values and a misguided belief in humankind‟s perfectibility”
 219
 was premised upon 
consolidating the status quo. The tension between civil libertarianism and hard-line social conservatism 
was resolved when the status quo was altered by “a third strain of postwar conservative thought, 
anticommunism.”
220
 Pemberton argued that the “common enemy” that communism afforded 
conservatives - mobilized by the admixture of Reagan‟s spokesmanship role for Goldwater conservatism - 
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enabled the conservative movement to expand its base according to population and wealth increases and 
purge the Republican Party of “radicalism.” Pemberton contended, “Reagan‟s conservative thought was 
founded on his absolute belief in American exceptionalism,”
 221
 with his conception of the United States 
abstracted into a messianic idea of historical providence.  Pemberton attributed the inaugural leadership of 
modern American conservatism to Reagan due to the fact that Reagan‟s “years with General Electric 
helped him direct his evolving populist brand of conservatism toward working-middle-class people. He 
added to his antitax, patriotic, and anticommunist themes a pro-business, antigovernment, essentially anti-
New Deal message.”
222
 Reagan perceived Kennedy‟s “bold new imaginative program” as “old Karl 
Marx”, derivative of the age of “benevolent monarchy” and Hitler‟s “State Socialism.”
223
 Reagan 
proclaimed – prematurely - in 1964, and to the consternation of Goldwater‟s closest advisers, Denison 
Kitchel and William Baroody, Sr., that American conservatism “will have no more of those candidates 
who are pledged to the same socialist philosophy of our opposition.”
224
 
Pemberton argued that while Nixon reached the “head” of the voter in 1968, Reagan connected 
with the “heart”- in what Nixon described as a demagogic way.
225
 Pemberton asserted that, as a result of 
the modern conservative movement, “virtually” all republicans held two core beliefs that encapsulated 
Reagan‟s new postwar conservatism: “that flawed human nature was an unchanging mixture of both good 
and evil, and that an objective moral order existed, independent of humanity.”
226
 Essentially, Reagan 
centralized the rhetorical focus of modern American conservatism. These beliefs explained the cohesion 
of conservative groups and the underlying tension within conservative thought, resulting from the 
opposing needs for authority and freedom, and the fact that secularism and pragmatism are perceived 
within the “culture wars” as providing the catalyst for the erosion of moral foundations. 
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Although Pemberton illustrated the developing relationship between Reagan and Nixon following 
1959, he failed to observe how Nixon‟s conservative populist advice to Reagan informed his developing 
self-identity. Pemberton, like most scholars, argued that Reaganism is the root of modern American 
conservatism because “Populist, antiestablishment feeling in the United States had traditionally directed 
its anger at big business. Reagan redirected that anger and identified the establishment as the 
government.”
227
 By the 1980s, “Conservatism retained its base of traditional, libertarian, and 
anticommunist adherents, and added a populist cast from the New Right and the Religious Right, and 
reestablished a profitable relationship with a newly mobilized corporate community.”
228
 While Pemberton 
argued that “conservatives saw the 1980 election as a giant step in the long swing toward conservatism 
that started in 1964”
229
, Nixon inaugurated the presidential swing through his form of centrist populist 
communication. 
Pemberton acknowledged that Reagan balanced his disparate conservative movement during the 
1984 presidential election by keeping “his Religious Right followers happy through rhetoric and symbolic 
gestures rather than through effective action on their agenda.”
230
 Although Reagan‟s presidential image 
was predicated upon a hardline conservative image - in accordance with the socio-political context and 
the authenticity of Reagan‟s self-identity - American political culture‟s inherited form of populist 
communication from Nixon was still constrained by centrist public opinion. Reagan inaugurated the 
postmodern presidency by instrumentalizing Nixon‟s neorealist populist rhetoric to affect public opinion. 
Accordingly, the strict implementation of Reaganism through the medium of Reagan‟s television image 
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2.1 THE McLUHAN CULTURE OF THE TELEVISION AGE 
 
The McLuhan culture of Nixonland has proved to be the regulatory medium for the American 
“culture wars” of the 1960s. Marshall McLuhan first observed the New Left belief in reforming the 
American political system through expansion of public knowledge before the “culture wars” of the 1960s 
were institutionalized in the 1968 presidential election: 
The ultimate conflict between sight and sound, between  
written and oral kinds of perception and organization of  
existence is upon us. Since understanding stops action,  
as Nietzsche observed, we can moderate the fierceness  
of this conflict by understanding the media that extend  




McLuhan‟s seminal interpretation of the effect of television on popular culture was the inaugural 
investigation into American consciousness through Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (1964). 
McLuhan‟s analysis of the effect of television on popular culture, which in the electric age extended to 
The Global Village (1989), is encapsulated by the illumination of a light bulb- unless it advertises a 
product- insofar as it illustrates the characteristic of all media, where “the “content” of any medium is 
always another medium.”
232
 Quite simply, a light bulb extends the sense of sight. McLuhan prophesized 
that technology is an extension of the human body and mind insofar as innovation extends existing 
processes or mediums. McLuhan argued that  “any technology gradually creates a totally new human 
environment.”
233
 This means “the personal and social consequences of any medium- that is, of any 
extension of ourselves- result from the new scale that is introduced into our affairs by each extension of 
ourselves, or by any new technology.”
234
 McLuhan claimed the residual disjuncture between the meeting 
of radio and television, between sight and sound, rhetoric and action, within American society as a whole, 
was inherent to the expansionary affluence of the 1950s: “In periods of new and rapid growth there is a 
                                                 
231
 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York and Scarborough: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1964), 30. 
232
 Ibid., 23. 
233
 Ibid., viii. 
234
 Ibid., 23. 
  
   
 64 
blurring of outlines. In the TV image we have the supremacy of the blurred outline.”
235
 As a result of the 
extension of humanity into the television age, the causal “amputations” or modifications of existing 
processes, or extensions of humanity, are minimized or ignored because of their negative effects. 
McLuhan argued that the natural over-extension of new technology and the willing blindness to its 
inconvenient effects produces a relationship in which the challenges eventually outweigh the benefits. 
Television detracts children from reading and learning but does this have a long-term effect? Does 
television free us or bind us? Television naturally enhances our senses but are these senses therefore 
controlled by the programs we watch? 
The most visible “amputation” during the transition from the mechanical age to the electric age 
was the centralization and urbanization of the railway system changing to the decentralization caused by 
electricity. McLuhan contended, “Print technology created the public. Electric technology created the 
mass.”
236
 The electric age enabled the rise of the “mass man”, the middle-class. By the early 1960s, the 
politicization of “mass man” in the American political system had the Democratic Party attempt to reform 
“mass man” through the Civil Rights Movement while the Republican Party sought to simply mobilize 
“mass man” by 1968 to contain the ramifications of the Civil Rights Movement.
237
 In The Unraveling of 
America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s  (1984), Professor Allen J. Matusow argued this 
conceptual framework based on the fact that Kennedy and modern American liberalism entered the 
decade on the basis of exploiting class and social antagonisms without provoking them, while Nixon and 
modern American conservatism exited the decade by exploiting the fear of class and social antagonisms 
without provoking them. The impetus for this transition originated in the reversal in American 
counterculture during the 1960s from the “politics of love” to the “politics of rage.” Nixon sought to 
capitalize on the cultural decline of liberalism by exploiting the societal fear of this new “politics of rage” 
by projecting an image of moderate paternalism, consequently reversing his personification during the 
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1960 presidential election as the antiquated mechanical age next to John F. Kennedy‟s visible 
personification of the new television age. For this reason, the electric age is aptly “the age of 
consciousness of the unconscious”
238
 because we feel what we see but we don‟t see what we‟re told. By 
the 1960s television let Americans see what they were being told. The speed and intensity of the 
dissemination of television throughout America‟s consumer-based economy apparently caused the 
television “mass” to be numb to what they hear and only feel what they see. 
In the “television age”, humanity no longer has to visualize the message because we can see the 
message. Prior to the Electric Age, Western man had been extended by phonetic writing, which “has the 
power of separating and fragmenting the sense and sloughing off the semantic complexities.”
239
 McLuhan 
argued, “The TV reverses this literate process of analytic fragmentation of sensory life.”
240
 Television 
brings all of our senses together but subsumes every sense under the power of sight. The viewer is 
naturally swayed by what he or she sees more than what they hear because the “phonetic alphabet forced 
the magic world of the ear to yield to the neutral world of the eye.”
241
 By 1964, McLuhan lamented 
humanity‟s intellectual ear: 
The new media and technologies by which we  
amplify and extend ourselves constitute huge  
collective surgery carried out on the social body  
with complete disregard for antiseptics…For in  
operating on society with a new technology, it is 
not the incised area that is most affected. The area  
of impact and incision is numb. It is the entire system  
that is changed. The effect of radio is visual, the effect  
of the photo is auditory. Each new impact shifts the  




With radio, the listener visualizes the narrator‟s imagery. With a photograph, the pictorial speaks 
to the observer. With television, what you see and hear makes you feel what you perceive the picture to 
denote and what the words connote; what the image says speaks louder than the words we hear; this is 
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why the viewer is inclined to subordinate the content of the message to the image itself. McLuhan argued 
that TV, as “an extension of the sense of touch” involves the “maximal interplay of all the senses.”
243
 He 
organized the transition from the medium of radio to the medium of television by differentiating between 
“hot media”, involving low participation, and “cool media”, involving “participation or completion by the 
audience.”
244
 In contrast to TV, literacy and radio extended psychically and socially “the power of 
detachment and non-involvement.”
245
 Since television involves the viewer, McLuhan analyzed how TV is 
“cooling down”
246
 America. Television fills in the holes of our fragmented reality. Television completes 
our picture of reality. For most people, television is their picture of reality. McLuhan determined that “the 
medium is the message”, or more directly, “the medium is socially the message”
247
 in the electric age 
because the characteristics of a medium such as television overshadow the content of the medium itself. 
McLuhan contended, “Societies have always been shaped more by the nature of the media by which men 
communicate than by the content of the communication.”
248
 In The Medium is the Massage (1967), or 
“mass age”, or “message”, McLuhan asserted, 
The medium, or process, of our time- electric technology–  
is reshaping and restructuring patterns of social interdependence 
and every aspect of our personal life. It is forcing us to reconsider  
and reevaluate practically every thought, every action, and every  
institution formerly taken for granted. Everything is changing-  
you, your family, your neighborhood, your education, your job,  




John Kenneth White argued in The New Politics of Old Values (1990) that during the 1980 presidential 
election, “The Republicans took custody of family, work, neighborhood, peace, and freedom.”
250
  
Although Reagan institutionalized this image in the Republican Party by 1980, in 1968 Nixon first 
instrumentalized the medium of television to actualize his mythical paternal centrist image of shared 
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values; this became visible in his administrative policy with the introduction of the Family Assistance 
Plan. 
 McLuhan argued that “organic myth is itself a simple and automatic response”
251
 for the 
television medium: “Myth is contraction or implosion of any process, and the instant speed of electricity 
confers the mythic dimension on ordinary industrial and social action today. We live mythically but 
continue to think fragmentarily and on single planes.”
 252
 We live in a “television reality” in the 
“television age” but we cannot think outside of the box to realize this fact. By 1964, Kennedy‟s election 
victory of 1960 was interpreted as “a pattern of TV reversal and upset.”
253
 Nixon was more qualified and 
was said to have won the debate in the minds of radio listeners, but Kennedy looked better on television. 
McLuhan observed, “When the person presented looks classifiable, as Nixon did, the TV viewer has 
nothing to fill in. He feels uncomfortable with his TV image.”
254
 McLuhan identified Kennedy‟s image as 
a sheriff while Nixon projected the image of a “railway lawyer.”
255
 Kennedy personified the younger 
television generation while Nixon personified the antiquated railway days of the older generation. 
Following the assassination and martyrdom of the younger generation, Kennedy became a “paradoxical 
feature of the “cool” TV medium” in that witnessing his death involved the viewer but it did not “excite, 
agitate, or arouse.”
256
 Americans did not riot over disputed images in the media; they just went numb. 
Nixon‟s politicization of the reversal in counterculture by the end of the decade became reflective of the 
natural inclination for the American polity to consolidate the conservative status quo because “innovation 
is for them not novelty but annihilation.”
257
 Nixon reversed the technological innovation of the younger 
generation by instrumentalizing their medium to project a marketable image. This was done through the 
creation and control of the “photo opportunity” and Nixon‟s “carrot and stick” approach to scheduling 
press conferences and bombing North Vietnam to project an image of strength. 
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 In The Selling of the President 1968 (1969), Philadelphia Inquirer columnist Joe McGinniss 
identified the Nixon campaign‟s explicit application of McLuhan‟s analysis of television to construct his 
presidential image: “Style becomes substance. The medium is the massage and the masseur gets the 
votes.”
258
 McGinnis‟ account of Nixon‟s 1968 campaign became a number one bestseller following its 
release in October and the day after the January 17, 1972 Harris Poll, which indicated Nixon‟s 49 percent 
approval rating, became dramatized in popular culture with the announcement of its adaptation into a 
Broadway musical.
259
 Greenberg argued that McGinnis‟ work enhanced the self-consciousness of 
American journalism by informing reporters of the media strategies in which they played a part, and 
confirming the liberal perception of the “Old Nixon‟s immutability.”
260
 While the victimized press corps 
felt deceived by Nixon‟s machinations, the frustrating tension of modern political discourse between 
politicians and the media was imbibed in the press corps‟ recognition of the realities of the McLuhan 
culture of American politics and the causal inability to identify the manipulation of reality independent of 
a partisan perspective.
261
 Greenberg observed, “Although the press was forming a picture of Nixon as a 
pioneer of image management, they felt the rules of objectivity still obliged them to relay Nixon‟s own 
preferred view of himself instead of the one that they had formed.”
262
 
McGinniss recognized the Nixon campaign as a failure in 1960 “because he was too few of the 
things a President had to be- and, because he had no press to lie for him and did not know how to use 
television to lie about himself.”
263
 McGinniss illustrated Nixon‟s concisely managed public image 
through his narration of the multiple takes and semantic or visual adjustments necessary in Nixon and his 
staff‟s creative process for arranging a one-minute television message. Nixon‟s one-hour television 
programs were produced by Roger E. Ailes, the executive producer of the popular Mike Douglas Show, 
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under his assumption that 1968 was the first electronic election: “TV has the power now.”
264
 Nixon‟s 
cultural image was further enhanced during his presidency by arranging for NBC to produce a prime-time 
special Christmas at the White House and for CBS to document A Day in the Presidency.
265
 Ailes‟ role as 
the media architect of the modern American conservative movement was confirmed in his construction of 
the television ad campaigns for President Reagan in 1984 and Vice President George H.W. Bush in 1988, 
injecting racial imagery to exploit racial feelings in the latter race through a photograph of black inmate 
William Horton - guilty of rape but exempted from the death penalty due to the supposedly passive policy 
of Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis‟s being soft on crime in relation to the Republican “Law & 
Order” motif. During the 1990s, Ailes became president of NBC‟s cable channel Consumer News and 
Business Channel (CNBC) and recruited a group of right-wing broadcasters (including Sean Hannity and 
Bill O‟Reilly) in conjunction with Rupert Murdoch of News Corporation to anchor the Fox News 
Channel (FNC), launched on October 7, 1996. While the communications apparatus of the modern 
conservative movement proliferated into the television market during the 1990s, it was during the Nixon 
presidency that the White House office of communications was established, introducing the position of a 
“full-time PR director”, advertising executive Jeb Magruder
266
, which was separate from the press 
secretary‟s operation in order to more efficiently distribute the administration‟s positive message to the 
public. 
Nixon‟s television image was created by “men who knew television as a weapon: from broadest 
concept to most technical detail.”
267
 William Gavin, a thirty-one-year-old high school English teacher, 
posing as a University of Pennsylvannia professor, wrote a letter to Nixon in the spring of 1967, 
encouraging him to run for the presidency in 1968 by utilizing his access to television to suit his ends: 
“Instead of the medium using you, you would be using the medium.”
268
 Soon after he was hired, “Gavin 
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began churning out long, stream-of-consciousness memos which dealt mostly with the importance of 
image, and ways in which Richard Nixon, through television, could acquire a good one.”
269
 Also in 1967, 
Nixon‟s campaign began under the former editorial writer for the New York Herald Tribune Raymond K. 
Price‟s assumption that, “The natural human use of reason is to support prejudice, not arrive at 
opinions.”
270
 The Nixon campaign explicitly attempted to create the ideal candidate rather than a real 
candidate to present as Nixon‟s reading of the American zeitgeist. According to the public polls forming 
the Ideal President Curve, “The gaps between the Nixon line and the Ideal line represented personality 
traits that Nixon should try to improve.”
271
 While Price asserted that Nixon represented “an open 
presidency”, he felt that voters naturally went with their “gut reaction” to the image rather than to the 
individual, diagnosing Nixon‟s problem correctly as a personal rather than historical matter. McGinniss 
asserted that the “creative director of advertising” for the campaign, Harry Treleaven, appeared 
“intrigued” by the fact that issues did not have to be involved in the election because they were not 
involved in selling other products on television like Ford automobiles.
272
 In Tear Down This Myth (2009), 
professor Will Bunch observed: “Going into the 1984 race, Reagan‟s team, including Nancy Reagan, who 
took a keen interest in how her husband was portrayed on television, seemed to sense instinctively what 
few other politicians did, that Madison Avenue was latching on to new ways to use emotion rather than 




The penetration of Nixon‟s multi-faceted conservative image into liberal popular culture 
solidified his intended visible identity of centrism: moderate paternalism (conservatism). Perlstein argued 
that Humphrey retrospectively lamented not appearing on the pop cultural parody of American society 
had cost him the election because “Rowan & Martin’s Laugh-In (think sit-in, teach-in, be-in) was a 
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deliberate attempt to harness insurgent new cultural energies for the mainstream.”
274
 Nixon appeared on 
the show on September 16, 1968, participating in one of the most popular running gags of Laugh-In‟s 
writer Paul Keyes, who was a former joke writer for Nixon. The other popular comedy show at the time 
was too subversive.  Perlstein observed, “The Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour on CBS was intended as a 
generic variety show, until the younger Smothers brother, Tommy, began injecting New Leftist touches 
into the skits, to the great consternation of network executives.”
275
 
On Day 17 of Nixon‟s First One Hundred Days, Nixon questioned his staff on the progress of 
beginning the regulation procedure of television on the basis of “letters to the editor project and calls to 
TV stations.”
276
 Prior to the scheduled State of the Union Address in March, Nixon‟s regulation apparatus 
was in place based on the RNC and state and local Republican parties creation of loyalists lists- the 
“Nixon Network”- willing to write on their own or lend their names to ghostwritten missives on items of 
presidential concern. On Day 52, Perlstein observed, it was the Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour: 
They have a sequence in which one said to the other  
that he found it difficult to find anything to laugh about- 
Vietnam, the cities, etc., but „Richard Nixon‟s solving  
those problems‟ and „that‟s really funny.‟” Nixon told  
aides he wanted letters to the producers, stipulating their 
argument: the gag was inaccurate “in view of the great  
public approval of RN‟s handling of foreign policy, etc., 




Beginning in the spring, Nixon and Kissinger began wiretapping reporters, orchestrating a “Game Plan” 
for media manipulation by the end of the year to counter antiwar protests.
278
 Following the release of 
McGinniss‟ polemic on the new realities of political media strategies and Nixon‟s November 3 televised 
speech to foment support from the “great silent majority” for his Vietnam policy, Greenberg argued that 
Nixon instructed Vice President Spiro T. Agnew to criticize the media during November with “high-
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 Greenberg, 145. 
  




 In the context of the expanding consciousness of media strategies, Nixon‟s overture 
to his abstract constituency rather than announcing a substantive next step in his Vietnam policy 
proliferated the liberal perception that Nixon‟s continued promise of a “secret plan” to end the war in 
Vietnam was simply an abstract form of leverage over his opponents. 
The day after Nixon‟s “Silent Majority” speech, press secretary Herb Klein reported opinion 
polls, some generated by the White House, which overwhelmingly indicated the public‟s aversion to the 
after-speech punditry, while the Federal Communications Commission chairman Dean Burch requested 
post-address transcripts of each networks analyses.
280
 During Agnew‟s speech on November 13 in Des 
Moines, the vice president conceptually grounded the public opinion polls within the proliferation of elite 
liberal journalism as the source for the lack of “straight and objective news.”
281
 Following the public 
support of his speech (reflected in an ABC poll indicating 51 percent of respondents favouring his 
speech), Agnew directly criticized The New York Times and The Washington Post in his next speech on 
November 20 in Montgomery, Alabama
282
, which convinced the editor of the Post Ben Bradlee to appoint 
an ombudsman, Richard Harwood.
283
 Greenberg concluded, “Nixon and Agnew were hoping to harness 
the rage of socially conservative Middle Americans and make the media heel to their concerns.”
284
 
Nixon reversed the introspective cultural fad of dissecting political media strategies by the end of 
the first year of his presidency by turning the spotlight onto the media. This was despite the fact that by 
the end of the first year of the Nixon presidency the percentage of positive stories was the second highest 
behind Roosevelt (88.8 percent) at 81.2 percent.
285
 As demonstrated during the interviewer‟s apologetic 
and timid interview with Agnew on Face the Nation in February 1970, Greenberg identified, “Eager to 
ward off charges of bias, reporters resolved to be fairer.”
286
 The perceptions of the Nixon administration 
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and the press corps polarized during visible cultural confrontations such as Defense Department official 
Daniel Ellsburg‟s release of the Pentagon Papers on June 13, 1971 in the Sunday New York Times, with 
the subsequent lawsuit by Nixon to prevent further publication and the rejection by the Supreme Court as 
an issue of national security; however, the press corps‟ reactions to the revelation of the Watergate break-
in on June 17, 1972 reflected the pervading constraints of the consciousness of cultural media strategies, 
indicative of the fact that CBS, principally Dan Rather and Daniel Schorr, was the only television network 
which pursued the Watergate story during the summer of 1972, with Walter Cronkite reporting the 
findings of Woodward and Bernstein‟s Post coverage for fourteen minutes of the program‟s twenty-two 
minutes of news on October 27, a week away from the election.
287
 Nixon‟s subsequent allegation of 
McGovern propaganda forced the producer of CBS to trim Cronkite‟s next report of the Watergate story 
to eight minutes. Gallup polls indicated Nixon‟s approval rating declining from 41 percent to 27 percent 
from January to November 1973, provoking the representative of the new Republican right, Senator 
James Buckley of New York, to call for Nixon‟s departure in March 1974 in what his father William F. 
Buckley, Jr. identified was an attempt to displace the cultural domination of liberal adversarialism rather 
than simply legitimize or appease liberal perceptions.
288
 
Nixon‟s political strategy for television continued to shape the image of the presidency on 
television following his resignation and the initial rehabilitation of his public image during the David 
Frost interviews in 1978. The Reagan presidency was explicitly premised upon the news management 
techniques that were introduced during the Nixon presidency, including the “line of the day”, “the 
morning conference calls among foreign and domestic agency press officers, the heartland journalist 
program, the weekly long-range communications strategy meetings.”
289
 In terms of Reagan‟s television 
image, Nixon can be attributed as a principal architect of the postmodern presidency. In Buckley‟s letter 
to Reagan, March 24, 1982, he recounted a recent meeting with Richard Nixon and Van Galbraith in 
Paris. While Nixon acknowledged that Reagan was “doing well”, he recognized “deficiencies”: 
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--RR should not spend as much time as he currently does 
up front, defending his policies. He should devote that  
time to occasional big-time television appearances. E.g.,  
when the subject of the budget is finally disposed of, RR  
should appear on television and announce the way it‟s  





Reagan‟s Press Secretary, from 1981 to 1986, Larry Speakes, recounted in his memoir of how Reagan 
exited the aisle between the rows of reporters until the end of his first term: “That prompted Richard 
Nixon, who was watching on television, to make one of his occasional calls to the White House and 
suggest that the whole mob scene at the end of press conferences “looked unpresidential.”
291
 Similar to 
Nixon‟s political strategy in 1968 to say as little substance as possible, one of Reagan‟s image managers, 
Richard Darman, contended in his 1996 memoir, “The 1980 Reagan election campaign had been light on 
programmatic detail, heavy on generality and anecdote.”
292
 Nixon knew he was selling an image. Reagan 
knew this as well, but he believed in his image. This is why the Reagan Revolution was founded 
“wholeheartedly and certainly not self-consciously” upon Reagan‟s belief that Vietnam was “a noble 
cause”
293
 within the history of American exceptionalism. 
Within professor Ryan Barilleaux‟s conception of the Reagan presidency as the inauguration of 
the post-modern presidency (1988), he asserted the media age “has emphasized image and appearance in 
politics, but appearance has not overridden substance so as it has affected the way that substantive matters 
are presented.”
294
 Barilleaux seems to have not been able to identify that in a McLuhan culture, “Style 
becomes substance.” In The Post-Modern Presidency: The Office after Ronald Reagan (1988), Barilleaux 
argued that the postmodern presidency, created through a series of events and trends that culminated in 
Watergate and the end of the Vietnam War, is post-modern in nature because it is not an extension of 
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FDR into the future, “but has been transformed into something substantively different.”
295
 Barilleaux 
believed the postmodern presidency represented Reagan‟s personification of a conservative ideology that 
was substantively different from FDR‟s personification of the modern presidency. 
Barilleaux contended, “Post-modern presidents not only use public politics to govern, but also realize that 
the entire public face of the presidency affects their ability to do so.”
296
 
Based on Fred Greenstein‟s conception of the “Traditional Presidency” in Evolution of the 
Modern Presidency: A Bibliographic Survey (1977), Barilleaux argued that American political history can 
be reduced to three periods of the presidency: traditional, modern, and postmodern. This comprised of 
Woodrow Wilson‟s conception of the “rhetorical presidency”, reflective of the president‟s role of chief 
policymaker and founded on the individual‟s popular election and the public opinion of his leadership. 
The modern presidency, or the Rooseveltian presidency, is associated with governmental activism and a 
liberal agenda.
297
 The trend toward president-centered government reached its height during the Nixon 
Administration, which was considered an “imperial presidency”, but it was still within the tradition of the 
modern presidency. While Nixon‟s introduction of “going public” presents itself as a logical continuation 
of the rhetorical presidency, “it is also a radical intensification of it.”
298
 The decline of the modern 
presidency was identified as a “protracted process” due to the congressional legislation passed to curb 
presidential power: the OMB director had to receive Senate confirmation for appointment (1973); the 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974; the Case Act (1972); and the War Powers Resolution (1973).
299
 
Reagan‟s image of strength, however, restored power to the medium of the presidential image. Barilleaux 
argued that the presidency itself is an “artificial creation”: “What voters see on their televisions is 
something constructed, whether by the media or the president, for public consumption.”
300
 While 
Barilleaux did recognize the fact that Reagan‟s “activities were planned with an eye to the visual 
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impressions they would leave”
301
, he did not perceive Reagan‟s instrumentalization of television 
originating from Nixon‟s politicization of television in 1968. He recognized the increasing defection of 
the New Deal coalition to the ranks of the Republican Party but he believed it was because “the electorate 
is in flux”
302
, not because of the party‟s television image of conservative paternalism, but rather because 
of Reagan‟s cult of personality. The historiography on Reaganism generally fails to sufficiently recognize 
the instrumentalization of Reagan‟s cult of personality through the medium of television as the primary 
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CHAPTER 3:  THE REAGAN REVOLUTION: The Modern American Revolution 
 
 Reagan‟s “primitive” instincts or his “inborn instinct”
303
 for the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
coincided with reality; however, Reagan‟s political image required him to construct reality. The Reagan 
era coincided with the historical closure of Alexis de Tocqueville‟s prophesy from 1835 of the dialectic 
between Anglo-American and Russian imperialism. At the beginning of the Cold War both political 
systems were driven M.A.D. by the older generation‟s doctrine of nuclear diplomacy and the presumed 
inevitability of one national interest historically subverting the threat of the “other.” While the Soviet-
American détente process of the 1970s was contingent upon the convergence of analogous internal and 
external circumstances, as William E. Pemberton (1998) argued in his psychological analysis of 
Reaganism, “The cold war ended because by the late 1980s the interests of the superpowers coincided.”
304
 
The returning focus of nuclear diplomacy and military superiority during the Reagan presidency was 
intentionally calculated by Reagan, coercing “open serious negotiations when American strength and 
Soviet vulnerability converged to bring Moscow to the bargaining table.”
305
 This convergence was 
precipitated by the “inner migration”
306
 within the Soviet Union, involving the existential rejection of the 
communist system that resulted from the détente process. Conversely, William F. Buckley, Jr. 
historicized the dissolution of the Soviet Union in a lecture at Vanderbilt University, on September 18, 
1991, as solely attributable to Reagan‟s historical image and leadership: 
In the West there were, everywhere, steadfast friends  
of liberty, but by no means can it be said that they  
dominated the public policy of the West. That can be 
said of only one figure. It was Ronald Reagan, history 
is certain to confirm, who suddenly forced the leaders  
of Soviet Communism to look in the mirror, and what  
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Gorbachev‟s appointment was in fact precipitated by the realist recognition by the old guard of the 
necessity for change by the new guard. Robert Gates - the principal Soviet analyst during the Reagan 
administration - asserted that the Soviet Union dissolved due to ethno-religious factionalism within its 
search for recognition of its superpower status. He recalled in his memoir of the system‟s psychological 
entropy: “Soviet defectors for many years had warned us that we had no real understanding of the narrow 
backgrounds and worldview of Kremlin leaders; how pedestrian, isolated, and self-absorbed they really 
were; how paranoid, fearful they were both of their own people and of a world they believed relentlessly 
hostile and threatening.”
308
 Reagan understood this immediately when he defected from his admiration of 
FDR‟s representation of the “people.” 
Similar to how the neorealist “balancing act” of “Nixinger diplomacy” produced a “process rather 
than a fixed policy”
309
, constraining coercive American rhetoric and action within the dialogue of Soviet-
American relations, the militaristic basis of Reaganism shaped Reagan‟s rhetoric; however, in the 
television age, Reagan‟s image-managers were cautious to prevent associating Reagan with the image of 
militarism. Within the inaugural interpretation of The Reagan Revolution (1981), Rowland Evans & 
Robert Novak argued that Reagan was the “mirror image” of Richard Nixon:  
While Nixon spoke in the contentious rhetoric of  
hyperbole, his policies as president were moderate  
if not downright liberal, careful not to disturb the  
national political consensus dating back to Franklin  
Roosevelt. In contrast, Reagan spoke in moderate  
language while pursuing policies whose only intent 




Reagan believed that Nixon‟s détente process “was born not out of reality but one of political pathology 
at home: defeatism, pessimism and appeasement.”
311
 The Soviet‟s rearmament program during the 
détente process of the 1970s – while hyperbolically exaggerated within Reagan‟s rhetoric - confirmed 
Reagan‟s belief that the Soviets could not be trusted. Nixon‟s neorealist diplomacy from a “position of 
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strength” rested upon Reagan‟s technological leverage during the 1980s of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative. In House of War: The Pentagon and the Disastrous Rise of American Power (2006), professor 
James Carroll determined that Jimmy Carter‟s failure to circumvent the conservative hawks‟ Cold War 
orthodoxy was the impetus for Reagan‟s 1980s: “It was Jimmy Carter, that moralistic liberal, who had 
paved the way for equally moralistic right-wingers, who deplored the tradition of Republican realists in 
foreign affairs (Nixon and Kissinger) as much as they hated the softness of Democrats.”
312
 Carter 
questioned Cold War orthodoxy, contending that arms control was a cover for nuclear expansion without 
clearly identifying “he was instinctively trying to undo not just an institutional mindset but a mystical 
construct.”
313
 Wilentz observed, “[Tip] O‟Neill resented having the House and Senate of the United States 
likened to the Georgia state legislature, and he knew that Carter‟s misunderstanding of reality in 
Washington could paralyze the legislative process, with politically fatal consequences.”
314
 Consequently, 
Nixon‟s “honor without victory” was supplanted with Reagan‟s “honor with victory”, or what Nixon 
referred to by 1988 as “Victory without War.” Nixon‟s “era of negotiation” dialogically produced 
Reagan‟s “era of reconciliation” through Reagan‟s faithful instrumentalization of “American Nationalist 
Globalism”
315
 to synthesize America‟s conservative political culture and liberal popular culture. This 
McLuhanesque ode to empire reconciled the conservative electorate of America‟s socially homogenized 
society by providing the collective with a superior relative existential status to gravitate toward. While 
Reagan‟s ideological rhetoric of Cold War Manichaeism was perceived as the most realistic medium to 
consolidate the international status quo through containment and deterrence, American liberalism shrunk. 
Nixon instrumentalized television in the 1968 presidential election by creating a television image 
of paternalism in congruence with the socio-political context; Reagan repeated this strategy during the 
1980 presidential election, institutionalizing a McLuhan culture by constructing his television image as 
the principal medium through which to aggregate public support for his ideological agenda. Reagan did 
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this by attracting new voters, with an increase of 20 percent for the Republican Party in the 1980 
presidential election, and 35 million voters changing party allegiance from May 1980 to January 1987, 
converting a majority of moderate Democrats.
316
 Reagan reversed FDR‟s portraits of “us” and “them” 
among the younger generation by institutionalizing the Republican Party as the political party of the 
“people”, representing small government and shared values, while the Democratic Party represented the 
failure of liberal bureaucracy. 
Reagan overtly conserved the status quo through his conservative ideology and imagery while he 
covertly expanded presidential control over the media‟s ability to filter the presidential message, or 
image. Reagan‟s personification of America‟s sense of “shared values”, through “the splicing together of 
Hollywood West, cowboy hero, citizen-statesmen, and Hollywood East”
317
, enabled him to acquire the 
titles of the Great Communicator, “the great storyteller of his generation”
318
, and “the master of the 
politics of symbolism.”
319
 Professor Will Bunch deduced Reagan‟s image of the Great Communicator as 
originating from his General Electric superior, Lemuel Boulware‟s communications strategy for GE to 
circumvent union leaders by selling the company‟s workers a “new politics” meant to convert employees 
as “mass communicators” of a new constituency.
320
 Reagan romanticized the American zeitgeist to fit a 
“Hollywood version of reality”
321
 out of his perceived duty to provide symbolic leadership and defend 
American traditionalism, culminating in the rhetorical use of the term “evil empire”, introduced during a 
speech to the American Evangelical Society in early 1983
322
, which was identified by speechwriter Tony 
Dolan as a “semantic infiltration”
323
 within international political discourse. Gerald Rafshoon, Carter‟s 
media advisor, articulated in an interview during Reagan‟s second term that Carter‟s failure to escape the 
                                                 
316
 John Kenneth White, The New Politics of Old Values (Hanover and London: University Press of England, 1990), 
87. 
317
 Ibid., 121. 
318
 Pemberton, 19. 
319
 Ibid., 95, 142. 
320
 Bunch, 36-37. 
321
 Ibid., 106. 
322
 National Association of Evangelicals, March 8, 1983. 
323
 David Gergen, Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of Leadership Nixon to Clinton (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2000), 242. 
  
   
 81 
hegemony the hardliners maintained over the discourse of the nuclear arms race was due to his inability to 
understand the television age: “he got into office and began thinking that good substance alone was 
enough, that style didn‟t matter.”
324
 During the 1980 presidential election, the Reagan campaign was 
governed under the assumption of Reagan‟s chief strategist and image-manager, Michael K. Deaver, 
which he revealed at the beginning of the 1984 election year in The National Journal: “Television elects 
Presidents.”
325
 Accordingly, the Reagan presidency inaugurated the “postmodern presidency” by basing 
the formulation and enactment of legislation and policy principles strictly according to the appearance of 
the personal popularity of the president and substantive public opinion polls. 
The postmodern presidency in the television age, with the supremacy of image over substance, 
institutionalized the importance of relatability over substantive content. Reagan‟s director of 
communications, David Gergen, admitted in his 2000 memoir, “Years ago, I didn‟t realize that 
camaraderie mattered much to leadership. I now think that a leader can barely survive without it.”
326
 
Unlike Nixon‟s politicization of American television in 1968, Reagan‟s personification of orthodox 
conservative ideology was a reflection of his personal and historical identity. Reagan was inherently more 
ideological than Nixon‟s new identity of paternal realist centrism. The Reagan presidency therefore 
extended Nixon‟s inauguration of the “imperial presidency” by centralizing executive power within the 
communications apparatus of the president to effectively control the president‟s message, which was 
acknowledged by Reagan‟s image-managers as formulated and communicated solely in terms of images. 
Professor Will Bunch (2009) observed, “Reagan, and his skilled PR people such as Mike Deaver and 
David Gergen, revolutionized the presidency because they understood how words and images could 
create a story line that could change people‟s mood and then change their minds.”
327
 
The “Reagan Revolution” was acknowledged among Reagan‟s image-managers as a contrived marketing 
campaign founded upon Reagan‟s cult of personality as a means to implement the ideological agenda of 
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Reaganism, comprised of deregulation and increased defense spending. In Reagan and Public Discourse 
(1992), Michael Weiler and W. Barnett Pearce observed that the political hegemony of Reaganism was 
premised upon rhetorically forging exclusion, disempowerment, and constraining public discourse within 
the “structures congenial to its own agenda”, conflating the relation between assertion and evidence in 
public debate.
328
 This disjuncture proved to be imbibed in the ideological formulation and governance of 
Reaganism: unapologetically ideological in rhetoric and image on television yet dictated by the personal 
popularity of the president and substantive public opinion. Within Wilentz‟ conception of the “age of 
Reagan”, this strategy for balancing constituencies was later identified as “triangulation” under the 
Clinton presidency. 
 Professor William E. Pemberton (1998) intimated Wilentz‟s identification of the “age of Reagan” 
in his observation that Reagan “reiterated the central core of American mythology” insofar as “what he 
said struck people as right because it was based on beliefs handed down through the generations as simple 
truths”, enabling him to mount the “most effective public relations operation in history.”
329
 The Reagan 
administration extended Reagan‟s initial strategic triumvirate, comprised of Michael K. Deaver, a public 
relations architect responsible for the management of Reagan‟s television image, Edwin Meese, 
responsible for daily campaign duties and later appointed Attorney General during the second term; and 
William Casey, a Cold Warrior at heart imbibed in his days with the Office of Strategic Services, the 
predecessor to the CIA, was responsible for semblance of administrative order and later convinced 
Reagan to appoint him as the Director of the CIA. The muse for Reagan‟s ideological strategy was Dr. 
Richard Wirthlin, a pollster responsible for long-range strategy during the campaign and consulted 
regularly throughout the Reagan presidency. 
Following his election, Reagan‟s image-managers implemented Nixon‟s form of news 
management by forming a communications apparatus consisting of image-managers who constructed 
Reagan‟s presidential image with an eye toward the television screen as a basis of governance. As John 
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Kenneth White observed in his analysis of The New Politics of Old Values (1990), “Reagan‟s selling of 
traditional American values had two objectives: winning election to the presidency, and establishing a 
framework for governing thereafter.”
330
 The Reagan presidency co-opted the residual “adversary culture” 
between the presidency and the press corps caused by the Watergate story and the Vietnam War by 
implementing a culture of “clique journalism.” This was comprised of partisan reporters recruited through 
the administration‟s ability to sell the presidential image to the media through the proliferation of positive 
news and the regulation of negative news. Mark Hertsgaard asserted in On Bended Knee: The Press and 
the Reagan Presidency (1988): “Long after Ronald Reagan has left the White House, the model of news 
management introduced during his tenure will remain behind, shaping press coverage and therefore public 
perception.”
331
 Hertsgaard claimed Reagan‟s political hegemony over the press lured the American 
electorate to the right as “the television era equivalent of the Pied Piper of Hamelin; he played a tune so 
gay and skipped ahead so cheerily that others could not help but trust and follow him.”
332
 The 
historiography on Reaganism during the Bush II presidency inferred a McLuhan culture as the source for 
the visible disjuncture between action and rhetoric, sight and sound, images and issues, assertion and 
evidence, during the 1980s and since; however, the concept of a McLuhan culture providing the principal 
medium of the Reagan Revolution has not yet been illustrated within the historical dialogue of 
Reaganism. 
In his farewell address Reagan expressed his confidence that it was the content of his message 
rather than his “style” that resonated among the public. However, Reagan‟s director of communications 
during the first term, David Gergen, contested in his 2000 memoir that, although Reagan was more than 
his image, “Style does count.”
333
 In fact, all of Reagan‟s image-managers, or public relations artists, knew 
“style” counted more than content in creating the outside cover for the inside story. While the story of 
Reaganism is central to the narrative of modern American conservatism, it was told in Nixonland. 
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3.1 REAGAN’S PUBLIC RELATIONS APPARATUS 
 
 New York Times columnist Elizabeth Drew‟s Portrait of an Election: The 1980 Presidential 
Campaign (1981) was dialogically produced from Kevin Phillip‟s “portrait” of the emerging Republican 
majority. Drew identified that “the great waves of discontent have been moving in Reagan‟s direction”
334
, 
and while Carter is “constantly blurring the picture”
335
, Reagan understood the zeitgeist: “His audience is 
the television camera.”
336
 Drew asserted that Reagan‟s famous popular line during the second debate in 
reaction to Carter‟s identification of Reagan‟s contradictions, “There you go again”, was a “theatrical 
coup” within American political theatre.
337
 Drew intimated the McLuhan culture of modern American 
political discourse during the 1980 presidential election by continuously identifying Reagan‟s anecdotes 
and imagery of the younger generation as “props”
338
 in his campaign as the “genial grandfather.”
339
 While 
Reagan enlisted psychological and behavioral strategists during his California gubernatorial tenure, Drew 
identified that Carter “seems to undervalue the emotional and psychological links between people that 
make things happen, and he seems to believe that arguments speak for themselves- that if you‟ve made 
your argument, that‟s all you need to do.”
340
 Wilentz observed, “Whereas Carter spoke philosophically of 
ambiguities and limits, Reagan spoke with splendid simplicity about an unbounded American future. 
Whereas Carter projected honesty, Reagan projected adventure.”
341
 Drew identified the politicization and 
the reactionary basis of governance for the Carter campaign during 1980 as the impetus for the style of 
the Reagan campaign: “This is a political fight, revolving around symbols more than substance.”
342
 Drew, 
as well as Reagan‟s pollsters, identified that it was the winning perception which provided substance to 
the debate rather than the substance of the debate itself: “Of course, the important thing in politics, when 
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it comes to determining the behavior of politicians, is not necessarily what happened but what people 
think happened- what become the accepted truisms. The truisms guide behavior.”
343
 As Drew observed, 
“Reagan‟s pollsters did not find an increase in Reagan‟s lead until two days after the debate”
344
, because 
the substance of television debates is derived from the dialogue between the candidate‟s exchanges and 
the media‟s interpretation of the event. Consistent with the network‟s projection of Reagan over Bush 
during the primaries, ABC News declared Reagan the winner of the debate, imprinting this perception on 
the post-debate consciousness. In 2009, ABC News became the principal media ally of the Obama 
presidency. 
 The institutionalization of the McLuhan culture during the 1980s is implied in the historiography 
on Reaganism by illustrating the predominance of image as the impetus for the disjuncture between action 
and rhetoric, sight and sound. The McLuhan culture of the 1980s, or the artificiality of modern reality, is 
predicated upon what Gil Troy has described as the “media realities of modern politics.”
345
 In Morning in 
America: How Ronald Reagan Invented the 1980s (2005), Troy observed the nature of the relationship 
between the administration and the media in the postmodern presidency: “Administration officials and 
reporters agreed: there was a new language to American politics, one more visual than verbal, more 
image-oriented than issue-oriented, more stylish than substantive.”
346
 Professor Will Bunch asserted that 
“news people were equal co-conspirators with the politicians in creating the political allegory around 
Reagan.”
347
 While all administrations establish a public relations apparatus to regulate the media‟s 
portrayal of the presidency, Hertsgaard asserted in On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan 
Presidency (1988), that “few, if any, administration‟s had exalted news management to as central a role in 
the theory and practice of governance as Reagan‟s did.”
348
 ABC News White House correspondent during 
the Reagan administration, Sam Donaldson, asserted in an interview with the author that Reagan‟s 
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communication apparatus understood “a simple truism about television: the eye always predominates over 
the ear when there is a fundamental clash between the two.”
349
 One of Reagan‟s image-managers, Richard 
Darman, reflected in his 1996 memoir upon his initial apprehensiveness of this new basis of “symbolic 
communication”, or “populist communication”: 
I understood the political value of this substance-free  
approach, and in some significant respects contributed  
to it. But initially, I felt that it seemed somewhat cynical, 
treating the public a bit like fools. Gradually, however,  




Darman acquiesced to Reaganism based on his recognition of how America‟s “television-centered 
democracy” was governed: “Whatever influences the perception of reality will also influence reality 
itself; therefore, the systemic management of illusion must be part of the effort to manage reality.”
351
 
David Gergen admitted in his memoir, Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of Leadership from Nixon to 
Clinton (2000), that not only were television speeches the “staple” of the Reagan presidency and the 
“legend of his leadership” but “he also governed through it.”
352
 The visible contradiction between 
Reagan‟s strong conservative image and the reality of his team of strategists “fighting for his mind” was 
identified by the assistant managing editor of the Washington Post in 1981, William Greider, as being 
based on the visual approach of Reagan‟s communications apparatus.
353
 This was identified by former 
White House journalist David S. Broder as a “six-tier communications system: radio, television, weekly 
and monthly magazines, and books.”
354
 
Hertsgaard identified that Reagan‟s communications apparatus, or “propaganda apparatus”, was 
controlled by the “Gang of Four”, consisting of Richard Darman, David Gergen, Michael Deaver, and 
James Baker III. The principal strategists for generating positive press coverage of Reagan and managing 
daily PR duties were Gergen, who contacted the networks daily to influence news stories, and Deaver, 
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who took over for Gergen when he left the administration at the end of 1983. Darman, the deputy chief of 
staff, boasted in his memoir that besides overseeing presidential speechwriting and attending most 
Cabinet and NSC meetings, he was the “last stop” for “all paperwork” to the president.
355
 As his superior, 
and suggested as a candidate for the position by Deaver
356
, White House Chief of Staff Jim Baker 
presided directly over the communications apparatus, while Deaver ignored the substantive policy matters 
of the three “pragmatists” with a tacit veto power with his eye toward Reagan‟s long-term strategy and 
Nancy‟s short-term schedule. Deaver‟s close relationship with the stereotypically private Reagan family 
originated during the Nixon presidency while Deaver worked as a public relations aide to Governor 
Reagan, and continued after 1974 with Reagan serving as the primary client of his public relations firm. 
Although Deaver was essentially an aide, as the Deputy Chief of Staff during the administration, Donald 
Regan, Reagan‟s Secretary of the Treasury from 1981 to 1985 and Chief of Staff from 1985 to 1987, 
claimed Deaver‟s title “in no way described the truly pervasive influence and power”
357
 he maintained in 
the White House “to handle scheduling and imagery.”
358
 Regan asserted, “It was Deaver‟s job to advise 
the President on image, and image was what he talked about nearly all the time.”
359
 Regan recounted in 
his memoir of how Deaver formulated public relations for television: “He saw-designed- each 
Presidential action as a one-minute or two-minute spot on the evening network news, or a picture on page 




Darman launched the legislative Strategy Group shortly after the election.
361
 Convinced that 
Reagan had to go on the offensive due to the fact that the bully pulpit had been abandoned to the 
television networks, Gergen asserted, 
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With the help of our Hundred Days Plan, we were off  
and running in those opening months. Or was it off and  
spinning, controlling, elbowing, and manipulating? It  




Reagan was the first president to be sworn in on the West side of the capital building under Darman‟s 
assumption that “symbolism was an important part of the three-month action plan”, designed to “create a 
sense of motion and change.”
363
 In his memoir, Speakes asserted, “Almost no news item, no speech, no 
trip, no photo-op whatsoever was put on the President‟s schedule during 1981 unless it contributed to the 
President‟s economic program.”
364
 Reagan‟s economic program was interpreted within the framework of 
the Reagan Revolution by depicting Reagan and Stockman as doing more than just reducing federal 
outlays, they were “changing the nature of the federal government” based on the “tactical strategy of 
maintaining public support behind them.”
 365
  By early March, only eight weeks into his presidency, 
Reagan‟s popularity was waning; this changed with his assassination attempt at the end of the month. As 
Reagan‟s director of communications, April 1981-December 31, 1983, David Gergen, observed in his 
memoir,  
The public rallied to him, as one would expect, but  
there was now a different feeling about him. To a  
great many, especially working people, he was now  





In A Different Drummer: My Thirty Years with Ronald Reagan (2001), Deaver recalled, 
 
   The remarkable acceptance of at least the first six years  
of his presidency and the astounding personal popularity  
Reagan was to enjoy began to take shape that day, I think-  
born out of his raw physical courage and the grace and  
aplomb he was to show under circumstances almost  
impossible to conceive. In his near end, to paraphrase  
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Visual representation and imagery were intrinsic to the decision-making process and the 
implementation of Reaganism. Although Reagan insisted on being presented with all the summarized 
perspectives of an issue, visual representation and imagery proved fundamental to Reagan‟s decisions for 
“policy options” and resolving ideological and personal conflicts among Reagan‟s decentralized Cabinet. 
In his 1986 memoir, The Triumph of Politics: How the Reagan Revolution Failed, former Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget (1981-1984), David A. Stockman, reflected on Caspar Weinberger‟s 
visual presentation for the president on September 9, 1981 to resolve the mounting estimated defense 
budget issue of $1.46 trillion over the next five years. Weinberger argued for an increase of the defense 
budget, maintaining that a decrease in expenditures was not an option, by presenting “an overlay of a 
Soviet tank factory on top of a map of Washington”, a chart comparing Warsaw Pact divisions with U.S. 
and NATO forces, and his penultimate illustration of a “blown-up cartoon” showing three soldiers. The 
first was a pygmy with a rifle, representing the Carter budget. The second was a “four-eyed wimp who 
looked like Woody Allen, carrying a tiny rifle”, emasculating the OMB defense budget. The third image 
was “G.I. Joe himself, 190 pounds of fighting man, all decked out in helmet and flak jacket”, representing 
the DOD budget.
368
 Weinberger‟s strategy worked but Stockman could not believe a Harvard-educated 




Reagan‟s press secretary from April 1981 to February 1986, Larry Speakes, referred to by 
Hertsgaard as the “most visible member of the Reagan propaganda apparatus”
370
, reflected in his memoir 
on the predominance of the “picture” in the television age:  
Underlying our whole theory of disseminating information  
in the White House was our knowledge that the American  
people get their news and form their judgments based largely  
on what they see on television. We knew that television had  
to have pictures to present its story. We learned very quickly 
that when we were presenting a story or trying to get our  
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viewpoint across, we had to think like a television producer… 
We knew very quickly that the rule was no pictures, no  




Most likely due to his position on the front lines, Speakes genuinely perceived the relationship between 
the Administration and the press corps as framed within Cold War Manichaeism: “For my six years as 
White House spokesman, it was Us against Them.”
372
 The basis of “interpretive reporting”, which became 
amplified by the Watergate story, was identified by Broder as originating during the socio-economic and 
military-diplomatic complexities during the 1930s and 1940s.
373
 The lessons learned by the American 
press of trust from McCarthyism during the 1950s caused an “adversary culture” during the 1960s and 
1970s that culminated in America‟s extrication from the Vietnam War.
374
  Broder observed, following the 
Watergate story the “rapidly growing army of television reporters and technicians has inflated the size 
and, in turn, has brought with it an expansion in the ranks of government press agents.”
375
 
During the Nixon presidency, Nixon broke from executive tradition by only holding a press 
conference on average every seven weeks, compared to the previous average since Eisenhower of two 
press conferences every month. Similarly, the media criticized the Reagan administration for its relatively 
small number of press conferences, conducting only three press conferences in his first eight months in 
office, the fewest in that period of the postwar presidency, even compared to Nixon‟s seven during that 
period. Speakes asserted that the “theatre” of press conferences “no longer serve the presidency or the 
press”
376
 because now “reporters come to create news, not to cover it.”
377
 Although Lyn Nofziger agreed 
that Reagan should have held more press conferences, in his memoir he claimed this was because 
following Watergate the aim of “too many reporters” was not to cover a story but rather to get on 
television: “They do not want to cover the news or write the news; they want to be part of the news.”
378
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Consequently, Reagan held only 30 press conferences during his first term, compared to almost double 
that number by Carter, and reporters were required to raise their hands, sit down rather than traditionally 
stand, and address the President only when called upon. 
The “visibility/accessibility paradox”
379
 that pervaded the Reagan presidency culminated in the 
contradictions of both permitting the press unprecedented access to the White House but reducing the 
direct access to the President,
380
 and Reagan‟s assassination attempt, visibly reinforcing his image of 
strength while providing justification for “further isolating President Reagan physically from the 
press.”
381
 Based on his initial background as a damage-control officer in the U.S. Navy, Gergen 
articulated this paradox within a military metaphor of sacrificing lower lieutenants and protecting the 
commander and chief from the front line fire of bad news.
382
 Barilleaux argued that this underlying 
paradox of the Reagan presidency could only be overcome through civic education; essentially, Reagan‟s 
manufactured image could only be dissuaded by informing the public of the contradictions of Reagan‟s 
public image. 
Donald Regan asserted in his memoir that this paradox originated from the fact that the Reagan 
presidency was the most open government in history but was premised upon “secret arrangements.”
383
 
Broder echoed this sentiment in lamenting American journalism‟s “main function of serving the broad 
public” in his 1987 memoir, Behind the Front Page: A Candid Look at How the News is Made: “In recent 
years our reporting of government and national politics has narrowed to the coverage of insiders, by the 
insiders, and for the insiders.”
384
 Since the Reagan presidency had to stimulate a positive public effect in 
the media, Regan contended that, while the administration was confrontational with the press, 
paradoxically, “the press, not the people, became the President‟s primary constituency.”
385
 If Reagan 
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could sell it to them, he could trust to have them sell it to the people; the quintessential example of where 
your enemy becomes your friend through a mutual interest: television and cultural fame. 
The Reagan administration controlled the American press corps on the basis of what Reagan‟s 
early Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr. referred to as “intangible power”, which was premised upon 
the proliferation of positive news and the regulation of negative news. Haig asserted in his memoir that 
the press provided “a powerful check upon the government, but the government has no tangible power 
over it.”
386
 The Reagan administration, however, exercised “intangible power” over the media and his 
own Cabinet by opening the doors to the White House and giving direct access to reporters, controlling 
the medium of information “in a way hitherto unknown in Washington.”
387
 Donald Regan asserted that 
the triumvirate “decided to control what it could not prevent, and in an action filled with meaning for the 
future, instituted a policy of leaking information to journalists on a systemic basis.”
388
 Since the 1960s, 
Haig confirmed, “Leaks constituted policy.”
389
 Haig recounted his initial “naïve” perception of the media 
and its ability to access sensitive memorandums that he had personally delivered to Reagan‟s Chief of 
Staff Edwin Meese: “At first, I did not realize that the Times and the Post and the networks and news 
magazines had let themselves be converted into White House bulletin boards.”
390
 Larry Speakes admitted, 
“our starting point was always the Washington Post”
391
, with the Post‟s White House team consisting of 
David Hoffman and veteran Lou Cannon, whose main sources were Bill Clark and Edwin Meese. Cannon 
later wrote what is considered within cultural and academic commentary as the quintessential biography 
of Ronald Reagan in 1998. 
The administration regulated the negative press of reporters, who they perceived to be attempting 
to steal the spotlight from Reagan, by planting friendly reporters, which Speakes pleaded mea culpa, or 
most commonly through the establishment of a patronage system among the press corps as a form of 
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status. This was identified by Broder in 1987 as “clique journalism”: “It is a form of journalistic 
corruption to which the current crop of Washington reporters- I include myself- is particularly 
susceptible.”
392
 The consciousness and public image of American journalism, which emerged from 
Watergate as the champion of America‟s national interests, were reversed by the end of the Reagan 
presidency. Broder observed, “Journalists have been made painfully conscious of the polls showing that 
our business suffers from its own credibility gap, that even as we give each other awards for excellence, 
there is substantial distrust from those we serve.”
393
 Speakes illustrated this arbitrary administrative policy 
in his memoir by boastfully recounting how he put NBC‟s Chris Matthews “out of business” for 
questioning the semantic complexities of his visibly disingenuous response: “You were unaware of any 




The Reagan presidency also structured a form of status among the press corps by glamorizing 
social engagements; due to the expansion of the press corps, the White House had to extend the annual 
Christmas party, the social engagement of the year, to two nights.
395
 As part of the same technique, the 
criticism from the press corps of Reagan‟s lack of press conferences was only counteracted during the 
1984 election year when Baker and Deaver finally acquiesced to Speakes‟ suggestion to meet with 
selective reporters over cocktails, among them Lou Cannon and David Broder, off the record.
396
 
While the Reagan presidency reconciled the “adversary culture” with the press corps through 
creating a culture of “clique journalism”, the communications apparatus was also premised upon 
infiltration. David Gergen represents a direct example of how the public relations approach and public 
relations goals of the Reagan administration, which originated during the Nixon presidency, extended into 
the media during the 1980s. Speakes asserted: “During Reagan‟s first term we devoted an inordinate 
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amount of time to the weekly news magazine, Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report.”
397
 The 
Reagan administration granted unprecedented access to selective magazines based on the anonymity of 
aides and members of the Cabinet, but “there was a feeling of ego, that you were writing history.”
398
 
Speakes illustrated the competition of egos within the Reagan administration by recounting his 
competition with the White House director of communications, David Gergen, until he officially left the 
administration on December 31, 1983 to become the editor of U.S. News & World Report.
399
 Hertsgaard 
claimed the underlying impetus for factionalism was premised upon the polarizing lessons learned from 
the Nixon presidency of whether to assert a conciliatory or confrontational stance with the press.
400
 In 
contrast to Reagan speechwriter Peggy Noonan‟s defection, from a CBS television journalist to a partisan 
Republican, Gergen infiltrated journalism as a partisan Republican. 
After the 1972 election, Gergen was promoted to chief of the White House research and writing 
team for his innovative work of scripting the Republican National Convention with an entertaining visual 
for television. Although he remained loyal during Watergate, he remained constantly criticized for 
“speaking too freely” with journalists.
401
 In an interview with Hertsgaard after leaving the administration, 
Gergen asserted that the basic goal of the administration‟s approach to the news media was “to correct the 
imbalance of power with the press so that the White House will once again achieve a „margin of 
safety‟.”
402
 During the interview, Gergen claimed the main limitation of the Carter administration was 
that it only had press secretary Pat Caddell to “philosophize about the nature of the administration.”
403
 
With this realization, the Reagan administration and its public relations philosophers were given an 
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3.2 REAGAN’S PUBLIC IMAGE 
 
Since the “Reagan narrative was an artificial creation posing as a natural phenomenon,”
404
 in the 
words of Pemberton, the natural, or revolutionary transition to this artificial reality was facilitated by an 
actor portraying a role near to his heart, a “citizen-politician”, who believed in his product but did not 
believe he was selling mythical constructs. During Peggy Noonan‟s first meeting with Reagan, after four 
months at the White House in 1984, she felt rejoiced to confirm that Reagan was “like a happy working-
class American boy of the thirties.”
405
 The “Reaganized America” of the 1980s - as Pemberton identified 
Reagan‟s effect on society - disseminated the Hollywood reality by creating a “modern reality”, imbibed 
in “a television age”
406
, relegating issues to images, subordinating rationalism to nationalism, and causing 
negative press, such as Patti Davis‟ tell-all, to have a negligible effect on Reaganism. After all, celebrities 




McLuhan asserted, “The fans of the cool TV medium want to see their star in role, whereas the 
movie fans want the real thing.”
408
 With Reagan, the audience got both. Reagan‟s conservative cult of 
personality was therefore created approximately when his movie persona met his anticommunist image on 
television during the 1964 Republican National Convention. Bunch observed that “from that day forward, 
Reagan was no longer a movie actor who dabbled in politics, but a politician who used to be in motion 
pictures.”
409
 When asked after his 1966 victory how he was going to conduct state government Reagan 
responded with a “revelatory” quip: “I don‟t know. I‟ve never played a governor.”
410
 Reagan articulated 
the difference between being a movie star and a politician during Johnny Carson‟s 10
th
 Anniversary of the 
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Tonight Show in October 1972 as maturing from an actor to a producer. Johnny Carson inquired whether 
Reagan missed the entertainment business and performing. Reagan responded: 
Every once and awhile when I miss it a bit you just go up  
and look up at the legislature. No, I thought I would. And  
I loved it. The life I had in show business, I thought it was 
the most exciting and wonderful life in the world. But I must  
say, this has been so exciting, so challenging, and instead of  
just talking about it, to be able to get a hold of something  
and try to do something about it- just to help write the script.  
And to succeed in something like our welfare reforms. You  
know you‟re saving the people some money and you‟re doing  
some good at the same time. 
 
This perception of politics as a form of entertainment was reiterated by Robert Gates, CIA head of Soviet 
analysis (Deputy Director for Intelligence) during the Reagan administration, in his claim that Reagan 
“was a hell of a lot better politician than actor- and uniquely combined the two arts.”
411
 Gergen claimed 
Reagan “was director, producer, and star all rolled into one- the “communicator in chief” from the 
beginning to the end of his presidency.”
412
 Similarly, while Donald Regan identified in his memoir that 
“celebrity and effectiveness are inseparable handmaidens in Washington”
413
, he conceptualized Reagan‟s 
career as Reagan achieving a level of fame in acting that enabled him to produce his own material on a 
larger stage:  
The Chief of Staff was a sort of producer, making  
certain that the star had what he needed to do his  
best; the staff was like the crew, invisible behind  
the lights, watching the performance their behind- 




For some peripheral “Reaganauts” like Richard Darman the “Hollywood reality” of Reaganism became 
too artificial: 
 
I was sick of living in an environment where people  
and issues were so often treated as if they were part of  
some fickle Hollywood world, where agents manipulated  
characters and scripts for the sole purpose of advancing  
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their star. I had learned a bit about the world of populist  
communication. But I wanted to get away from the  





In Exit with Honor: The Life and Presidency of Ronald Reagan (1998), Pemberton analyzed the 
psychological disjuncture between Reagan‟s self-identity and his public image. Pemberton concluded, 
“He was a masterly image manager, as children of alcoholics often are, a trait enhanced by his interest in 
acting and his sense of his “presence”, his effect on other people.”
416
 Pemberton implied a McLuhan 
cultural reality where “the picture always overrides what you say,”
417
 portraying Reagan as the 
representation of “the increasing dominance in the modern world of image over substance.”
418
 However, 
Reagan was more than a self-conscious actor, “more than a performer, his performance served his 
beliefs.”
419
 Reagan “understood that loneliness was a major problem for people living in modern urban, 
industrialized society and that he spoke directly to isolated individuals, enveloping them into a 
community based on a shared vision of the American past and its future.”
420
 Reagan consolidated his 
commercial spokesman role for the conservative movement by regulating his public interaction with a 
few rules that he would later provide to his White House professional speechwriters: Always avoid 
negatives, “use short sentences, do not use words of two syllables if one would do, never reach for 
eloquence at the cost of convolution, frame ideas in terms of striking images, use examples in place of 
sermons.”
421
 Haig asserted in his memoir that Reagan served primarily as the spokesman for the 
Republican Party in that Reagan had not intellectually impressed him prior to his taking office and he did 
not believe this quality was essential for the Reagan presidency.
422
 Similarly, in a private conversation 
with Gates, the architect of Reagan‟s foreign covert strategy, William Casey, complained about “the 
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President‟s lack of interest in specifics, his unwillingness to take hard decisions (especially between 
feuding cabinet members), and his rather simplistic view of the world.”
423
 
Reagan‟s strongest and most enduring public image was captured on the big screen in his 1940 
movie role as the college football player, George Gipp, “The Gipper.” Reagan‟s cultural image as the 
Gipper first entered political discourse during the 1996 gubernatorial contest in California when Reagan‟s 
recently hired public relations firm Spencer-Roberts were explicitly asked by Newsweek reporter Karl 
Fleming how they would win one for the Gipper.
424
 Reagan‟s public spokesmen asserted that their 
strategy was premised upon replacing Reagan‟s foundational cultural image of a hardline conservative 
anti-communist with a less hyperbolic style of moderation: “Our toughest job is going to be proving that 
he isn‟t a right-winger.”
425
 During the 1980 election campaign, Reagan‟s association with his onscreen 
character caused many voters to believe that Reagan attended Notre Dame. Shortly following his election, 
on May 17, 1981, Reagan consolidated this image by accepting an honorary degree at Notre Dame, the 
alma mater of his extended caricature, which he described in his diary: “Every N.D. student sees the 
Rockne film and so the greeting for Pat & me was overwhelming.”
426
 During the 1984 election year, 
Reagan “sought refuge in the role once more” by requesting the United States Olympic team and the 
American electorate to “do it for the Gipper.”
427
 Within the Reagan administration, Gergen asserted that 
the competition imposed upon the Reagan staff, similar to the policy formulation structure of Roosevelt‟s 
New Deal coalition, was premised upon a desire that “we wanted to win one for the Gipper.”
428
 Even as 




White inaugurated the historiography on the mythical origins of Reaganism in The New Politics 
of Old Values (1990) by tracing Reagan‟s movie persona of George Gipp to an inauthentic tale 
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embellished by the star football player‟s former coach, Knute Rockne. White claimed that “the myth of 
Gipp the paragon”, comprising primarily of George Gipp‟s “parting words”, was no more than “a product 
of Rockne‟s hyperactive imagination.”
430
 Although “Reagan well understood the power he held over 
audiences as the Gipper”
431
, the authenticity of his stories were negligible because he was conscious of 
the fact that it was “the moral of the stories, the values reaffirmed, that count with his listeners.”
432
 Gates 
retrospectively observed in his memoirs: “His stories were Lincolnesque and often would capture the 
point of the discussion with precision.”
433
 Gergen semantically explained that “his stories were in the 
nature of parables, their literal truth less important than the larger truths they captured.”
434
 This is why 
Reagan was able to recite a letter he claimed was sent to him but was published in Scouting Magazine in 
1969, or proclaim “Facts are stupid things.”
435
 Reagan‟s image only suffered when the viewer couldn‟t 
feel the authenticity of what he or she saw. Accordingly, amidst the Iran-Contra Affair, “Ronald Reagan, 
in the starring role as the Gipper, was a less believable character.”
436
 White argued, “Like Rooney and 
Travolta, Reagan‟s image was bruised when he acted out of character.”
437
 Gates implied in his memoir 
that Reagan simply grew out of his image of strength: 
…as the second term wore on, we would hear a  
story told over and over, often told with no point  
at all. I thought he was still on top of the issues,  
at least the major ones, but a quality I believed to  




 In Tear Down This Myth: How the Reagan Legacy Has Distorted Our Politics and Haunts Our 
Future (2009), Will Bunch provided a narrative similar to Greenberg‟s analysis of modern political 
discourse but with Ronald Reagan as the mythological foundation. Bunch asserted that Reagan‟s 
symbolic character of the “Gipper” provides the ultimate allegory for American society through Reagan‟s 
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genuine rhetorical belief in the power of individual heroism to make a difference: “Perhaps it makes 
sense, in hindsight, that Reagan was nicknamed for a role in which he asked his teammates to “win one 
for the Gipper”- and not for themselves.”
439
 Bunch illustrated the enactment of the Reagan Legacy 
Project, directed by right-wing activist Grover Norquist, three weeks after the public disclosure of 
“Monicagate” in the spring of 1997, and first identified by the media on October 23.
440
 Bunch observed, 
“The Ronald Reagan myth didn‟t die when the Gipper passed away in June 2004, it only grew stronger as 
it helped George W. Bush win reelection and then loomed over both parties in the 2008 race.”
441
 
Unfortunately for modern political discourse, as Bunch observed, “The only way to slay a myth is with 
those stubborn things- facts.”
442
 Bunch described the present media realities of modern American politics 
based on a senior Bush aide‟s identification of how journalists like Ron Suskind, the cultural derivative of 
Woodward and Bernstein, were part of the “reality-based community”: “That‟s not the way the world 
really works anymore. We‟re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while 
you‟re studying that reality- judiciously, as you will- we‟ll act again, creating other new realities, which 
you can study too, and that‟s how things will sort out. We‟re history‟s actors…and you, all of you, will be 





3.3 RESTORATION AND RECONCILIATION:  THE REAGAN REVOLUTION 
AND THE CULT OF PERSONALITY 
 
Reaganism can only constitute a revolution in terms of the effect of the personality cult of the 
presidency as the ideological personification of America‟s national interests on political discourse. 
Nixon‟s politically expedient personification on television of the older, paternal, moderately conservative 
generation in 1968 reflected his “southern strategy” of “identity politics.” By 1980, the “southern 
strategy” was generalized by what Darman identified as Reagan‟s personification of a renewed “spiritual 
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appreciation of the virtue of shared sacrifice on behalf of the precious values our nation represents.”
444
 
The identification of ideology was subordinated to the public‟s perception of Reagan‟s populist television 
image. Darman asserted in his memoir that from the beginning it was apparent to him that Reagan was 
“prepared to abandon the purists‟ version of the Reagan Revolution in order to assure a popular Reagan 
presidency.”
445
 However, the constant image of Reaganism was a “position of strength.” One of the 
principal architects of Reaganism, Robert Gates, asserted in his memoir that the Reagan Revolution was 
overtly premised upon three elements of Reagan‟s strategy of economic pressure, which the 
administration pursued independently: a military buildup, economic sanctions and limits on western trade 
to the Soviets, and a continued prevention of the transfer of technology to the Soviets.
446
  Reagan‟s 
intensification of confrontational rhetoric, and his intangible leverage over the Soviets in the abstract form 
of his Strategic Defense Initiative, came to full fruition once he realized his public campaign for 
Weinberger‟s unprecedented defense budget would not get past Congress. 
By the end of 1981, once the public campaign for his economic program was actualized, Reagan 
intensified his rhetorical war on communism. On December 13, Reagan staged a formal press conference 
in the Oval Office to inform his American audience of the struggle for freedom in Poland on behalf of the 
courageous Solidarity Movement. In a diary entry on December 21, 1981, Reagan reflected on his 
European strategy: “I took a stand that this may be the last chance in our lifetime to see a change in the 
Soviet Empire‟s colonial policy re Eastern Europe.”
447
 The next day he proclaimed: “We can‟t let this 
revolution against Communism fail without our offering a hand.”
448
 On March 10, 1982 Reagan informed 
his audience of the “unsung heroes” of the Afghan people, combating communist carpet bombing and 
biological weapons. During Reagan‟s diplomatic European tour in June he spoke in front of British 
Parliament, encouraging the members that while the West must be “cautious in forcing the pace of 
change, we must not be hesitant to declare our ultimate objectives and to take concrete actions to move 
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towards them.” Within two weeks he spoke before the UN General Assembly, informing his audience of 
the abuses and pervasiveness of Communist atrocities, and reminding them of the abuses of the détente 
process. However, by November 22, Reagan proposed a revisitation to the détente process with the “zero 
option.” 
The defeat of Reagan‟s legislation for the development of his mobile MX missile by Congress, 
285 to 176, two weeks later on December 7 appears to have provided the impetus for SDI. Elizabeth 
Drew identified the specific institutional impetus for the SDI speech in her portrait of the 1984 
presidential election: “It was to influence the [Senate Budget] committee that the President gave what 
became the “Star Wars” speech; the theory was that over the recess members of Congress would be 
importuned by their constituents to support the President.”
449
 After procuring agreement among his 
council for SDI during a February 11, 1983 defense meeting, Reagan bypassed legislative procedures and 
requested SDI to be included in his next speech, without advanced notification of the Pentagon. While the 
historiography contends that Reagan came up with the idea he saw in a 1947 war movie as an abstract 
means of leverage, Reagan‟s unsubstantiated paranoia at that point was recorded in his diary on June 28, 
1982:  “No question that Soviets have moved to a military priority in space. We must not be left 
behind.”
450
 On March 23, 1983, Reagan formally addressed his audience to inform them of communist 
subversion in Central America and the Caribbean Basin, with extremely suspicious plans in Grenada. He 
finished his formal address to the nation on defense and national security by introducing the abstract 
possibility for the technological interception of nuclear weapons. With SDI, or what came to be identified 
simply as “Star Wars”, named after the popular movie trilogy, the strategic nucleus of the Reagan 
Revolution- of life imitating art, of Reagan‟s television image and rhetoric producing substantive content 
and policy- was realized. 
 In Elizabeth Drew‟s Campaign Journal: The Political Events of 1983-1984 (1985), the media 
realities of American politics forecasted “[t]he left-right difference will be less important than the 
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 Drew‟s conversation with Carter‟s pollster, Patrick Caddell, months 
after Reagan‟s SDI speech revealed “the ever-increasing emphasis in our political system on style, verve, 
audacity; we are developing a political system in which substance means very little, he said. We don‟t 
debate anymore – we react.”
452
 Based on the unprecedented media coverage of the election and the 
anticipated fact by March 17, 1983 that “the rationales and the self-portraits will probably have more to 
do with style than with substance,”
453
 the Republican reaction to Democratic criticism as unpatriotic 
guided public discourse. Wilentz identified the rhetorical power of Cold War Manichaeism reminiscent of 
the 1968 presidential election in a 1984 Republican campaign memo: “Paint Reagan as the personification 
of all that is right with or heroized by America. Leave Mondale in a position where an attack on Reagan is 
tantamount to an attack on America‟s idealized image of itself.”
454
 Accordingly, President Reagan‟s 
reelection solidified this image in modern American political discourse. 
Professors Rowland Evans and Robert Novak identified that The Reagan Revolution (1981) was 
predicated upon ideological “change”
455
, or “radical change.”
456
  This conservative ideological agenda 
was comprised of two fundamental precepts: deregulation and military modernization. The main precept 
of the Reagan Revolution was that the United States stopped competing in the arms race and fell behind 
the Soviets, losing their “position of strength.” Reagan believed the Soviet‟s rearmament program during 
the Carter years was because he was too soft on communism, not because Carter‟s enforcement of human 
rights was provocative. The authors contended that Reagan “incorrectly” thought Nixon believed “that the 
American people were psychically and economically unable to bear the burden of outright competition 
with Moscow.” Evans and Novak asserted that the Reagan Revolution materialized because “The nation‟s 
ability to compete with Moscow, therefore, was not yet measured.”
457
 The failed assassination attempt on 
Reagan apparently dispelled the rumors of a figurehead presidency, causing Ewans and Novak to 
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determine that the “grisly events of March 30, 1981, bestow[ed] upon the former Hollywood actor a 
mythic quality that, whatever the future, he would never lose.”
458
 The assassination attempt reinforced the 
authenticity of his projected image of strength. 
In his 1996 memoir, Darman intimated that the event was merely an exercised opportunity. After 
the gunmen fired, Jerry Parr, the President‟s lead Secret Service agent, pushed Reagan to the floor of the 
presidential limo. At 2:30, the president and Parr determined inside the limo that the blood coming from 
the President‟s mouth was the result of a broken rib caused by Parr‟s shove: “That was the President‟s 
self-diagnosis as he started to walk into the hospital. Then his knees buckled as he gasped for air.”
459
 
Within ten minutes, Donald Regan‟s security detail contacted the President‟s Secret Service detail, who 
asserted that Reagan was not hit. Deaver then had his personal aide contact Secret Service, who 
confirmed the previous assessment that the problem was the President‟s chest because he was having 
difficulty breathing. By 3:00, the Secret Service “confirmed” Deaver‟s report: “The president had been 
hit. His condition was serious, but stable.”
460
 While substantiating Reagan‟s confusion in the limo, and his 
conscious attempt to appear strong in the eyes of the public before collapsing inside the hospital doors, 
Gergen recounted the event semantically different than Darman: 
For hours, we labored inside the White House under  
the illusion that the President himself had not been  
gravely wounded. Only later, did we begin to piece  
together the story of what truly happened- and realize  




In A Different Drummer (2001), Deaver recalled, 
 
   Thankfully, the agents were there to catch him and help  
him to a private room. I have always been grateful that  
the agents let Reagan walk in on his own. No one, not  
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President Reagan indirectly revealed in his diaries the fact that he observed the first polling numbers 
during his first Cabinet meeting since the shooting on Friday, April 24.
463
 By the end of the Reagan 
presidency, White reiterated the scholarly consensus that the Reagan Revolution was more than just the 
cult of personality, more than an “ephemeral” basis of personal popularity. White argued that Reaganism 
represented an ideological revolution, with Reagan reading the zeitgeist of the stagflation of the 1970s 
similar to how FDR read the zeitgeist of the Great Depression: by articulating a genuine set of values that 
were congruent with the circumstances.
464
 White argued that “the American polity is not a structure of 
government, but a contract between the government and its people whose clauses contain shared 
values.”
465
 Since Reagan “understood that voters respond to symbols and phrases that evoke commonly 
held values”
466
, he presented himself as the leading spokesman for this political strategy due to his 
“ability to conjure for a willing, and eager, audience visions of values that have roots in our collective 
subconscious: family, work, neighborhood, peace, and freedom.”
467
 
White intimated the Republican ideology of Cold War Manichaeism in his observation of the 
natural division of the politics of shared values into “one of us” and “one of them.”
468
 The irreconcilable 
nature between the Democrat Party and the Republican Party was deduced as originating from America‟s 
inaugural dialectic between Hamiltonian nationalism, comprising of liberty coupled with authority, and 
Jeffersonian democracy, liberty paired with local civic responsibility.
469
 White observed, “As time passed 
Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan appeared to be “bookend presidents”: one expanded and the other 
confined the limits of the federal government.”
470
 America‟s visible preference for a Republican 
presidency and Democratic control of Congress was indicative of how “Voters were still trying to graft 
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Hamiltonian Nationalism onto Jeffersonian Democracy.”
471
  This basis of grafting, however, is premised 
upon the perceived necessity for a conservative presidential image in the context of Cold War 
Manichaeism, with liberal democratic control of Congress to act as a check on power. The New Deal 
coalition intensified partisan politics by forcing politicians to choose between business and the people, 
delineating the contemporary connotations of the Republican Party with business and the Democratic 
Party with the people. LBJ had introduced a “new American consensus” and the “politics of consensus” 
to American society through the invocation of Jeffersonian democracy and the “common man.”
472
 
Following the Republican mandate and values imbibed in the 1980 presidential election, American 
political culture reconceptualized JFK‟s inaugural address: “the Roosevelt version of American 
federalism was itself reversed.”
473
 The Democrats lost again by the end of the decade because “Dukakis 
refused to play the role of chief warrior by arming himself with the accoutrements of Hamiltonian 
Nationalism or Jeffersonian Democracy.”
474
 
White contended that the Democratic agenda in 1987 - comprised of the “pursuit of liberal ends 
by conservative means”
475
 - represented the predominance of ideology; however, these conservative 
means were necessarily transmitted through a conservative presidential image. The necessary 
instrumentality of the cult of personality as a means to implement conservative ends reflects the 
paramount importance of Reagan‟s television image. White acknowledged Reagan‟s emulation of FDR‟s 
“bully-pulpit” to convince the Congress and American people of his agenda, but he failed to sufficiently 
recognize that the “bully-pulpit” is founded upon the image of the president; this is why Gergen perceived 
the “bully-pulpit” to be weak by 1980, because Congressional measures to restrain and limit presidential 
power reduced the efficacy of the presidential image in the television age. 
White argued that the ideological foundations- if not the political strategy- of Reaganism 
subverted Reagan‟s cult of personality: “It was no Kennedy-Nixon race for best manager, but a struggle 
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between two value systems and two different philosophies of governance.”
476
 While Reagan did 
unquestionably revolutionize the presidency by culturally solidifying the separation of the image of the 
president from the institution of the presidency, this postmodern priority for the self-identification of 
citizens with a “citizen-politician” domesticated the Nixonian strategy of triangulation in foreign policy 
within American political discourse. After Reagan, every president has to appear as a “citizen-politician” 
by projecting an image congruent with shared values. White inferred that the projection of shared values 
takes precedence over the candidate‟s political image, but a candidate‟s personification of these shared 
values is inseparable from him or herself; similar to the medium of television, a candidate must embody 
or emulate what he or she projects. Reagan‟s public image was the personification of his ideology: civic 
military nationalism. Reagan institutionalized the “New Politics of Old Values” by believing in his 
product and consequently personifying the embodiment of that product. Due to the medium of television, 
the image always outweighs the content, or substance. This is why Mondale‟s choice of Geraldine Ferraro 
“to add substance to the Mondale values strategy”
477
 was inconsequential. Reagan‟s personification of 
paternal civic pride overpowered any substantive alternative. 
While Nixon was a centrist to rationally avoid alienating the dissolving New Deal coalition and 
the shifting socio-political demographic, balancing the interests of the Sunbelt with the public‟s aversion 
to the radical form of New Right populism, Reagan fomented a conservative revolution in a different 
context, enabling him to appear unapologetically ideological in his rhetoric and action. The disjuncture 
between sight and sound is what enabled Reagan to continuously assert that the two lines, representing 
the deficit and inflation, would eventually meet. The same verisimilitude - a willing suspension of 
disbelief - that the audience applied to Reagan‟s movies was applied to his television appearances as the 
President of the United States. White acknowledged the power of television in the American discourse of 
military strength by recognizing the political effect of Reagan‟s public image, but he did not analyze the 
effect of television on the American political system. White stopped short with his insinuation of the 
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essence of Reaganism: “It is almost as if television provided the Great Communicator with the technology 
that gave coherence to his governing strategy of individual empowerment.”
478
 The necessity of this 
television image was acknowledged by Mondale following his 1984 loss with the recognition of his 
“inability to master the art of television.”
479
 Gergen asserted that Mondale‟s claim was “an exaggeration 
but not without point.”
480
 As a fundamental precept to the New Deal coalition, “The Democrats sought to 
sew more patches onto the American quilt.”
481
 By 1984, the New Deal precept was reconceptualized in 
the context of the Reagan Revolution: “Mondale had a different conception of his audience, viewing it 
more like a quilt in need of mending.”
482
  Hence, Ronald Reagan changed American political discourse 
directly through his public image. 
 In Darman‟s 1996 memoir, Who’s in Control: Polar Politics and the Sensible Center, Darman 
contended that Clinton not only appropriated Reagan‟s techniques but also “the substance of what he had 
to say.”
483
  However, at the same time, Darman observed the disposal of substance to the metaphorical 
ash heap of history with the advent of Reaganism: “I was forced to learn that excessive attention to 
substance could be seen as actively harmful. Symbolic communication, demeanor, and one-liners were 
evidently more important.”
484
 Although Reagan‟s public relations philosophers recognized the supremacy 
of style over substance and image over issues, Darman and Gergen both interpreted Clinton‟s declaration 
at the beginning of the 1996 presidential election year, that “The era of big government is over”, was 
Clinton‟s substantive appropriation of a public concern since the Kennedy era and the consolidation of a 
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Darman acknowledged that “in practice, the “Reagan Revolution” had been more a matter of 
rhetoric than reality”
486
, crediting the Reagan strategists with formulating a political agenda in congruence 
with the mainstream. Due to the fact that Reagan “understood well that pragmatic compromise was 
necessary in order to govern”
487
, Reaganism constituted a “restoration” more than a revolution because 
Reagan‟s achievements were “largely consistent with the objectives of the American mainstream.”
488
 
Darman asserted that, in spite of the fact that the actual mandate was “highly abstract”, the “Reagan team 
artfully used the concept of a “mandate”, and supported it with a well-conceived legislative strategy and a 
disciplined approach to public relations.”
489
 Although Darman acknowledged that Reagan‟s supporters 
perceived the phrase “Reagan Revolution” to be “largely sloganeering or media hype”
490
, Reagan was 
reading the American zeitgeist according to the images that the public demanded: Reagan‟s image-
managers were simply supplying Reagan‟s image with the accoutrements of public demand. 
By 1996, Darman claimed the “choice” for the American people was between governing styles, 
similar to the 1960 election: “whether, on the one hand, to tolerate a continuation of polarized politics; or, 
on the other, to return a degree of power and legitimacy to the sensible center.”
491
 Wilentz argued that 
Clinton‟s reelection vindicated what liberal Democrat Arthur Schlesinger Jr. identified following 
Truman‟s election victory as The Vital Center (1949); however, following Clinton‟s reelection, Wilentz 
asserted that Schlesinger “now wondered whether Clinton knew the difference between creative 
moderation and the convenient middle of the road –between what he called the “vital center” and the 
“dead center.”
492
 The difficulty with Darman‟s analysis of the inheritance of Reagan‟s political discourse 
and imagery is that the basis of socio-political mobilization in the United States is premised upon 
combating the reality of “identity politics” with a candidate‟s projected centrist image on television; the 
balancing act - or superimposition - of cultural images appears to explain why a candidate changes his or 
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her position depending on their audience. The postmodern presidency appears to be mired in Evans and 
Novak‟s inaugural observation that Ronald Reagan represents the mirror image of Richard Nixon. While 
Nixon first instrumentalized television during the 1968 presidential election, Reagan “wholeheartedly and 
certainly not self-consciously”
493
 institutionalized Nixon‟s McLuhan culture by implementing his 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
 
 President Nixon inaugurated the modern imperial presidency by imposing a hegemonic 
framework for news management that enabled him to polarize political discourse within Cold War 
Manichaeism. President George W. Bush inaugurated the postmodern imperial presidency within modern 
American culture by using Nixon‟s cultural image to illustrate the self-perceived providence of the 
Republican cause within the history of American exceptionalism. While the ideological purity of 
Goldwater conservatism during the 1964 presidential election required the image of moderate paternalism 
(conservatism) to symbolize change during the 1968 presidential election, the neoconservatism of the 
Bush II presidency required the image of moderate liberalism to symbolize change during the 2008 
presidential election. The Obama campaign and presidency actualized America‟s faith in itself and the 
majority‟s hope for the future through the visible personification of racial change and the rhetoric of New 
Left rationalism to expand political discourse as representative of a “new politics”, inaugurating the 
instrumentalization of the medium of the Internet. Following the election, President Obama created a 
website for the White House to keep the public informed and involved- and to consolidate the liberal 
Democratic electorate (www.whitehouse.gov). The unprecedented proliferation of the liberal Democratic 
message was also supplemented with the inaugural broadcast of political campaign commercials on MTV, 
announced on July 30 2008, as a public campaign entitled “Choose or Lose” to attract the “new 
generation” of youth voters who were also war veterans. The principal medium for the dissemination of 
Obama‟s liberal Democratic message was YouTube.com, activated on February 15, 2005. Following the 
election, the institutionalization of YouTube.com as a symbol of liberal Democratic transparency was 
injected into American political discourse on May 25, 2009 when CNN informed the American public 
during The Situation Room that America‟s enemy, the polar opposite ideology of the United States, the 
Iranian government, was blocking access to YouTube.com prior to Iran‟s national election on June 12. The 
externalized demonstration of American foreign policy‟s neorealist hegemony over international political 
discourse was illustrated in Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad‟s explicit appropriation of Obama‟s 
populist liberal democratic message (“Yes We Can”) while he blocked access to Obama‟s liberal means 
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of dissemination, YouTube.com. In terms of public visibility, President Ahmadinejad won reelection by 
appropriating the public image and means of American neorealist hegemony to visibly project an image 
congruent with the majority of Iranian society, the younger generation: two-thirds of the 39 million 
Iranian population are younger than thirty-three. 
 While the Clinton era witnessed the domestication of Nixon‟s foreign policy strategy of 
triangulation within the framework of Reagan‟s postmodern presidency, the inauguration of the 
postmodern imperial presidency during the George W. Bush era caused the internationalization of 
Nixon‟s hegemonic framework for the modern American kulturkampf. While protesters of President 
Ahmadinejad and the national Iranian election are universally vindicated as a democratic movement in the 
United States media, analogous liberal and New Left protests during the Bush II presidency and Nixon 
presidency were politicized as anti-patriotic and depicted as an enemy of the national democratic interest.  
The younger New Left generation of the late 1960s was led by various organizations of radical 
protesters, primarily the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (MOBE), led by 
student radicals Tom Hayden and Rennie Davis of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS); and the 
Yippies, led by Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin, organized as a drug-induced Festival of Life to 
“dramatize a more fundamental internal conflict: the confrontation of a liberated, authentic culture with 
the phony, straitlaced, inhibited, greedy one that had brought on the war.”
494
 The New Left‟s multi-
faceted “acts of guerilla theater,”
495
 as Schulman observed was exhibited during the 1968 Democratic 
National Convention, represents the primary basis of progressing modern American political discourse 
due to the cultural identification of partisan viewpoints within the theatre of American political discourse 
rather than the substance of the “other” viewpoint. Since the final encroachment of entertainment on 
American political discourse during the Reagan era, the media realities in the political “age of Reagan” 
require what Elizabeth Drew identified during the 1980 presidential election as a “theatrical coup” to 
effect public discourse; however, that is not to say that “acts of guerilla theatre” are owned solely by 
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contemporary New Left radicals and rationalists. At the end of the George W. Bush era, Wilentz 
documented the Republican Party‟s intervention during the recount of the disputed ballots in Florida at 
the beginning of the era, comprising a group of fifty congressional Washington staffers financed by 
Senator Trent Lott and House majority whip Tom Delay with plane tickets and expense funds to stage a 
public protest to prevent the recount, assaulting members of the canvass board and blocking Democratic 
Party chairman Joe Geller from entering the courthouse.
496
 
This tactic has become the principal means of dissemination for modern social movements (special 
interest groups) and television personalities to accumulate public support due to the fact that in the “age 
of Reagan” television and talk radio provide the primary mediums for perpetuating and consolidating 
political constituencies.  
The interjection of New Left rationalism into American political discourse by the end of the 
George W. Bush era will be illustrated by documenting the increasing popularity of New Left 
constructivist comedians Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert during the Bush II presidency as the primary 
cultural source for the younger generation‟s news coverage due to the decreasing trust in network news 
coverage. The increased influence of New Left constructivism on public discourse will be illustrated 
within the first decade of the New American Century by providing a dialogue for the interpenetration of 
the political institutions of conservative political media, such as CNN and Fox News, liberal political 
media, such as MSNBC, and New Left constructivist media, such as Comedy Central‟s The Daily Show 
with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report. The interpenetration of opposites - between conservative 
political culture and liberal popular culture - was reflected in the theatrical interactions between liberal 
and conservative commentators and pundits during the Bush II presidency. New Left comedians 
culturally infiltrated public discourse during the Bush II presidency by identifying the media realities and 
nature of modern American culture, with Stephen Colbert assuming the role Bob Hope performed during 
the Nixon presidency in the early stages of the Obama presidency as the televised host of the USO Tour. 
                                                 
496
 Wilentz, 424. 
  
   
 114 
While Jon Stewart is a New Left constructivist commentator of the theatre of American political 
and popular culture, Stephen Colbert ironically emulates a Republican commentator in the American 
political theatre: “Colbert embodies the kind of bad reasoning that Stewart merely exposes.”
497
 The 
dramatic increase in influence of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart in liberal popular culture was reflected 
in Pew research polls in 2004, which indicated that 21 percent of 18-29 olds identified The Daily Show 
and Saturday Night Live as their predominant source for presidential campaign news (an increase from 9 
percent in 2000), while the same polls indicated that respondents were less likely to get their news from 
network news (a decrease from 39 percent in 2000 to 23 percent in 2004).
498
 Following Colbert‟s cult 
popularity on The Daily Show, The Colbert Report debuted on Comedy Central on October 17, 2005. 
Colbert introduced the term “truthiness” into American popular culture to prescribe a cultural 
identification for the nature of Nixonland: a disingenuous statement of reality- and therefore 
reconstruction of reality- by eclipsing the truth with half-truths, which do not semantically represent false 
truths. The visible and tangible penetration by liberal popular culture into conservative political discourse 
was exemplified by New Left comedian Stephen Colbert‟s 2008 presidential campaign. 
 While the cultural formation of CNN as an institution of conservative political culture was 
imbibed in the formation of the conservative apotheosis during the 1980s, Jon Stewart‟s cultural 
personification of New Left rationalism, or liberal constructivism, was imbibed in opposition to the 
creation of Fox News by former Nixon image-manager and political advisor to Reagan and Bush, Roger 
Ailes, during liberal conservatism‟s era of globalization. Similar to the increased cult popularity of talk 
radio host Rush Limbaugh during the 1990s, the “underdogs”, Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert increased 
in cult popularity during the neoconservative radicalization of the conservative apotheosis. Just as the 
liberal Democratic Party was ostracized from political discourse due to the domestic imposition of New 
Left rationalism during the 1960s, the neoconservative Republican Party was ostracized from political 
discourse for the international imposition of American neoconservatism. Gitlin‟s observation of the 
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orienting framework for American political discourse (liberal rhetoric vs. conservative action) was 
observed during the Bush II presidency in that during Bush‟s reelection campaign of 2004, premised upon 
conservative action committee attack ads, Stewart and Colbert shared the Peabody Award for journalism 
for The Daily Show‟s coverage, entitled Indecision 2004. CNN won the Peabody Award for their network 
coverage of the 2008 American presidential election in which Senator Obama‟s liberal Democratic New 
Left rhetoric deflected the conservative action committees‟ hegemony over American political discourse. 
The centrality of the issues of a credibility gap and morality gap within the inaugural 
neoconservative era of the New American Century has visibly reinvigorated the foundational political 
culture and discourse of the 1960s.  By 2004, the American presidential election drew explicit parallels 
between the political culture and discourse of the Vietnam War through Senator John Kerry‟s 
synthesizing personification of both anti-patriotism and the failure of public dissent. The Bush campaign 
delegitimized Kerry with attack ads to counteract any positive image he managed to present to the public. 
The liberal Democratic leverage of Kerry‟s military service was deflected by diminishing his Purple 
Heart. The Republican convention handed out bandaids with tiny purple hearts painted in the center for 
men to wear on their cheeks. The standard script wasn‟t hard to remember: “I woke up this morning and 
shaved. And I nicked myself a little. So I drew up a certificate and I awarded myself this Purple Heart cuz 
of what I went through.” On top of that, the Republican Party handed out flip-flops for supporters to hold 
up (on camera) during the convention to visualize Senator Kerry‟s political expediency and presumed 
indecisiveness. Elizabeth Drew identified the origins for this “flip-flopper” strategy by the Carter 
campaign against Reagan in her portrait of the 1980 presidential election, identifying a revealing 




Stewart appeared on CNN‟s Crossfire with Democrat Paul Begala and Republican Tucker 
Carlson on October 15, 2004, rejecting the framework of the “culture wars” by asserting that the hosts 
were “partisan hacks” of a “bad show”, who were “hurting America” because they were part of 
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politicians‟ strategy. Tucker Carlson attempted to compare the sophistication of questions between his 
show and The Daily Show, which Stewart deflected by pointing out the absurdity of comparing the 
integrity and contribution to the public discourse of Crossfire to a comedy show. Stewart acknowledged 
that “this is theatre”, identifying Tucker‟s television image wearing a bowtie as an example of the show‟s 
artificial dishonesty and failure in contributing to public discourse. When asked by Begala which 
candidate provided Stewart with more material, Stewart corrected him, “We look at the absurdity of the 
system, which provides us with the most of our material. And that is provided by the theatre of it all, 
which, by the way, thank you both.” By the end of the interview Stewart attempted to reiterate his point 
by identifying where the viewer was escorted following the debate, “Spin Alley”: “Don‟t you think that 
people watching from home that that‟s kind of a drag. That you‟re literally walking to a place called 
deception lane. Don‟t you see that that‟s what I‟m trying to talk to you about.” Stewart concluded by 
observing the psyche of the postwar conservative generation: “What I believe is that they‟re not making 
honest arguments. In their minds, the ends justify the means.” Gerald J. Erion observed that the 
cancellation of CNN‟s Crossfire following the election was identified by CNN President Jonathan Klein 
in the January 6, 2005 edition of the Washington Post as being directly attributable to Stewart‟s 
grievance: “I think [Stewart] made a good point about the noise level of these types of shows, which does 
nothing to illuminate the issues of the day.”
500
 
Stewart defended his rational basis of argumentation during the Crossfire debate while he 
appeared on CNN‟s Larry King Live on December 8, 2004 to promote the release of his attempted 
“counter-intuitive polemic” by The Daily Show entitled America: A Study of Democracy Inaction. In 
response to King‟s question of whether Stewart‟s sense of celebrity provoked his outburst, Stewart 
sarcastically responded, “I think the issues that finally were brought up finally started a discussion in the 
media if I‟m too big for my britches.” Stewart asserted that the culture wars are “real” but the 
politicization of cultural issues is “for show.” Stewart identified Bush‟s historicizing of Kerry‟s image 
within the socio-political dialectic of the 1960s: “I really think if Kerry had just focused more he could 
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have defeated Nixon and had our troops out of Vietnam by „74.” During the interview, Stewart observed 
the constraints of public discourse within the reality of the postmodern presidency: 
I think that ultimately there is an authenticity problem  
that George Bush probably has conquered. There is a  
strange thing in our electoral process where candidates  
when they run for office decide that they have to be  
regular dudes. That they have to be us. There‟s this sort  
of general “I‟m just like you, I‟m a regular Joe.” Really?  
You watch ten hours of TV a day? Cuz‟ I would think that  
you would want to work. I don‟t understand why they  
don‟t come out and say “I‟m bettter than you, that‟s why  
I want to be president.” Cuz‟ if you‟re just like me than I  
why am I voting for you? I should be president. It‟s this  
weird sense of “I‟m gonna put on a red and black check 
jacket and go down to a factory and have a coffee and a  
donut with a joe and show him that I‟m an idiot.” There  
was an attempt on his part to dumb himself down which  
was disingenuous it seemed. Other than that he did get five  
million more votes than Gore got. I think Bush just beat him. 
 
Prior to the 2006 midterm-elections in which the Democratic Party reclaimed majorities in the 
House and Senate, the Bush II administration had Stephen Colbert deliver the central monologue during 
the White House Correspondents Dinner (Roast). Colbert, in character, acknowledged his privilege to 
celebrate the Bush II presidency based on the fact that he was the same as President Bush: 
We‟re not so different, he and I. We get it. Guys like us  
we‟re not some brainiacs on the nerd patrol. We‟re not  
members of the factinista. We go straight from the gut.  
Right sir? That‟s where the truth lies. Right down here,  
in the gut. Did you know that you have more nerve endings  
in your gut than you have in your head? Now I know some  
of you are gonna say, “I did look it up and that‟s not true.”  
That‟s cuz‟ you looked it up in a book. Next time look it up 
in your gut. I did. My gut tells me that‟s how our nervous  
system works. Every night on my show, The Colbert Report,  
I speak straight from the gut. I give people the truth, unfiltered  
by rational argument. I call it the “No Fact Zone.” Fox News  
I want a copyright on that term. I‟m a simple man with a simple  
mind. I hold a simple set of beliefs that I live by. Number One:  
I believe in America. I believe it exists.  
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I know there are some polls out there that say that  
this man has a thirty-two percent approval rating.  
But guys like us don‟t pay attention to the polls.  
We know that polls are just a collection of statistics  
which reflect what people are thinking in reality.  
And reality has a well-known liberal bias. 
 
Colbert also identified his support for President Bush‟s encapsulation of a “citizen-politician” based on 
his identification as a “good joe”:  
I stand by this man. I stand by this man because he  
stands for things. Not only for things, he stands on  
things. Things like aircraft carriers, and rubble, and  
recently flooded city-squares. And that sends a strong  
message. That no matter whatever happens to America 
she will rebound with the most powerfully staged photo- 
ops in the world. 
 
Colbert emphasized President Bush‟s ideological agenda through the administration‟s primary cultural 
medium of Fox News: “Events can change, this man‟s beliefs never will. And excited as I am to be here 
with the president, I am appalled to be surrounded by the liberal media which is destroying America, with 
the exception of Fox News. Fox News gives you both sides of each story. The President‟s side, and the 
Vice-President‟s side. But the rest of you what are you thinking?” 
The partisan basis of American political theatre was illustrated by Colbert in relation to the 
media‟s enhancement of the American celebration. Colbert asserted that the press should stop revealing 
“depressing” news: “Write that novel that you‟ve been kicking around in your head. You know, the one 
about the intrepid Washington reporter with the courage to stand up against the administration. You 
know, fiction.” When asked by MSNBC anchor Tim Russert what Colbert meant by the comment, 
Colbert responded,  
I just have so much respect for the way the Press  
supported the goals of the Administration for the  
first four years. And I was just so distressed that  
at any point they started standing up to the Admin- 
istration and asking questions. I just couldn‟t  
understand why they couldn‟t go back to the good  
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Colbert appeared on MSNBC‟s Meet the Press during the Fall of 2007 to promote his book, I am America 
(And So Can You), and publicly announce that he was running based on generalities: “I think our country 
is facing unprecedented challenges in the future. And I think that the junctures that we face are both 
critical and unforeseen, and the real challenge is how we will respond to these junctures, be they 
unprecedented or unforeseen, or God help us, critical.” Colbert acknowledged the fact that people were 
questioning if his campaign was “real” but he dissuaded the belief that it was a “dream”, informing the 
viewer, “You‟re not gonna wake up from this.” Russert asked whether “authenticity” was important to 
him. Colbert responded, “You gotta convey to them that you mean what you say, and that you have put 
some thought into what you do.”  
At the beginning of the interview, Russert attempted to emphasize the media realities behind 
Colbert‟s public image by inquiring about the pronouncement of Colbert‟s surname - similar to Fox News 
Bill O‟Reilly‟s tactic to reveal Colbert‟s inauthentic French pronouncement of his surname. Colbert 
claimed he was running only in the State of South Carolina to bring the focus back onto South Carolina 
and away from Florida, Ohio, and New Hampshire. Russert then failed to demonstrate Colbert‟s lack of 
knowledge of his home state during his common knowledge quiz. Russert referred his audience‟s 
attention to Colbert‟s past pictures as a bearded, long-haired counterculture persona, described by friend 
Chip Hill in Esquire magazine as having once communicated his desire to study mass-psychology and 
start a cult. Colbert responded, “I did want to be a cult leader but I find that being a TV pundit is much 
more powerful and you can be less reliable.” Colbert asserted that he would like to lose twice: once as a 
Republican, and once as a Democrat. Russert then informed his audience of Colbert‟s fondness of 
Richard Nixon, which Colbert asserted was because “Nixon was the first president I was conscious of.” 
The centrality of the historicized issue of Vietnam in the discourse of the 2004 Presidential 
election visibly structured the rhetoric and imagery of the 2008 presidential election. While Richard 
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Nixon co-opted the Civil Rights Movement
502
, Barack Obama fomented a cult of personality populist 
movement which symbolized the closure of the Civil Rights Movement. Although the generational 
political discourse of the 1960s was sufficient to consolidate the Republican Party‟s 50 million voter base, 
Obama reinvigorated liberal populism through his cult of personality to interject New Left rationalism 
into political discourse. American liberal popular culture subordinated conservative political culture by 
relegating nationalism to rationalism, despite the Republican attempt to instrumentalize the Georgian 
border dispute through the discourse of Cold War Manicheaism. 
On the morning of August 8, CNN reported that the Russia military invaded Georgia in South 
Ossetia following the opening ceremonies of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The Russian military was 
dispatched to key geopolitical strategic areas and bombed a southeastern Georgian military base near the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the pipeline itself. Russian soldiers also eventually took up post at 
Poti, the main seaport. On August 12, McCain cast himself as a Nixonian “Rocky” by entering a rally in 
his tour bus to the “Rocky” theme song, asserting during his speech that he relished the opportunity of 
playing the role of the “underdog”, while emphatically warning Russia against attempting past ambitions. 
McCain informed his audience that Georgia was one of the first converts to Christianity, depicting the 
barbaric unilateralism of Russia and the patriotism of Georgia as the fight for western democracy: “Today 
we are all Georgians.”
503
 On the same day, the McCain campaign released a television commercial called 
“fan club”, depicting Senator Obama strictly as being an attractive (liberal) celebrity, who is “young” and 
“not ready to lead”, rather than a (conservative) politician. 
The Russian government staged a formal public withdrawal of the majority of its military forces 
fourteen days after the initial invasion; twenty days after the invasion, on August 28, the final day of the 
DNC, Russian President Vladymir Putin made a public statement to the media, asserting that the U.S. 
government conducted their foreign diplomacy during the Georgian military conflict within the context of 
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the U.S. presidential election, and that he had evidence of U.S. personnel being on the ground during 
initial fighting between Russia and Georgia, which the Pentagon claimed was patently false. 
The Obama presidency actualized America‟s faith in itself and the majority‟s hope for the future 
through the Obama Campaign‟s visible personification of change and the rhetoric of New Left rationalism 
to expand political discourse as representative of a “new politics.” By June 2009, New Left comedians 
Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert became a central fixture of American political discourse due to their cult 
popularity, with The Colbert Report‟s USO Tour televised from Iraq, June 8-11. During the first show, 
Colbert‟s television character declared the United States‟ victory in the Iraq War within the cultural 
framework of Bush‟s declaration of “Mission Accomplished” in Iraq on May 1, 2003. On the first night, 
Colbert visually converted to the American Army Corps by having Obama appear on screen to order the 
commander who Colbert was interviewing to shave Colbert‟s head. On the final night, President George 
W. Bush appeared on the screen to wish his best to the troops while thanking them and applauding their 
patience, asserting that they we‟re gonna need it because he has “had to sit through Colbert‟s stuff 
before.” 
On June 8, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart first illustrated the contrast between liberal political 
media and New Left constructivist media as well as the continued regulation of liberalism by conservative 
political culture. Stewart asserted, “Fox News uses insinuation. MSNBC uses misrepresentation. And 
CNN, desperation.” Stewart opened the show by showing his audience how Joe Scarborough of 
MSNBC‟s Morning Joe brewed by Starbucks served him up “a helping of humble pie” that morning 
“over a pair of prominently displayed Starbucks drinks” in his response to Stewart‟s parody of the show‟s 
publicly announced sponsorship by Starbucks on June 3. Joe‟s claim that the show was being sarcastic 
and ironic through “shameless transparency” provoked Stewart‟s sarcastic revelation: “Sarcasm. I get it 
now. See at the time I thought your jokey manner was just the way you were sublimating your shame for 
your discomfort in your soul for extinguishing the last smoldering embers of any of your program‟s 
journalistic bonafides.” Stewart pondered, “I wonder if Joe Scarborough‟s a real person or if he‟s playing 
a character too?” 
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While President Reagan intensified the messianic rhetoric of Cold War Manichaeism against the 
Soviet Union in order to implement his ideological agenda, President Obama has attempted to rebrand 
Cold War Manichaeism through the euphemistic restructuring of public rhetoric while subsequently 
expanding the federal communications and information infrastructure. On February 9, Fox News observed 
the Obama administration‟s conscious attempt to replace the conservative absolutist rhetoric of Cold War 
Manichaeism of the “War on Terror” with a “more hopeful message.”
504
 On May 29, CNN televised 
Obama‟s 11am press conference in which he identified the increased cyber threat of hackers for the public 
before announcing the formation of a digital infrastructure for Cyber Security. On June 22, following the 
televised accusations by the Iranian foreign minister of the American media‟s coordinated subversion of 
the Iranian government‟s communication apparatus through “cyber wars” (organized hacking and 
espionage), CNN released a public statement: 
  The accusations are completely false. CNN stands by its 
comprehensive coverage of the Iranian election and the  
protests that followed. CNN has been and will remain  
committed to continuing its efforts to bring news from  
Iran to the world in whatever way it can. The images and  
events coming in from Iran speak for themselves. CNN is 
beholden to no government in its reporting of international 
affairs. 
 
President Obama injected political discourse with a proposal for détente with Iran - dialogically 
produced from Nixon‟s détente with the Soviet Union - based on equal superpower status in his speech 
directed to the Muslim world in Cairo, Egypt on June 4, immediately prior to the region‟s national 
elections. As part of the same strategy, CNN reported “U.S. Wrestlers in Iran” on March 11 (as opposed 
to Nixon‟s ping-pong players in China in 1969). In Obama‟s détente speech, the President contrasted 
American democracy and the universal need for transparent inclusive government with the violence of 
Hammas within his vision for leading America back to being a shining beacon on a hill. 
CNN followed their panel discussion of Obama‟s speech in the early afternoon, discussing how 
“He was applauded and lauded but did Obama‟s speech reach the Muslim world?”, with three polarizing 
                                                 
504
 YouTube.com, “Obama drops the „War on Terror‟ rhetoric”, posted February 10, 2009. 
  
   
 123 
stories before revisiting the news of the day: “Obama Speaks to the World.” The first story involved a 
doctor from Tampa, Florida, identified by CNN as “selling hope for $25,000” based on medical 
procedures, “not miracles.” CNN correspondent, Drew Griffin, asked the doctor: “Aren‟t you just 
pedaling hope?” The next story was introduced by the female anchor through witty word play and the 
graphics at the bottom of the screen reading, “Bring your gun to church day”: “A Kentucky pastor wants 
you to go in peace with your piece.” The Louisville pastor, Ken Pagano, identified himself as a 
“conservative Protestant Evangelical”, asserting that a religious man does not have an obligation to be a 
pacifist based on his core belief of American history: “Without a deep-seated belief in God and firearms 
we wouldn‟t be here.” The third story involved an immediate threat to the United States along its southern 
borders. CNN reported that the violence along the Mexican border, which has “killed 60 people so far”, 
has “spilled over the border.” The female anchor intimated a state-by-state domino effect in her questions 
to the correspondent in El Paso, Mexico. CNN returned to discussion of Obama‟s speech in Cairo by 
going live to correspondent Atia Abawi in Afghanistan. Abawi asserted that Obama‟s speech did not 
demonstrate a significant effect upon Afghanistan because the majority of Muslim people did not know 
about it and will not be informed of its message until the evening news or by some other media (like most 
Americans). But Abawi asserted that there was one undeniable reality in Afghanistan, “Afghan people are 
doing what they do best: surviving.” CNN‟s message: Afghanistan is just like U.S. 
CNN has attempted to dilute Obama‟s political hegemony over the Internet by using the Internet, 
primarily the social networks of Twitter.com and Facebook.com, to attract and empower their audience. 
By reporting news based on Internet opinions in order to attract the younger generation audience, Stewart 
observed, “CNN has basically given up. They‟ve actually put the power of the news in your hands.”
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Rick Sanchez‟s broadcasts over what Stewart asserted looked like “a nanny cam”
506
 are meant to visually 
dissociate Obama‟s hegemony over direct broadcasts to the public on the Internet. 
                                                 
505




   
 124 
The Obama administration has attempted to counteract the expansive audience of the 
conservative political media of Fox News and CNN through liberal political media. On June 15, ABC 
Nightly News in conjunction with the Obama Administration publicly announced the White House was 
hosting a primetime television conversation on healthcare scheduled for June 24. The next day Fox News 
reported that the Obama Administration decided to continue the Bush II Administration‟s policy of not 
documenting visitors to the White House. The following day CNN produced a partisan debate during Lou 
Dobbs Tonight on June 17: “Obama & the Media”, featuring a conservative columnist for the Wall Street 
Journal, William McGurn, currently a Vice-President of News Corporation and serving as the 
speechwriter to the CEO for Fox television, Rupert Murdoch, after serving as chief speechwriter for 
President Bush II from 2005 to 2008; his opponent was the liberal columnist for salon.com and The New 
York Observer, Joe Conason. Dobbs opened the segment with a poll, indicating “Obama‟s Press vs. 




Stewart illustrated the liberal political media‟s demonization of Rush Limbaugh within Cold War 
Manichaeism as an “increasingly dangerous” and “un-American” voice in accordance with James 
Carville‟s and Stanley Greenberg‟s Democracy Corps polling studies from October 2008, indicating that 
Limbaugh was only viewed as 11 percent positively among respondents under 40, receiving a lower 
positive rating than the radical Rev. Jeremiah Wright from the 2008 presidential election.
508
 During 
MSNBC‟s “Psycho Talk” segment with Ed Schultz on May 12, a liberal personality, who Stewart 




Clinton Democratic strategists Paul Begala, James Carville, Stanley Greenberg, and White House 
Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel implemented this strategy of negative symbiosis following what Begala 
identified was the “tripwire” four days before Obama was sworn in when Limbaugh asserted, “I hope he 
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 Comedy Central‟s The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, June 8, 2009. 
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fails.” On January 21, Limbaugh appeared on Fox News‟ Hannity’s Headline where he clarified his radio 
comment the previous week: “If he turns out to be a Reagan, if he adds Reagan to his resume of FDR and 
Lincoln, and if he does cut some taxes, if he does not eliminate the Bush tax cuts, I would call that 
success. Than yes I would hope he succeeds if he becomes like Reagan. But if he becomes like FDR, if he 
does the New New Deal over, why would I want him to succeed?” Rahm Emanuel identified Limbaugh 
as “the voice and intellectual force behind the Republican Party” for journalist Bob Scheiffer during his 
appearance on CBS‟s Face the Nation on March 1 - evident in Limbaugh‟s role of delivering the keynote 
address during the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) on Saturday February 28, 
broadcasted on Fox News and CSPAN. 
On the Friday night, thirteen year-old-turning-fourteen on Sunday - Jonathan Krohn, a former 
child actor and recent author of Define Conservatisim - offered a rhetorical dichotomy between 
Republicans and Democrats premised upon “principle” rather than “policy” by arguing during his three 
minute speech that “Conservatism is not an ideology of feelings or romanticism as some people like to 
say, but it‟s an ideology of protecting the people and the people‟s rights.” The next night Limbaugh 
argued that Americans are created equal but are fundamentally different. Limbaugh argued that while 
Reagan‟s rhetoric of America being “a shining beacon on a hill” raised America to its position as the first 
truly global superpower, Obama was “portraying America as a soup kitchen”, fomenting class conflict 
and tearing America down. That night, on CNN‟s DL Hughley Breaks the News, Steele rejected 
Hughley‟s assertion that Limbaugh was the “de facto leader of the Republican Party” but rather “an 
entertainer” with an “incendiary” talk show compared to himself as the de facto leader of the GOP. 
During the morning of Monday March 2, Krohn appeared on Fox & Friends and CNN‟s Live Most News 
Morning where both programs identified him as the new political prodigy of the 1980‟s archetype of Alex 
P. Keaton. Later that evening Steele offered an implicit public apology to Limbaugh during an interview 
with politico.com: 
My intent was not to go after Rush. I have enormous  
respect for Rush Limbaugh. I was maybe a little bit  
inarticulate…There was no attempt on my part to  
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diminish his voice or his leadership. I went back at  
that tape and realized words that I said weren‟t what 
I was thinking. It was one of those things where I [sic] 
thinking I was saying one thing and it came out differently.  
What I was trying to say was a lot of people… want to make 




Two days later Steele appeared on Fox News‟ Hannity’s Headline, identifying the media strategy of the 
liberal Democrats by showing the entirety of the clip from January 21 as the impetus for the Democratic 
cultural campaign against the Republican Party. On March 7 and 8, Jonathan Krohn appeared on Fox 
News‟ Huckabee, rejecting Obama‟s and the liberal media‟s strategy to label Limbaugh as the de facto 
leader of the Republican Party. On March 9, a Rasmussen Reports poll was released, indicating that 68 
percent of Republicans identified that the Republican Party does not have a clear leader. During the 
Saturday night show, former conservative governor Mike Huckabee retrieved a picture of an embryonic 
birth, Alicia Lancaster of Seattle Washington, from his wallet (which he has carried for two years) to 
illustrate his point “that frozen embryos are not just blobs of tissue”: “I carry this as a reminder that when 
we start experimenting with embryonic stem cells we are really talking about destroying a life in order to 
save it.” During Huckabee‟s appearance on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart on June 19 to debate the 
issue of abortion, Stewart pointed out that artificial insemination, such as Alicia‟s, would not be possible 
without stem cell research. 
Stewart‟s critique of Fox News revealed the instrumentalization of Nixon‟s inaugural technique 
during the 1968 presidential election: a disingenuous statement of reality- and therefore reconstruction of 
reality- by eclipsing the truth with half-truths which do not semantically represent false truths. Stewart 
illustrated this tactic by showing how Fox News‟ Sean Hannity accused Obama‟s speech in Cairo of 
“giving 9/11 sympathizers a voice on the world stage” and then showing a clip of Obama‟s speech in 
which he said “I‟m aware that there are still some who question or even justify the offense of 9/11.” 
Stewart then showed the entire excerpt of the clip: “I‟m aware that there are still some who question or 
even justify the offense of 9/11. But let us be clear. Al Qaeda killed nearly 3000 victims on that day. The 
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victims were innocent men, women, and children. These are not opinions to be debated. These are facts.” 
Stewart responded, “Oh that‟s why. Cuz‟ if you play the rest of the clip you see Obama was doing the 
opposite of that.” Stewart observed, “While Sean Hannity uses moral certainty to decide and then report, 
his cohorts are less straight forward”, as he demonstrated in clips where Fox personalities identified how 
Obama‟s actions and rhetoric were “odd”, “interesting”, “fascinating”, and “curious”, from what Stewart 
asserted seemed to be out of “Roget‟s Guide to Insinuation.”
511
 
Stewart showed a clip of Fox & Friends host Gretchen Carlson complaining on June 1 about 
MTV‟s coverage during the 2009 MTV Movie Awards the previous night in which comedian Sacha 
Baron Cohen‟s new character Bruno, a gay German VJ, fell from the ceiling to reveal his uncovered 
buttocks directly in rapper Eminem‟s face at 9:50pm. The next clip showed the anchor questioning if it 
was for ratings that shows “cross over the line” and “feel like they have to go to the nth degree.” Stewart 
then demonstrated the hypocrisy of the Fox personality by showing a clip of the same Fox News show‟s 
coverage of a relay course identified as “Bikini Bowl” at 8:48 am on June 4 between host Brian Kilmy 
and members of the Lingerie Football league. During the segment, the Fox personality was tackled by two 
females in bikinis. Stewart observed, “I guess it‟s ok since it‟s a woman having a man‟s ass shoved in her 
face. The way God intended it.” Stewart next showed a clip where Carlson ran onto the course, giving 
high-fives to each woman in a bikini and declaring “I think this is about the best thing I‟ve seen on TV.” 
Stewart concluded the segment: “To borrow a phrase, I think it‟s interesting.” 
On July 20, 2009, liberal corporate media confronted New Left constructivist media when the 
liberal anchor (corporate spokesman) and managing editor for NBC’s Nightly News, Brian Williams, 
appeared on stage with New Left constructivist Jon Stewart on Comedy Central‟s The Daily Show. 
During the Back in Black segment with New Left political comedian Lewis Black, the comedian analyzed 
the cultural fronts on the healthcare reform issue, showing a clip of Peggy Noonan on MSNBC’s Morning 
Joe brewed by Starbucks on July 17 in which she historically framed the issue as a strictly liberal partisan 
                                                 
511
 Comedy Central‟s The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, June 8, 2009. 
  
   
 128 
issue: “When I was a kid growing up we never talked about healthcare. Why has America become 
obsessed with healthcare the past twenty years or so?”  
Stewart opened the interview with Williams by asking him how a network seduces a subject so 
that individuals like the latest political adulterer, Republican Mark Sandford, could come on the program 
so that its flattering to their interests. Williams responded: “You‟re watching it right now.” Stewart then 
pretended to be an attentive child with Williams to co-opt his patronizing description of the process of 
network news in terms of superficial jargon such as Williams‟ revelation that the big interviews were 
“gets.” Williams asked Stewart: “What way do you wanna go tonight, Jon?” Stewart responded that 
Williams should feel compelled to defend the integrity of his industry from “parasites” such as himself. 
Williams identified that his network does not agree to “preconditions” under the recognition that “this is 
big boy TV.” As Williams pointed to the vacant backdrop behind Stewart, he asserted, “Our news room 
has people working in it.” Stewart responded: “And when those people are done finding out where 
Michael Jackson‟s brain is what do they do?” Stewart boasted to thunderous applause: “This is big boy 
comedy.” Williams then attempted to deflect the subject by referencing the greater priority of Walter 
Cronkite‟s death the previous week. Williams asserted that Cronkite was the reporter that he strove to 
become, belittling Stewart by claiming, “It was like Carrot Top for you.” Williams motioned to Stewart 
with his palm to bring it on as Stewart once again responded with disdain: “So how does it feel to fall so 
short?” Williams acknowledged aloud: “I think that ended up about even.” 
Williams responded to Stewart‟s question concerning Cronkite‟s perception of recent network 
news by identifying that through his contact with Cronkite he was aware that Cronkite was “genuinely 
happy that nightly news protected the news but he was not particularly happy with the trend in the 
industry of the encroachment of entertainment.” Stewart extinguished the adversarial perception of their 
cultural confrontation by feeding Williams a genuine line with comedic possibilities: “So if I were Mark 
Sanford [the latest adultery scandal involving the Senator flying down to Argentina on Father‟s Day 
weekend to meet his proclaimed soulmate], who would you rather be right now? The wife or the 
girlfriend?” Williams responded with a genuine entertainer‟s line: “Oh, I don‟t know, but I‟m on a flight 
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south.” Stewart comradely slapped his hand across the desk: “Brian Williams once again. Comes into the 
ring.” What great entertainers. 
It appears the politicization of history within the visible dialectic of the “culture wars” of the 
1960s constrains modern American political discourse based on the public debate over the opposing 
perceptions of the event rather than the factual content or substantive character of the event. Nixonland: 
the nature of modern American culture based on the duality of American conservative political culture 
and liberal popular culture, which is academically premised upon the development of Nixon‟s inaugural 
politicization of television as the means of campaigning and governance during the postwar “age of 
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